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ABSTRACT
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Elshtain

This dissertation examines the relationship between

citizenship and the growth of standing national armies in
early modern Europe.

The works of Niccolo Machiavelli,

Frederick the Great, and Carl von Clausewitz are examined
in detail to account for the evolution of realist

political-military strategy in the balance-of-power state
system.

My thesis is that the state's recurring efforts to

mobilize citizenship

— construed

as armed

virtue—and its

development of ever-more violent technologies and
strategies of war rendered the balance-of-power unstable.
The opening chapter surveys the legacy of realism in

the history of international relations theory.

viii

Chapter

two surveys how the modern state system developed out
of

the declining Christian Commonwealth of medieval Europe.

Each of the three following chapters locates

a

realist

theorist within the historical context in which he wrote
and was active as a political-military reformer:

Machiavelli and the crises of the Florentine Republic;

Frederick the Great's struggle to form a Prussian Army;
and Clausewitz's effort

during the Reform Era to respond

on a revolutionary scale to the challenge of total

Napoleonic warfare.
By studying the political context in which secular

realism in early modern Europe developed
power state system,

I

a

balance-of-

show the genesis of political-

military strategies that even today prepare for war in
order to achieve international peace.

My study of

mobilized citizenship, military strategy, and the state's
preparation for war shows that the balance-of -power is
inherently unstable.

A state system that arose on the

basis of limited and pre-emptive wars can scarcely
serve as a worthy model for international relations in
the era of total war, indeed, of nuclear war.
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CHAPTER

I

INTRODUCTION: THE LEGACY OF REALISM

Considerations of a balance-of -power have long ex-

ercised

a

forceful hold upon the theory and practice of

Western international relations.
framework of statecraft

— or

Evidence of such a

at least evidence of diplo-

matic thinking about balances and imbalances of state
power

— can

be traced back to Ancient Greece.

1

It con-

tinues to play a significant role today in the search
for stable nuclear deterrence.

The two and a half centuries between the end of the

Thirty Years War in 1648 and the beginning of World War
One saw the balance-of -power emerge as a formal system of
By the end of the War of the

international relations.

Spanish Succession in 1714, the sovereign European
states were conducting their foreign policies in terms
of constant realignments and allied wars that assured no

one power could predominate.

This decentralized Euro-

pean state system gave way in 1815, after the defeat of

Napoleonic France, to a more formal, more centralized
system of concert diplomacy in which power was managed
by convention.

The high water mark of this concert

diplomacy was the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when Otto
von Bismarck, Chancellor of the Second German Reich,

1

—
2

convened a meeting of Europe's leaders to settle issues
of which powers would secure hold of the Balkans.

A

complex web of mutual treaties enmeshed all the Continental powers so that no one state or coalition of
states would be able to gain European hegemony.

A rela-

tive peace, a caesura in war between the major European

powers between 1878 and 1914, enabled these states to

pursue colonial ambitions and to build up their own

industrializing economies.

In the summer of 1914,

how-

ever, a combination of rabid nationalism and diplomatic

myopia impelled these powers to carry through in lockstep fashion the alliances and promises of military

support they had fashioned in the name of the balance-ofpower.

The war they undertook, however, bore no re-

semblance whatsoever to the ritualized warfare of limited

objectives which had characterized the classical balance.
The advent of total industrial warfare in the era of

mass nationalism induced the architects of interwar di-

plomacy to move away from traditionally anarchical international arrangements.

Interwar plans, however, for an

international regime based on collective security
through a worldwide League of Nations—proved unable to

displace the discourse on power which had informed the
prewar state system.

3

Not even the ravages of the Second World War have been
able to dislodge the realism of military power as the

key element in relations among states.

An imminent

threat of nuclear annihilation hovers above the poli-

tical-economies of mutually interdependent states.
enduring legacy

Of-

the nuclear powers.

The

power politics has been inherited by
The search for stability in the

balance of nuclear deterrence has now gone on for 38
years.

During no period of the nuclear era have the two

major powers been content to rely solely on the promise
of retaliation.

Despite the character of nuclear wea-

pons, despite the promise of a nuclear revolution, the

balance of nuclear power very much recalls the classical

balance-of -power

2
.

...

.

.

The similarity, however, is not in

terms of the formal state system, but in terms of the

politics within the state itself.
This dissertation explores the nature of the state

that had underpinned the classical-balance-of -power and

that today underpins nuclear deterrence.

My focus upon

realism in early modern Europe explores the path of citi
zenship as armed virtue and the path of warfare as it

evolved from

a

limited to a total activity.

My point is

that the preparation for warfare played a central role
in European states after the Renaissance.

Prussian mobi

4

lization under Frederick the Great was but the clearest

example of a Continent-wide phenomenon.

It was a phenom-

enon that both emerged out of and prompted further efforts by all the European states to organize their poli-

tical-economies for warfare.

The resulting instability

in the early era of the balance-of -power remains embedded

today in the state system and within the states themselves of our day.

The State of Realism

Thucydides analyzed the origins of the Peloponnesian
War in terms of Corinth allying with Sparta in order to
thwart the growing power of Athens.

In the narrative of

war, and in the many dialogues which report to us either

what orators actually said or what Thucydides believes
was called for by each situation,

3

we can discern the

origins of an intellectual tradition which sees the state
system as subject to no central authority, as the product
of each polity's interests competing against the inter-

ests of other polities, as a realm in which good will or

professions of intent are irrelevant if not misleading,
and as a realm in which war stands as an acceptable ar-

biter of political disputes.

It is a world in which

citizens, rather than appalled by recourse to violence,

5

are actually supposed to be ennobled by the
state's wil-

lingness to resort to warfare when its leaders believe
it is threatened or that vital interests are
at stake.

Because states acknowledge the propriety of warfare
as an instrument of politics, they have to be wary of

those countries professing peaceful intentions while

retaining

a

military capability.

After the Persian War,

for instance, Sparta proposes that Athens not build her

own fortifications and that existing fortifications

throughout Hellas be dismantled.

Sparta explains this

disarmament proposal in terms of denying Persia, should
it again invade Hellas, potential positions of strength.

But Sparta really fears Athenian power; it should become

neither too strong nor invulnerable to attack.
cles, leader of Athens,

Themisto-

travels to Sparta to negotiate

the proposal, but once there he delays talks until

Athens, unbeknownst to Sparta, has completed erecting the

city's fortifications.
.

.

Themistocles will not negotiate

from a position of weakness.

4

The continued growth of the Athenian thalassocracy

alarmed the Laecedemonians of Sparta and their fellow
Dorians of Corinth.

Their common fear of Athenian power

induced them to league together in support of

a

revolt

in Potidea against her tributary status in Athens' empira

.

6

This allied

intervention shattered over three decades

of Hellenic peace and initiated a quarter of
war.

a

century of

It was a war that spread from the Aegean Sea
to

Sicily.

As Thucydides wrote, it was not simply the al-

liance of Corinth and Sparta over Potidea that breached
the peace, but rather their concern about Athenian he-

gemony.

"What made war inevitable was the growth of

Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta." 5
Sparta and Corinth resorted to war in order to es-

tablish

— or

of-power.

to re-establish--a peace based on a balance-

The goal of their alliance was not imperial

gain, but a weakening of the Athenian empire.

doing the alliance adhered to

a

In so

basic element of what,

two millennia later, became the basis of European states-

manship

.

We see evidence here of realist considerations and
of a state system based upon them.

Realism is a theory

of international relations, a discourse on the management

of force in politics among states, that relies upon the

threat and use of military power to establish
of peace.

a

modicum

It sees world politics in terms of a given im-

mutable structure to which states have to orient their
policies.

It attributes to that system an objective,

unyielding character over which no unifying sovereign
reigns

.

7

Such statesmanship entails a peculiar
responsibility
for the fate of a polity: a responsibility
construed in

the realist tradition as requiring political
leaders to

accept the risks of war in the name of restraining other
states
In the centuries after Thucydides, the realist tradi-

tion repeatedly addressed the anguish, the moral anguish,
of a statesmanship whose means involve recourse to force.
St.

Augustine agonized over the legitimacy of violence in

the "civitas terrena," the city of man.

His work focused

upon the politics by which fallen man must order his
world.

Only with power can the public peace be assured.

It is a peace based upon the just uses of force and not

upon justice itself.
As we will see with Machiavelli, this moral dilemma
of realist statesmanship was made all the more vexing be-

cause of the secular conditions in which politics had to
take place.

Shorn of gods, unable to appeal to purer

forms of knowledge and the good, struggling with the vi-

cissitudes of "fortuna" in its always incomplete attempts
to secure a political space, the strategies of power ad-

vanced by realist statesmanship have been

a

central con-

cern of Western thought and practice.
That concern has become paramount in the era of nucle-

8

ar

weaponry.

There have been developed levels of arma-

ments and technologies of destruction to the point
where
the firepower available to statesmen exceeds in
dramatic

disproportion the scale of political conflict that might
lead to their deployment.

We now have the power, for the

first time in human history, to annihilate life on earth.
Yet the strategies devised for the management of that

power are rooted in the aged politics of realism.

A concern for insinuating a certain measure of restraint into realist conceptions of diplomacy has been

cogently handled by

E.

H.

Carr.

The Twenty Years' Crisis

,

written on the very eve of the Second World War, discusses
the dilemma of modern statesmanship in terms of a dia-

logue between realism and idealism.

Realism sees no

prospect in altering the world it confronts.

It places

no faith in the reconstruction of human nature; it argues

rather that external relations among men or nations provide the only opportunity for action and for effecting
change.

Idealism, by contrast, builds upon the mutabil-

ity of the world.

It sees possibilities for change over

time in the very nature of man and in the ability of man
to influence his own actions by moral suasion.

Idealism

attributes to public life an internally constructed quality, one that man may affect.

9

The debate between realism and idealism
can be

traced back to the Old Testament

,

where the Jews are

confronted after their exodus from Egypt with the
choice
of devoting themselves to that God which has chosen
them
or to become like the other peoples of the world.

Samuel

tries to convince them to choose God, but the "people

refused to listen to Samuel." 6
In Book

I

of The Republic

,

Thrasymachus cannot ac-

cede to the rules of Socratic dialogue and threatens to

disrupt the whole enterprise.

The discursive serach for

an ideal truth obscures the underlying element of power

which on Thrasymachus
justice.

1

account is the "ultima ratio"

of

This debate between a politics of power and

a

politics of epistemology can be traced through subsequent

political thought.

It courses through the tension be-

tween the city of man and the city of God.

The debate

opposes the absolutist Leviathan to the reign of perpetual peace.

It places the unsheathed sword of "raison

d'etat" against the natural law foundations of just-war
and the law of nations.

Carr undertook his study to restore an appreciation
for the element of power in international relations.

In

British free-trade doctrine, in Woodrow Wilson's idealism
about erecting through the League of Nations

a

truly in-

ternational regime that would deter conflict among states,

8

10

and in Anglo-French adherence to the
anti-bellicist

norms of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in the
face of the
Third Reich's violations of the Treaties of

Locarno,

Carr discerned a refusal by Western countries
to con-

strue power seriously as the basis of world
politics.
He argues for a realist critique of idealist
diplomatic

styles, but he does not leave power politics unchastened.
So long as power wholly dominates

international relations, and policy
exists exclusively in preparation
for war, the subordination of every
other advantage to military necessity intensifies the crisis, and
gives a forestate of the totalitarian character of war itself."7

A foreign policy based solely upon realism will exhaust
itself in limitless exertion; a foreign policy based

entirely upon idealism will obscure to both itself and
others the underlying interests that it mistakenly construes in terms of a "harmony of interests" and the a-

bility of power structures to change.
Carr argues, in short, that diplomacy and the study
of international relations cannot jettison either of

these world views;
if an orderly procedure of peaceful
change is ever to be established in
international relations, some way
must be found of basing its operation
not on power alone, but on that uneasy compromise between power and
morality which is the foundation of
all political life.

—
11

There can be little doubt, however,
that Carr advanc,:es a
highly qualified realism of means
rather than a highly
qualified idealism of ends as the foundation
for world
politics.
He argues that a true science of
international
relations was only possible when the fate of
states was
torn from the hands of a professional military
caste and

was incorporated into the full panoply of resources
that

characterize modern political-economies.

World politics

concerns itself with policy and political action in

realm of sovereign units:

a

a

world of states with dis-

crete interests, intentions, and traditions, and with

institutions and resources mobilized behind them.

The

challenge of diplomacy is to interpret political purpose
as a constitutive element that envelops itself in power

in military, economic, and moral strength

— and

that en-

gages and often conflicts with the interests of other

sovereign polities.
In reaction to the optimism and political generosity

with which the Western powers

— until

September 1939

— had

looked upon the totalitarian-fascist states, there de-

veloped in the aftermath of The Twenty Years' Crisis

a

systematic, theoretically self -conscious real ism that pro-

vided the basis of postwar foreign policy.
tive realists like George

F.

Reconstruc-

Kennan and Hans Morgenthau

sought to broaden the basis of the practical realism that

12

they thought America should adhere
to in its role as
postwar architect of the West.
They pointed to the need for the
classical realist
paradigm to appreciate the limits of
relying upon military power and national economic
interests as the guidepost for diplomacy.
in their early reassessments of
U.S.

foreign policy in the era of containment,
they

criticized the misguided crusading spirit which
shaped
cold war statesmanship.

9

They argued from within

a

realist perspective that America's exceptionalism--its

historical uniqueness, its geographical insularity, its

confidence and industrial prowess--worked against its

development of

a

cultivated, measured statesmanship.

it

is no wonder that as early critics of the Vietnam War, as

advocates of arms control

— including

unilateral measures--

and as critics of Kissingerian linkage, both Kennan and

Morgenthau voiced respect and support for the negotiating
style by which technology and power were subordinated to
the guiding hand of diplomacy.

Their internal critiques

of American diplomacy exemplify a concern for what might
be called the virtual autonomy of political leadership.

From this perspective, statesmen stand in an indefinite

relationship to their own nation-state on the one hand,
and to the international community on the other.

The

mark of successful statesmanship is to address these two

—
13

realms without ever abandoning
responsibility for the
integrity of the one by dogmatically
asserting the primacy of the other.

The world cannot be remade to conform
to

particular image.

a

state's

A curious form of idealist realism

emerges from the single-minded concern for
interests and security.

a

state's

It becomes a realism that con-

strues interests as global, that legitimates

a

worldwide

network of military bases for allied security, that
perceives straits of water as potential choking points,
that sees Soviet surrogates everywhere disturbing nations

whose social structures and governments would otherwise
be bastions of freedom, and that is apparently mandated

by the delicate balance of nuclear terror to presume

worst-case scenarios in justifying continuation of an
arms race.

To cover its flanks before entering the nego-

tiations "process," a country holds out bargaining chips
in terms of new weapons systems in order to prompt seri-

ous discussions.

Such strategies ensure, however, not

mutual restraint and agreement, but rather a dialectic
of escalating reserve force in which both sides end up

less secure than before the arms control talks were un-

dertaken.

And each party to this Armageddon waltz points

an accusing finger--and not without some justification

.

.

14

to the other as the
source of all the trouble.

When

I

began this dissertation,

I

thought that the

conventional wisdom of
reconstructed realism could show
a
way out of this cycle.
But in the course of my
research
I discovered that
the realist tradition offers
an inadequate basis for this task of
salvaging statesmanship.
The fault resides deep within
the whole tradition.
The
problem lies in the realist theory
of
the state, and in

the citizenship that populates
it.

And, contrary to the

conventional wisdom, this problematic
complex finds full
expression in the idea of a balance-of
-power

As Kenneth Waltz has pointed out,
the "balance of

power is the hoariest concept in the field
of international relations." 10

For instance, Morgenthau's formal

theory of international relations revolves around
the
claim that politics, both domestic and foreign, is

gov-

erned by the pursuit of "interest defined in terms of
power," 11 and that this has always been so: an iron law
of politics, so to speak, that does not so much commend

itself to statesmen as actually embody itself in all their
works.

It does so in an objective manner which the poli-

tical analyst

must recognize if he desires to apprehend

the logic of politics and of the international balance-of-

power

.

15

Morgenthau's view of international relations, however, emphasized the political autonomy with
which

statesmen wield their political power.
argues,

They pursue, he

"interests defined in terms of power." 12

The

autonomy of the political sphere is one of the basic
elements of Morgenthau's realism.
of political actors to marshal

a

It means the ability

country's sources of

national power: its geographic strengths, its natural
resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness,

population, national character, national morale, and its

quality of diplomacy.

Collectively, these comprise the

sources of national power which

a

statesman deploys in

the balance-of-power
Inis L. Claude has pointed out that Morgenthau habi-

tually shifts from the view of the balance-of-power as
evitable to an appeal that diplomacy voluntarily heed

in-

it.

13

Morgenthau cannot really decide whether the balance refers to a diplomatic system specific to Europe in the

eighteenth and nineteenth centuries; to a more general
phenomenon characterizing the whole history of international relations; to an analytic category referring to any

distribution of power; or to a specific condition of international equilibrium.

Indeed, Morgenthau's ambiguity

about the balance-of-power reflects the broad variety of

—
16

views throughout the whole discipline of international
relations.

There exists no agreement on whether the

balance-of-power is

a

specific system or a general con-

dition of world politics; whether it is inherently or

only fortuitously unstable; whether it refers to
dition of equilibrium or

a

a con-

condition of predominance; whe-

ther it persists in the era of nuclear superpowers; or

whether

foreign policy that ignores it is possible

a

or advisable. 14

These are not questions merely for the diplomatic

historian.

They are crucial issues in analyzing the con-

temporary search for balance and stability between (and
among) nuclear arsenals.
In the wake of the failure during the interwar

years to construct an international regime of collective
security, there developed after the Second World War a
dual system of mutual security.

The North Atlantic

Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact became the means
by which a fragile peace was maintained across Central
Europe.

The military alliances of the West and the East

relied heavily upon the nuclear bomb to oversee their
security.

But security in the nuclear age is a precari-

ous, if not chimerical, matter.

In the face of huge

arsenals deliverable within half an hour, neither the

6

.

17

European Continent nor the two superpowers could
ever
claim to be assured of their safety. 15 Indeed,
it

.s
li

a

strange reversal of the realist order of things
that the

deterrence upon which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
relied
claimed it a sort of security to remain vulnerable
to an
attack with nuclear weapons.

Only by remaining vulner-

able does a country forgo any possibility of enduring or

surviving a protracted nuclear war.

A country thus de-

clares itself unwilling (because unable) to benefit from
a

first-strike, and it reduces the mutual tension that

which would inevitably arise from preparing to do battle

with nuclear armaments.

In contrast with conventional

military strategy, then, nuclear deterrence calls for
"no-defense"

— neither

an active defense of anti-ballistic

missiles nor a passive defense of civil defense shelters.

1

A nuclear revolution, a transvaluat ion of the

traditional continuity between foreign policy and the use
of warfare, has seen to it that each side on the nuclear

scale of balance would pursue security by remaining vul-

nerable—and would only promise

to retailiate against a

first-strike
The advent of atomic and thermonuclear weaponry

ushered in an era of armaments which dwarfed all those
ever deployed in military history.

But the nuclear revo-

lution is not merely a technical phenomenon, to be meas-

—

ured in terms of new radii of destruction,
the distance
of delivery, and the speed with which
these weapons
travel.

The nuclear revolution is also a revolution
in

political-military strategy: in the way statesmen and

military leaders use their new-found capability.
Classical realism, and most dramatically, the realism embodied in the Continental balance-of -power

,

had

seen limited warfare comprise an essential component of

foreign policy.

This balance-of -power was built upon the

imminent recourse to warfare as

a

means of intervening in

the affairs of ambitious or emboldened states and as

a

means of preventing them from becoming too powerful.

In

effect, many wars of the balance-of -power were pre-emptive, much like the allied intervention of Corinth and

Sparta in the Potidean revolt sparked the Peloponnesian
War.

In 1756,

for instance, Prussia seized Saxony in the

face of a new alliance between Austria and France that

Frederick the Great feared would threaten his hold over
Silesia.

Even offensive wars, such as Prussia's seizure

of Silesia in 1740, or earlier, recurrent attempts by

Sweden to capture lands along the south coast of the

Baltic Sea, were undertaken for specific objectives
though without annihilating opposing armies, and without

warring upon homelands and civilians.

Wars, to recast

Clausewitz's famous dictum, were the continuation of

political intercourse, with the addition
of other,
though limited, means.
Gradually, the firepower of states grew,
as did the
size of their armies. War increasingly
became a matter
of national mobilization and professional
effort and

approached the total integration of
ces.

a

country's resour-

The mercenary armies of Machiavelli

1

s

Italy became

the standing citizen forces of Frederick the Great's
Prussia.

During this entire period of development, the

armies of Europe retained their classical role: to win
wars by compelling the enemy's retreat or surrender,

cutting off its supply lines, and preventing it from

besieging fortresses or walled-in cities.
the Continental balance-of -power

Napoleon and after Metternich

,

,

The armies of

particularly before

were instruments of poli-

tical policy, but that policy had limited aims.

Armies

sought neither complete destruction of the enemy nor to

engage an adversary's whole land and people in battle.

Popular and courtly outrage over the destruction wrought

upon Germany by the various Protestant and Catholic,
French, Swedish, and Imperial armies during the Thirty

Years War led the statesmen of Europe, after the Peace

oJ

Westphalia in 1648, to restrict the movements of armies.
Mercantile considerations combined with technological
shortcomings and widely shared Christian sentiments to
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shape and limit the aims of
warfare. 17
In Clausewitz's day these
constraints loosened themselves.
Standing armies were transformed
into nations
at arms, and this in turn led
to the industrialization of
combat and the total mobilization
of the

nation-state.

In this new era of total national

warfare— a warfare

Clausewitz scrutinized in On War -wartime
aims became annihilation and the unconditional surrender
of the enemy.

War approached the very limits of rational
policy.
The nuclear revolution burst those limits
asunder.
It completely transformed the nature of

military strategy.

political

The nuclear superpowers each have at

their disposal arsenals and delivery systems sufficient
to destroy whole countries in once concerted blow.

The

weaponry now available to the armed forces renders meaningless the traditional categories of victory and defeat, of achieving specific war aims: categories by which

armies had appraised their performance for millennia.
The use of nuclear weapons in the course of battle
has thus been made literally incredible.

No one could

now seriously consider using these weapons against an

adversary armed with sufficient numbers of "survivable"
weapons which it could use in retaliation against an
aggressor.

From the perspective of such

a

nuclear revo-
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lution, nuclear war-fighting is but a euphemism
for in-

ternational suicide.

The adjective "nuclear" contra-

dicts the noun "war-fighting."

Nuclear weapons, their immediate effects of blast,
heat, radiation, and fallout, and their longer term ef-

fects upon genetic structure, the food chain, the atmosphere, and the climate, have elevated modern "warfare"

into a totally new realm: a realm which exists apart from

that conventional continuum of weapons and warfare ranging from the battle axe to the strategic bomber.

The revolutionary character of this new weapon in-

duced on the part of political-military planners
tally new strategy.
of mutual deterrence.

a

to-

The weapon gave rise to the strategy
As the most astute student of the

nuclear revolution observed as early as 1946, "thus far
the chief purpose of our military establishment has been
to win wars.

avert them.

11

From no on its chief purpose must be to
^

An enormous literature has developed around the issue of mutual nuclear deterrence.

review those works here.

19

There is no need to

It suffices to say that this

dissertation constitutes an effort on my part to question
the common belief today in a nuclear revolution.
of writing about nuclear strategies, however,

I

Instead

have de-

cided to write about the tradition which deterrence is

.

alleged to have repudiated.
That repudiation takes place
on four grounds: no
first-use of nuclear weapons; no
defense against

them;

only a limited number of them
are necessary-enough to
pose a retaliatory threat to a
potential

aggressor; and

these weapons should not become an
instrument of foreign
policy, but instead should be deployed
only to pose a

retaliatory threat against the first-use of
nuclear
weapons
To one degree or another, however, recent
strategies

of nuclear deterrence have failed to

uphold these norms.

Both the Warsaw Pact and N.A.T.O. are prepared to
use
"battlefield" tactical weapons on

a

the face of conventional aggression.

first-use basis in
The Soviet Union

has taken the lead in relying upon civil defense shelters, and

— despite

treaties to the contrary

— the

United

States has re-opened the case for defensive missile systems.

Both powers have continued to arm themselves with

weapons far beyond the number needed to ensure
pling retaliatory second-strike.

crip-

a

And the U.S. has taken

the lead in incorporating the nuclear bomb into

a

conven-

tional strategy of worldwide containment, while the Soviet Union has replied with a far more modest use of

nuclear arms in its foreign policy within the Eastern
bloc and with both N.A.T.O. lands and China.

It now ap-
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pears that the temptations of
a nuclear "war-fighting"
strategy are stronger than the
arguments on behalf of a
strategic revolution.
This should come as no surprise
to students of realism.
The realist state which forms
the object of this
study and which informed the classical
balance-of -power
was built upon several propositions.
First, interna-

tional peace can only be achieved when
countries prepare
for war and show their resolve to defend
against potential aggressors.
"Si vis pacem, para bellum;" if you want
peace, prepare for war.
Second, the state has to prepare
itself constantly for the possibility of going to war;
it
has to train a standing force, organize the acquisition
of materiel, and mobilize its economy

basis.

— on

a permanent

And third, its citizens must discipline them-

selves for the hardships of military service and they

must be willing to fight on its behalf.
There is much of political life that is overlooked

by this realist theory of the state, but there is little
of that theory that eludes these three elements.

comprise the essence of the realist state.

They

They comprise

that state which Max Weber, in the weeks after the First

World War, defined as a "human community that successfully
claims for itself a monopoly of the legitimate use of
physical force within a particular territory."
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The classical balance-of -power
relied upon that un-

questioned legitimacy and enabled
statesmen to call upon
their armies without having to offer
special justifications to citizens. A professional
officer corps

and dis-

ciplined troops were literally instruments
of state policy.
Deterrence theory today has inherited a
legacy left
behind by that classical realism. The
legitimacy of
deterrence, the credibility of retaliation,
would be entirely undermined were citizens to make clear
they will
not allow themselves to be held hostage under
a nuclear
umbrella.

Peace movements today pose a challenge to

statesmen who hope to wield without restraint the threat
of retaliation. 21

War-fighting doctrines abandon even

this restraint and demand of citizens that they be pre-

pared to endure

a

protracted nuclear war, as if these

weapons were nothing but intercontinental artillery.

The State of "Peacelessness

This dissertation explores three moments in the de-

velopment of realism: those represented by Machiavelli,
Frederick the Great, and Clausewitz.
a

The second chapter,

general survey of statesmanship in Medieval Europe, sets

the stage for the emergence in late fifteenth century
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Italy of a state system that
structured itself in t,:erms
of competing republics,
principalities, and city-states.
The third chapter explores one
stage in the emergence of
modern realism: Machiavelli s development
of a secular
theory of armed civic virtue and
citizen-armies. The
fourth chapter examines the efforts of
Frederick the
Great in mobilizing within absolutist Prussia
the mili'

tary strength and economic base required for
the wars of
the classical balance-of -power
The fifth chapter does
.

not so much explore the balance-of -power as explore
the

nature of that total warfare which all the European
states

— in

the wake of the French revolutionary

had to be prepared for.

In this chapter,

I

wars—

explore in

some detail the contribution of Clausewitz to

a

politics

of warfare: a theory of the relationship between the

state and the conduct of warfare that had been implicit
but unarticulated in the era of the classic power bal-

ance

.

I

have chosen these three thinkers because they lo-

cated themselves in a tradition emphasizing military

power as
state.

a basic,

indeed, the basic, element of the

They shared a view of the propriety of warfare

as an instrument of policy.

They were also all active in

military reform, and a good part of this dissertation

con-

cerns transformations in the scope of warfare and in the
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armies that eonducted it.

Why this emphasis upon the nature
of warfare?
Debates about realism too often
construe debate:es
about power and the state in terms
of the role played by
moral considerations in foreign policy
deliberation.

Friedrich Meinecke's Die Idee der Staatsrason

for in-

,

stance, explores how the whole tradition
of "Realpolitik"

from Machiavelli to Treitschke absorbed
within its calculus of state imperatives what arose as questions
of

conscience and morality. 22

in critically examining how

"Staatsrason" endowed the state with its own logic and

ethical character, Meinecke casts the issue in terms of
the philosophy of politics and the philosophy of histori-

cism.

His study is scholastically masterful, yet it

lacks embodiment.

A tradition so imbedded in the realms

of force and warfare calls for a style of analysis that

provides visual representation of what life looks like in
its terms.

It ought to portray what the armies of early

modern Europe looked like to those who comprised its
ranks in the name of "Staatsrason" or armed civic virtua
So

I

have tried in this work to keep one eye cast

upon citizens and their role in warfare.

And

I

have

tried to reconstruct from within what these three thinkers were doing, or thought they were doing, in their ef-
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forts and arguments on behalf
of reliable armies for
their countries.
The point of the title,

"The Politics of the Un-

stable Balance-of -Power," is
threefold.
to show that from the vantage
point

I

First,

I

want

have adopted, one

sees recurrent efforts by statesmen
and military strategists to expand the scope and intensity
of warfare.

Analysts of the balance-of -power have only
looked at
political decisions for the source of instability:

Na-

poleon's, for instance, to create a Continental
Imperiunv
or Hitler's, to militarize and expand the Third Reich.

From the perspective of warfare as

a

continually evolving

phenomenon, however, one appreciates how

a

balance-of-

power based upon a calculus of force levels tends inex-

orably towards imbalance at ever higher levels.
Second, a functionalist school of equilibrium had
for years viewed international relations in terms of ar-

rangements tending toward stability.

Indeed, the search

for stability and consensus characterized the whole post-

war behavioral enterprise of social science.

Formal

theorists of international relations like Morton Kaplan
were indiscreet— and unreflective

— about

this bias.

24

Even a more classically rooted theorist of world politics
like Henry Kissinger sought to define the balance-of-

power as inherently stable, supported by those playing
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the rules of the game and only upset
by revolutionary
states. 25

in the terminology of Kenneth
Waltz,

I

have

chosen a "second image" approach to the
sources of instability: the state itself as the source
of international insecurity and war. But my approach
differs fun-

damentally from Waltz's.

His analysis of "second image"

models, of the nature of the states which comprise
the

international system, focuses narrowly upon the various
forms of government—democratic, socialist, autocratic,
or totalitarian

— to

see whether one of them tends in-

herently to destabilize world politics. 26
Waltz's "forms of government" approach,

I

By contrast to

have focused

upon the politics within states: a politics of efforts to
enhance military power which was common to all states in
the early modern era.
Third,

I

show that the constraints imposed upon

citizenship and legitimate discourse in the public sphere
strengthened the ability of states and statesmen to decide when and where their armies were to be deployed.
The relative autonomy which political leadership enjoyed

created the appearance of diplomacy among polite and
sensible men.

Yet this realm of appearance was built up

upon a deeper structure of political mobilization.

The

courtly rituals of concert diplomacy could not fully obscure the deeper structure of international relations in

.
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which statesmen assiduously measured
one another's power
in terms of population,
territory,
resources, and Indus-

trial strength.
The point of this exercise in
political reconstruction is to trace the emergence of
a discourse on poweron power as military force.
it explores the origins of
the unstable balance-of -power and it
locates that insta-

bility in the realist state.

it locates the perpetual

insecurity of the modern state in the political
vision of
realism.
The result has been what a young German peace
researcher, Dieter Senghaas, has called a condition
of

"organized peacelessness

:

"

the systematic negation of

peace through the perpetual mobilization of

a

society

and through the imminent threat of annihilation. Senghaas

uses this concept to analyze politics in the nuclear
age.
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It is time now to locate the sources of "orga-

nized peacelessness" in the tradition whose legacy we bear.
Permanent mobilization on

a

pre-wartime footing.

recurrent admonishment of citizens that they
render service to their state.

are

The

obliged to

The incantation of "si vis

pacem, para bellum," that the only way to achieve peace
is by preparing for war.

These elements of peacelessness

in the age of nuclear deterrence have their source in the

realist state of the early modern balance-of -power

CHAPTER

II

ROMAN AND MEDIEVAL ORIGINS OF
STATESMANSHIP

Rome and the Early Church

The entirely secular discourse of realism
which

Machiavelli founded during the Italian Renaissance
repudiated prevailing doctrines of Christian universalism under Papal authority.

It forged in their

stead a theory of political action which in part re-

turned to Aristotelian and Ciceronian conceptions of

citizenship and virtue.

But Machiavellian realism ap-

propriated only parts of Roman legal thought, for it
acknowledged the value of positive, innovative law while
rejecting the Stoic psychology and natural law constructs that had guided "ius naturale," the Roman philo-

sophical ideal of natural, rational law.
survey

I

In this brief

want to trace the Roman and post-Roman European

context from which Machiavelli

1

s

thought emerged.

My point in this exposition is threefold.

First,

I

want to explain what has been commonly referred to as the
innovative
avelli'

s

— indeed,

revolutionary

— character

of Machi-

secular theories of diplomatic conduct and of
1

citizenship as armed civic virtue."

"

In this respect

there is little that is new or revisionist in this chap-
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ter on the emergence of modern
statesmanship, for I
concur with the conventional wisdom.
My second point,
however, is to provide a framework
for understanding all
those efforts, of which Machiavelli
s was the first, to

articulate in the aftermath of the declining
ideal of the
Christian Commonwealth a secular basis for
relations amongst the emergent states of early modern
Europe.

The

full development of balance-of -power theories
had to

await the early eighteenth century.

But the problem—

of working out a state system— was posed by the
very de-

cline of those Medieval institutions that had found full

expression in the works of St. Thomas Aquinas.

Third,

the state system and the rules of diplomacy that finally

did emerge in terms of a balance-of -power did not do

away entirely with certain elements of the Medieval world
that had, in the era of Church supremacy, underpinned the

international system.

Jus-t-war theory,

for instance, and

the concept of a universal or international world, did

not entirely disappear in Europe after Machiavelli.
deed, though

I

In-

focus in this dissertation upon the sour-

ces of instability in the balance-of -power

,

what stabil-

ity and continuity that secular system did enjoy owed

itself more to the cultural heritage of Medieval univer-

salism than contemporary theorists have acknowledged.

Machiavelli

'

s

radical repudiation of those traditions

.

itself spawned a reaction on the part
of Enlightenment
theorists and Christian diplomats.
It is upon this
residue of natural law theory and just-war
doctrine that
contemporary alternatives to realism have
had to rely in
arguing for a reconstructed foundation for
international

relations
Both Platonic and Aristotelian political thought

were based upon the goodness of public life in the
limited city-states of ancient Greece.

Plato's ideal city,

for instance, was to have a population of only 5,040;

Aristotle makes clear that citizenship for the "zoon
politikon"

— man,

the political animal

— entailed

face-to-

face public association among friends and members of a

propertied leisure class, and that the overwhelming

majority of inhabitants, whether women, slaves, day laborers, soldiers, or children, are ineligible for citi-

zenship and condemned to political silence.

Speech in

the "agora," the public space of markets and parks, pro-

vided the Context upon which true citizenship flourished.
It is ironic, but as we shall see, not unique, that

the very terrain of such citizenship was eroding at a

time when theories celebrating it reached their intel-

lectual zenith.

Indeed, for Aristotle the irony was per-

sonal, for this private tutor of Alexander the Great saw
the Hellenic world come under attack from the Macedonian
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armies trained by his former pupil.

After their tempo-

rary subjection to Macedonia, the Greek
city-states were
conquered more lastingly by the legions of the
Roman
Republic.

The political units analyzed by the classic

Hellenic philosophers were relatively intimate citystates whose citizens congregated in one place, in
which

leaders spoke directly to the populace, and which could
find security behind walls of clay and stone.

Later

writers like Zeno, Polybius, Cicero, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius examined very new and vast political insti-

tutions: institutions and legal theories designed to

administer territories on

a

continent-wide scale.

Whereas Plato had devised the good state in terms
of an absolute, ideal form of justice, Aristotle had

construed the city-state as a natural political community logically and philosophically consistent with the
life found in whole nations or the entire universe.

Roman thought refined this view of the political commu-

nity as something natural, but it revolutionized political thinking by arguing on behalf of

a

universe-wide

polity in which prevailed the rule of public law.
cause of the extent of the Roman Republic

Be-

— embracing

the

Mediterranean, and stretching from Britain and Spain to

Armenia and Egypt--and because of the institutions re-

quired to oversee the agriculture,
trade, and defense of
these regions, there developed
a whole range of constitutional, written, and legislative
processes to govern
the republic's widespread affairs.
in addition to administrative, legal, and political
innovations, the
state

undertook massive road and waterway
projects to facilitate commerce within its domain.
These improvements
were complemented by a growing
cosmopolitanism spawned by
increased contacts between the Romans and
travelers,

poets, tribal leaders, and slaves.

Cicero, in the first century B.C., defined
the new

structure of civic virtue that flourished on this
enlarged political terrain.

"Law is the bond which unites

the civic association," he wrote.

2

A "iuris societas,"

a community of law exercised by popular consent, was

based upon the rule of just law.

This law, derived from

right reason and nature, was carried by the love of fellow men and established the foundations of a just polity.
The classic question which had so occupied Aristotle and

Polybius--which of the three forms of government (kingship, aristocracy, or polity [democracy]) was best and

which worst—found

a

resolution in Cicero's thought that

transformed traditional arguments for

a

mixed constitu-

tion of monarchy, aristocracy, and popular participation.

The institutional character
of any polity had to be underpinned by elements that humbled
worldly aspiration
before the more enduring laws
of nature.
"True law is

right reason in agreement with
nature." 3

The natural,

eternal laws of God, reflected in
the love which informs
life among all inhabitants of a
community, provided for
Cicero the deeper structures of
justice upon which a
state's institutions called.
Cicero's tentative formulations about the
place of
law in the Roman "res publica" played an
important role
in defining the nature of contemporary
government.

It

placed responsibility for articulating the laws of
a

political community in the hands of its various institutions and in the hands of its virtuous statesmen. The

ability of Rome throughout its republican and imperial
incarnations to govern itself and its far-flung domains
through legislators, governors, councils, senators, and,
ultimately, Caesars, was largely attributable to its

having broken with

Hellenic, traditions

of relying upon

various gods, wise kings, orators, or ephemeral decisions
of spontaneously assembled councils.

Though Roman consti-

tutionalism virtually disappeared under the Empire, the
legacy of procedural rule is to be found in the political
thought to which it gave rise: Roman Law.
Roman constitutionalism also provided a solid ground-

..

ing for what came to be
international law. The Roman
legal system of the law of
nations, "ius gentium," was
the entire structure of
positive, written laws that
governed its relations with its
subject peoples and
lands

This conception of citizenship which
lay at the
heart of the Roman state was intimately
tied
to the

philosophical ideal of natural law, "ius naturale."

A

much more abstract construct than the specific
laws and
practices of "ius gentium," the Roman view of "ius
naturale" played a major role in all of Roman legal
and

political thought.
Though elements of this natural law are to be found

— Zeno, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius
among them — developed this concept into

in Cicero, the Stoics

most prominently

a unique theory of citizenship.

The Stoic theory of

citizenship was the first systematic attempt to express
a theory of individualism within a larger theory of the

state.

It located political life within an explicitly

natural context, and it sought to reconcile individual

psychology to the enduring structure of the natural
order
Zeno

1

s

Republic

,

written around the beginning of the

fourth century B.C., was perhaps the most radical state-

ment of Stoic political thought.

It offered a view of

the universe as one, united
under an embracing state.
Citizenship was founded not on
the accidental particularities of nationhood, language,
or birth.
Citizenship, rather, was of one
piece, and neither class hierarchies nor discrete political
interests were to intrude upon this universalism.
The Stoic conception of a
natural equality among all
men, an equality not limited
to Roman citizens, helped
shape the ensuing development of
Christian social thought
The Roman concept of love as a
constitutive element of

virtuous public association was transformed
by the early
Church fathers during the Roman Empire into
a sophisticated body of theology and political thought.

Epictetus'

conservative view of nature, of interpreting as natural
and then accepting worldly affairs as matters of
ra-

tional purpose to which one had to reconcile oneself,

became the basis for a psychology of worldly detachment:
of turning one's attentiton to the inner soul, of disre-

garding the material and carnal temptations of external
events.

The distinction he articulated in the late first

century A.D. between inner reality and outer, insignificant appearances, embodied Christ's doctrine of re-

sisting worldly temptation and of pursuing, instead, a
life of grace, humility, and unrequited love so as to

38

prove deserving of
redemption.
The conversion of the
Emperor Constantino in
A.D.
332 transformed the heretofore
treasonous Christian
preachings into state religion.
The problems with which
the Church Fathers and
political theorists dealt
separately became fused, though
in an era of profound
turmoil.
The crumbling economic
and political institutions
of the Empire rendered it
increasingly vulnerable to
forces both on its periphery
and at its core.
Military

weakness was compounded by internal
decay.
Cons tantine s establishment of a new
imperial capital at Byzantium exacerbated the spiritual and
material decline of
Rome.
And with the collapse of the Western
Empire in
'

476 A.D., there arose the fundamental issue
of the basis

upon which

a

truly virtuous man could build his life.

The collapse of the Roman Empire brought
to the fore a

search for new institutions in which natural law
could
be located.

As St. Augustine was to show, such a search

led to the Church.

Augustine of Hippo, A.D. 354-430, saw justice in
terms of the right relation between man and God, not

merely in terms of reason and natural law prevailing in
the "res publica."

means to

a

Like Plato, he saw the state as a

higher end, not as an end in itself.

For

•

Augustine, true virtue
transcended that of the civic
realm; it inhered in the
Christian community. By
counter
posing Christian life
xire in the
+-h~
communio sanctorum," the
community
the sainflv
*
saintly, 4-«
y of ^ne
to life
among the impious in
the "societas impiorum,
- he was able to show
how citizenship in a polity, regardless
of its government,
lacked true and abiding adherence
to the principles of
Christian virtue.
i

In God's realm, the "civitas
Dei," there could be no

uncertainty for the true Christian.

The unmediated reign

of righteous love and piety was
a matter known to and
fully embodied only by those blessed
with grace. But for
the rest of mankind, a segment of the
population, St.

Augustine grimly reminds us, comprising an
overwhelming

majority of the population, the task of devising
rules
to govern life was a matter fraught with
uncertainty,

anxiety, and, indeed, much terror.
hind,

so to speak,

For those left be-

to suffer embodiment in the "civitas

terrena," issues of worldly peace and justice proved

overwhelming in their magnitude.
St.

Augustine's profound pessimism regarding the

fate of fallen man emerges from his severe Christian view
of human nature.

From this emerges his understanding of

worldly suffering as something deserved.

St. Augustine

thus developed from Stoic
philosophy a theo io
gy of natural contrition.
The mu „dane tlme
constituting the real,
of man is filled with a
suffering and pain that can
never
be done away with.
Only by means of force
and coercion
can the civil peace be
assured; it is a peace
enforced
upon citizens, not one built
upon abstract justice. We
must look to true Christian
law for an explanation
of

Jesus' word as the anticipation
of true love and eternal
justice.
But this hardly serves to
eliminate the terror
that overwhelms us every day.

Such knowledge, however, makes
sense of human suffering and mitigates it without
removing it. This human
suffering is a result of God's will to
punish man for his
carnal nature— a nature of fallen grace
and sin inherent
in man after the Fall.
it is a will that ultimately
lies

beyond man's power to control and in which
he ought instead to acquiesce.
The coexistence with a worldy realm
of a sphere wherein God's love is pure and
merited must

comfort those confined to dwell on earth.
is doubly compounded.

Yet the issue

First of all, grace is unmerited

by self-consciously choosing a Christian life— though in
the absence of such a choice, grace is impossible.

Se-

condly, true Christians must await the Last Judgement

before realizing the City of God.
grace

—a

What to do without

grace conferred by God's volition and not neces-
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sarily according to pious
action-is thus made all the
more problematic by the
knowledge that one must
await
Christ's resurrection before
the righteous enter the
Holy Kingdom.
Meanwhile, chaos reigns in

Babylon.
No true justice, St.
Augustine tells us, can ever
be found in the City of
Man.

S^^f "
6

1

thS Cit

of

the ungodly,
^
which did not obey the command
of God
that it should offer no
sacrifice save
to Him alone, and which,
therefore,
could not give to the soul its
proper
command over the body, nor to the
reason its just authority over
the vices
is void of true justice.
'

In contrast to the admiring
love and optimism which

guided St. Augustine's view of the
"civitas Dei," despair and grim determination shaped his
view of matters
secular.
For spiritual questions there was the
New
Testament to turn to: by no means indisputable,
but at

least the central source of Christ's teachings

one can guide one's will.

by which

But for political questions

there existed no such guiding source-book.

On earth man

was left to his own devices.
The human condition was thus painfully limited.

was trapped godlessly within its own terms: a realm in

which prevails "cupiditas," the love of and drive for
earthly things and human glory.

it

There remains, however,
a tension in St.
Augustine's
bGtWeen ChriSti
Cachings and worldly politics
between the "civitas Dei"
and the oivitas terrena."
Though Augustinian thought
does not prescribe

-

a sig-

nificant position for the
Church in the conduct of
secular affairs, there
remains in his world of

states
and citizens certain
principles of Christian teachings,
without which the "civitas
terrena" would quickly degenerate into a world
resembling Kakos cave.
'

St.

Augustine criticizes the Roman
Empire for its
use of slavery as the basis
of its wealth.
slavery can
only be justified in terms of
sparing the
lives of war

prisoners and enemies and by enslaving
them instead.
But Roman slavery, though originating

in such an act of

mercy, had long ago left behind
its origins, and had
become instead an institution that
violated the under-

lying natural equality of all Christian
men.

Indeed,

the very fault of the later Roman
Empire was not, as

contemporary critics had supposed, that she had
embraced Christianity, but that her rule had
been
es-

sentially un-Christian.

St. Augustine wrote his City

of God to repudiate the view that Christianity
had im-

pelled the collapse of the Empire.

On the contrary,

argues Augustine, only the charity of Christ's vision

can stabilize and

i mp ose

a se mb ianee of justness
upon the

terrestrial city of man.
Nowhere is this more evident
than in Augustine's
contribution to what became, in
the late medieval period,
the doctrine of just-war. 5
Here St. Augustine outlines
an account of the justness
of undertaking
war,

"jus ad

bellum," and sketches, too, an
outline of limits upon the
conduct of warfare, "jus in bello,"
that was to exercise
a profound influence upon
relations among states. From
the Christian viewpoint, a war
could be sanctioned if it
was declared by a soverign authority,
if it redressed or
punished a wrong act already committed, and
if it maintained its righteous intent by relying upon
reasonable

means in the course of warfare with the aim of
restoring
the peace.
The full articulation of just-war doctrine, of the

truce of God and the mediation by the Church of private

wars among competing bodies, was to await the emergence
of a unified Christian politics, of a unified Christian

Commonwealth.

Only after the Investiture Controversy,

with the thirteenth century advent of Thomism, was the

Augustinian tension between the true Christian realm and
the fallen city to be replaced by an ordered natural

theory of the universe in which

a

politics informed by

Christian teachings took its full place.

But before

44

St. Thomas Aquinas could
achieve this masterful fusion,

and before the fifth century
doctrine of Pope Gelasius I
regarding the "two swords ,» the
one imperial, the other
canonical, could be replaced by
Pope Boniface's proclamation in 1302 of a "Unam Sanctum,"
of one sword wielded
by the Church, there intervened
centuries of profound
change in Europe. The political landscape
marked first
by Roman, then by Christian theories
underwent dramatic

transformations during the Middle Ages.

Feudal custom

and Germanic law interrupted the growth
of Church power.

And when, in the thirteenth century, the Church
emerged
triumphant, it reigned spiritually supreme over
pean continent.

a

Euro-

And yet, as we shall briefly see, this

Christian Commonwealth was itself about to give way to
the modern, secular world

—a

state system in which the

teachings of Christ were to give way to the teachings of
the secular prince.

Medieval Europe

The precise origins of the fifth and sixth century

barbarian invasions of imperial lands are far less sig-

nificant to us than their consequences.

The over-ex-

tended, financially weak Empire could no longer maintain
the numerous military legions which had enforced the

"pax Romana."

Despite the economic and
agricultural
reforms of Diocletian, prosperity
and trade waned.
Domestic revolts by Jews,
Christians, and local nations
-especially in Lombardy, the Levant,
Macedonia,
and

Illyricum-continued to weaken imperial
administration
and to exhaust its treasury.

Soldiers, once paid in

silver coinage, became unwilling
to accept the debased
coins struck by the financially
strapped
Empire.

The

legions resorted to payment in kind,
a system of gaining
title to land and livestock which was
gradually to blossom into the soldiers' holding landed
fiefs in collabo-

ration with the inhabitants.

Inexorably, the Roman

Empire bankrupted itself and lost control over
its farflung armies.

It proved unable to forestall the great

influx of non-Roman peoples from the east.
The ensuing barbarian migrations brought great num-

bers to the outermost, and soon, innermost, regions of
the Empire.

The overall result was a peculiar concat-

enation of residual Roman traditions overlaid by newly
imported feudal customs and law from the Visigothic,
Ostrogothic, Hun, Vandal, Viking, and Saxon migrations
from lands across the Danube and Elbe Rivers and from

across the Baltic.

These peoples, who had never known

either Roman law or Christian thought, brought to an
empire already split between East and West

a

whole new

range of traditions.

6

The decisive blow to
the Roman imperium
was delivered by these barbarian
invasions and migrations
of
the Early Middle Ages.
They culminated
symbolically in
the Vandals' sacking of
Rome in 410 A D
But the extent
and impact of these
migrations throughout all of
the
Empire's western lands cannot
be comprehended in terms
of this or that city.
The new populations of
heathen
military bands and the entirely
primitive agricultural
techniques brought with them to
Dalmatia, Lombardy,
Spain, Gaul, and Britain introduced
conceptions of law
.

.

radically different from any known
in the areas formerly
under Roman rule. The later
absorption-during the Middle Ages— of this Germanic law
through ecclesiastical
efforts provided the basis of the
Christian Commonwealth
Its admixture of feudal customs,
Christian

teachings, and

Roman natural law traditions was to underpin
European
legal and diplomatic practices until the Italian
Renaissance

.

One hesitates to talk of states and formal political

institutions at all when discussing the loosely organized
Germanic, Slavic, and Scandinavian tribes which over-

whelmed Europe between the fifth and ninth centuries.
With the transient exceptions of the Carolingian Empire,

300-843, and the revived
empire under the Saxon
emperlife of the former Roman
Empire was marked by a
millennium of Germanic, customary
law.
Scarcely recorded,
and then only in fragmentary
fashion, the entirely tra-

dition-bound character of
Germanic public law was embodied in assemblies of the
tribes, in the folk-memory
of the people, and in the
customary adherence of elected
kings to what was called the
"good old law."

Such law, governing punishment
for offenses, seignorial rights to fief, livestock,
and grain, and acts of

reprisal or revenge, was the product
of public assemblies
called to ascertain-or to recall-which
royal oaths had
been sworn and what custom would
dictate.
in this absolute unification of positive and natural
law— though
each concept would have been alien to feudal

practice—

and in this context where law was not
innovative but

merely restorative, the kings and princes of the
various
Frankish, Rhenish, Magyar, and Saxon tribes were
obliged
to regard the widely recognized right of popular
resis-

tance in the early Middle Ages.

This right of resistance

was most strongly recognized by the peoples living well

beyond the Danube and Elbe Rivers and the Baltic Sea.
This tradition, unknown to Roman and Christian teachings
of passive obedience, was so fully embedded in Slavonic
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custom that

as late as the
seventeenth cent ury the
eno rm ous Kin gd o m of
Poland reqnire a in its
g ove rn in g
diet a unanimous vote
on an
all questions of
policy!
But
in areas farther west,
in Caul, Lo mbardy,
F i anders
and
Saxony, the political
institutions that emerged
first
,

under Prankish tutelage
with the Merovingians,
and then,
after the Carolingian
Empire's breakup in 843,
under the
rule of the various German
princes, retained certain
Roman constitutional elements.
These
royal houses, in

vying for control of the
former Carolingian lands scattered after the mid-ninth century
throughout Lombardy,
Burgundy, Bavaria, and Franconia,
were required to
establish hand-in-hand with clerical
administrators the
foundations of unified Christian
rule.

The legacy of

Roman rule in these western areas
enabled

the uneasy

alliance of the Church with Prankish
and German kings to
establish a modicum of economic and political
control

over peoples who had migrated only after
the collapse of
imperial unity.
The farther east, however, the more

prevalent were rural and tribal customs unaffected
by the
institutional and intellectual residue of imperial
admin-

istration, ecclesiastical literacy and scholarship,
and
the techniques of agriculture and irrigation that had

lain at the heart of Roman political-economy.
In these eastern areas, where cities and riparian

trade were essentially
unknown, ancient tribal
custom
handed down orally and
mythically over centuries,
called
upon Ostrogothic, Wendish,
Hun, and Viking peoples
to
adhere to he "good old
law."
This law unenacted
unwritten, was only gradually
supplanted by Roman,
Christian, and constitutional
practices.
The inherent institutional
weakness of these Germanic political conceptions
expressed itself in what appears to us today as a virtual
hiatus in the existence
of an international system
or of international relations.
The dearth of treaties for
this era, and the absence
of
written records detailing negotiations
and diplomacy
among states, testify less to any
bureaucratic neglect by
chancelleries than to the simpler fact
that such chan-

^

,

celleries—or any formal diplomatic procedures
among major public bodies— scarcely existed
at all.
with two

major— if short lived— exceptions

,

the Frankish Caro-

lingian Empire and the Saxon Empire of the
German kings
a century and a half later, Europe
between the
fall of

Rome and the Second Crusade knew no discernable
system
of interstate relations, indeed knew no states at
all.
The development of more or less stable states—
Capetian

rule over the

He

de France, the states of Castile, Leon,

Aragon, and Navarre, England after the Norman Conquest,
and the various city-republics of Northern Italy

— a-

"
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waited, fi rst

the emergence of a
Christian Commonwealth
and, secondly, its
decline in the face of those
flourishing secular forces which
gave rise to the Renaissance.
,

Charlemagne's coronation by
Pope Leo III on Christmas Day, 800, transformed
the Carolingian
Kingdom, suc-

cessor to the Merovingian, into
an empire.
The Church's
blessing invested Charles' Prankish
rule with the aura
of a second Roman Empire.
Clerical administrators played
no small role in consolidating
imperial control over
lands newly conquered east of the
Rhineland.
The

Church's new activism was its response
to the natural-law
right of resistance which had been
practiced by the

various Germanic tribes upon their settlement
in the
West.

The Papacy was now developing the view
of govern-

ment as a benevolent "patria potestas" headed
by

consecrated by

the

Church.

a

vicar

This conception of sacral

authority, in variance with the Gelasian doctrine
of
"two swords," came gradually during the ninth and
tenth

centuries to supplant the Germanic view that both the

monarch and the tribal community were "subordinate to
God and Law.

7

With the breakup of the Carolingian Empire and the

distribution of its lands to the three grandchildren of
Charlemagne according to the Treaty of Verdun in 843,
dynastic politics, especially in the East Frankish lands,
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turned to co m petitio n
for control of the
Central Prankish lands of Burgundy,
Lorraine, and Lombardy.
Papal
interests in exercising
economic and political
control
over bishoprics throughout
the Prankish lands led
the
Church to regard with great
concern these disputes of
the
various Germanic kings.
The Clunaic reform movement
of the tenth century,
and the subsequent eastward
spread of the Clunaic monasteries, further involved the
Church in German princely
politics by elevating to the fore
the question of controlling and overseeing these newly
conquered lands.
Because the Clunaic movement was
particularly skilled in

introducing land reclamation and
agricultural techniques
where none had prevailed, and because,
too, it possessed
the resources of literacy and record
keeping required for
administrating these lands, lands until recently
occupied
by un-Christian barbarian tribes, the
Church became
em-

broiled in the political machinations of the
German princes: in the election of a German emperor, his
consecra-

tion at Rome, and the attending importance this
conferred
on the imperial body for authority in the Rhineland,

Lombardy, Saxony, and Bavaria.
The gradual intervention of the Papacy in the monar-

chial politics of the German princes culminated in the

.
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withdrawal of imperial
consecration by pope
in 1076.
The investiture
Controversy which ensued
far
transcended the immediate
issue of who-the Papacy
or the
German princes-had the
authority to appoint
bishops to
the national ohurohes
and to confer i mp erial
blessings
The controversy involved
issues of central i mport
to the
evolution of a coherent
European state

^^^^

system.
The debate between Church an d
Empire was spawned by Papal
efforts to introduce among
the patchwork, feudal,
recurrently warring European
principalities a modicum of unity
within a universal Christi an
Commonwe a lth

The Crusades, the military
campaigns in Jerusalem and
the Levant initiated by Pope
Innocent III, established
both spiritually and materially
the bases of the Christian
Commonwealth that dominated European
diplomacy
in the

twelth, thirteenth, and fourteenth
centuries.

The unity

prompted by the First Crusade of 1095-1099
established
throughout the lands of the old Roman Empire
a fundamental
shift away from the feudal thoughts and
practices which
had prevailed since the barbarian invasions.
The
invo-

cation of various Christian "signs" conferred
upon participating lords and their vassals the common
blessings
of an institution which until then had remained
aloof

from most of feudal diplomacy.

The plague of private

wars so characteristic of
feudalism-wars of reprisal,
of greed, of revenge-was
to come gradually
under the'
guidance of Church sponsored
laws during this period.
These laws of war were
adhered to far more in wars
among Christians than
between Christians and
Moslem-or

Turkish-armies.

But the Crusades provided
the impetus

for an alliance of European
chivalry under one banner.
These links brought together
those disparate European

classes which had come to acknowledge
one another through
the military code of chivalry,
a code which
since the

Carolingian Empire had drawn together
on the battlefield
knights who observed a certain
collegial
code of warfare

among themselves.

Arthurian legend was not merely le-

gendary in its celebration of such
codes in the highly
ritualized spectacles of court jousting
and chivalric
tournaments. As we know from the Song of
Roland an
,

eleventh century "geste" retelling Charlemagne's
campaign
against the Saracens, the code of chivalry
played a

major role in uniting armies in terms of their
behavior
in the field.

In the High Middle Ages, that one unifying

cause was usually Christianity.

We can see in the armies

united under Papal calling that the ideal of the Christian Commonwealth forged together material forces whose

allegiance was either to an immediate lord or to the collegial, military values of common knighthood.

But the

code of chivalry merely
served to ritualize m
ilitar y
conduct; it did not itself
constitute a political force
with cohesiveness and
resources sufficient to
create institutions capable of reshaping
the European landscape.
The Church, by contrast,
was just such a force able
to alter the nature of
European politics. Not only
did
the Crusades forge a unity
unavailable since the Roman
Empire; it also brought to
the Continent, particularly
to Genoa and Venice, later
to London, Paris, Bruges,
and
the Hansa, riches and trade
at a level which was to
alter
decisively the whole feudal
political-economy. The maritime trade of the northern Italian
city-states was a
direct result of routes secured by
Papal armies on the
way to Jerusalem. Entrepots
throughout the Moslem world
brought untold riches in grain, jewelry,
spices, and silk
to the Italian cities. 8
The residence of merchants in foreign
cities brought

with it the need for their protection from
the wrath of
native people and local governments. Only
gradually did
the legal practice of extraterritoriality emerge,
and

this was an important step in the evolution of
interna-

tional law from the informal customs and traditions of
feudalism.

Moreover, the need to protect tradesmen from

the raids of pirates and overland brigands helped shape
the kind of positive, contract law that took the form, in

"

contradistinction to Germanic
practicei
and treaties.

^

^^^^^

Because literacy was
largely confined to
Church officials and monks, the
Papacy, bishoprics, and
masteries became the seat
not only of learning
but of statutory law and recorded
docu m ents.
mdeed, the Church
provided a crucial service
during this era in the
transition from customary,
fragmentary law to legal codes
fully enscribed.

Church efforts were significant
in the development of
international law.
it emerged in part from
the need to
rationalize business practices
by providing security to
traveling merchants. But a less
material, more spiritual
source produced this development,
too.
After the cessation of the barbarian invasions,
Europe was plagued by
private wars. Nowhere was this more
endemic than in the
Central lands of the old Carolingian
Empire: in the lands

of Burgundy, Lorraine, Lombardy, and
the old East Frankish

realm— over which

a succession of

for control and authority.

would-be emperors vied

In an attempt to limit the

German civil wars, the Church encouraged the
development
of

just-war doctrine, of the theory of "jus ad bellum.

The hope of the Church was to proscribe the range
of wars

that could be deemed legitimate and to strengthen the
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authority of sovereign principalities
by establishing
some foundations for stable
international relations.
The expression of just-war
doctrine, itself a carry
over from Augustinian thought,
was part of the Church's
efforts in an era in which it had
become a major political force.
The New Testament injunction, to
"give unto
Ceasar the things that are Caesar's,
and unto God the

things that are God's," which for

a

millennium had in-

formed Church practice began giving way in
the later
Middle Ages to an active role in worldy
politics.
The Church's claim to spiritual universalism
was

aided by its manifest territorial presence.
in the Romagna,

in Jerusalem,

in the bishoprics of the Empire, and in

the newly conquered German lands east of the Elbe, the

Church emerged as a prominent element in contemporary

politics and statesmanship.

By investing secular au-

thority with Christian sacrament, codifying the rudiments
of international law, overseeing the reclamation of

lands for agriculture, and by itself exercising political

power in Tuscany, the later Medieval Church was able to
present itself as the embodiment of

wealth

a

universal common-

.

The most sophisticated expression of the ideal of a

universal Christian Commonwealth came in the work of the

thirteenth century theologian
and philosopher, Tho.as
Aquinas (c. 1225-1274).
In a system Qf thought
in the wake of the twelfth
century Aristotelian revival,
Aquinas expressed in sublime
form a four-tiered hierarchy of the universe in
which all animate

life, and the
actions of all institutions,
assumed their unique place.
Aquinas, who soon after his
death was canonized for his
philosophical achievement, weaved
together an all-embracing synthesis by which matter,
life, and action were
located in terms of their fulfilling
a natural order

or-

dained by God.

Eternal, natural, divine, and human
laws

comprised, in descending order of scope
and eminence,
the structure of all existence and
action.
Eternal law,
the embodiment of divine reason, governed
the entire universe.
Natural law established worldly participation
in

terms of eternal law.

Divine law, or revelation, was

enscribed in the Old and New Testaments as the earthly
teachings of God.

And human law, expressed and embodied

in worldy affairs, involved human nature, both
individual

and social, and the pursuit of good by men acting alone
or in community.

From this hierarchy of laws, St. Thomas

achieved a new theology that defined or interpreted the
law as "nothing else than ordinance of reason for the

common good, made by him who has care of the community,

"
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and promulgated

.

9

Aquinas, having accepted the
Augustinian view of
secular politics as a realm
in which men would have
to
accept suffering, even at the
hands of an unjust and
wicked king, was unable to
acknowledge tyrannicide as
consistent with Christian doctrine.
His study, "On Kingship," explicitly rejects the
forcible removal of unjust
princes.
But Aquinas nevertheless provides
strong
Christian support for institutional
arrangements designed
to keep such tyranny from arising.
He argues, too, that
unjust rulers, because they violate
natural law, do not
merit God's love. The true Christian may
not rebel

against tyrants, but he may pray that God
will see that
their reign is shortlived.
Aquinas' theology and political theory united
in the

most rigorous and systematic fashion several kinds
of law
found in Medieval Europe: Christian, Roman natural,
and

written, positive law.

By locating these customs and

laws within a philosophy that addressed the entire uni-

verse, and by endowing these divine, natural, and secular
laws within a purposeful cosmology derived from Aristotle,

Aquinas defined the foundations of modern Christian political and social thought.

His designation of the state

as an essential component in a natural order, and his

,
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view of human nature
as inherently
uy social
social, *transformed
the feudal conception
of a ri
0t
r-irrh^
^ ht of resistance reserved
for the political
community.
Resistance became
legitimate only when
sanctioned by the Church.
Secular
authority became fully
subordinated to a universal
Church which embodied divine
law-itself the ecclesiastical expression of eternal
law.
Thomistic

theology, with its derivative
argu-

ments for Church supremacy
in secular politics,
provided intellectual nourishment
for Papal efforts in its
recurring disputes with the
German princes.
One

significant

doctrinal result was Papal

repudiation

of Gelasius' concept of two
separate swords.

church
authority was now seen as wielding the
prince's sword.
Pope Boniface VIII expressed this
new view
in his

Papal bull of 1302,

"Unam Sanctam."

Both swords, he

wrote
are in the power of the church, the
material
sword and the spiritual.
But the one is
exercised for the church, the other by the
church, the one by the hand of the priest,
the other by the hand of kings and soldiers,
though at the will and sufferance of the
priest.
One sword ought to be under the
other and the temporal authority subject to
the spiritual power. 10
It is characteristic, however, of intellectual
sys-

tems that they should capture the essence of a system or
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practice on the verae
verge of
nf its
it. j„
decay.
celebration of the polls in

Much like Aristotle's

an era in which the
Greek

city-states were about to
crumble, the Thomistic
framework of universal Christendom
sanctified in the form of
a rigorous theology an
institution about to decay.
The
very forces which helped
in the age of the Crusades
to
bring the Church to the forpfmnf of w
roretront of European politics
were to undermine it in the
later medieval centuries.
The spread of trade and wealth,
the gradual breakdown of
a feudal economy and its
replacement by cash economies
and secular contract, conspired
with divisive forces within the Papacy itself to
undermine the Church's
position.

The vicious feuding throughout
the Empire of Guelph
and Guibelline factions unavoidably
brought the Roman

Church into conflict with the princes
of the Continent.
The Papal schisms— the fourteenth
century Babylonian Captivity of the Papacy at Avignon, followed
by two separate
Papacies at Avignon and Rome— were resolved by
the Council of Constance, 1414-1417, at a grave price
to
the

Church.

The restoration of a unified Papacy required the

brutal suppression of Lollard and Hussite heresy and the

accommodation of the Church hierarchy to the growing secular power of French and Italian governments.

Seculariz-

ing forces prevailed in a variety of forms; Rome's au-

thority over the national churches and European govern-

ments was unable to
reconstitute itself.
Vernacular
literature and the subsequent
spread of literacy-owing,
first of all, to the
European universities and
then,
after 1456, to the
popularization of the printed
wordundermined the crucial position
held by clerical Latin
scribes.
The growth of guilds in
the manufacturing towns
helped weaken the dependence
of formerly unskilled
laborers upon the manorial system.
The rise of a banking
system to expedite trade and
credit accelerated commercialization and weakened the authority
of a Church whose
power outside of Tuscany was
largely spiritual.
The

devastation wrought by the Plague led
directly to mass
migrations from farms to cities, and
subsequently

to the

spread of a secular, cosmopolitan culture.

Fabulous

wealth imported from the New World
combined with improved

techniques for the mining of silver in Central
Europe to
transform the Continental economy into one based
largely
upon cash, commerce, and an international market.
The emergence in this era of diplomatic
practices--

of extraterritoriality, of ambassadors and bureaucratic

chancellories, of diplomatic immunity, negotiations, and

arbitration among princes and Papal legates

— led

to the

eclipse of the very institutions which in the High Middle
Ages had helped to produce these recognizably modern

—

practices.

The political weakness of
the Papacy was particularly evident in its inability
to compete militarily

with the princes.

The crusading armies under
the Church's

banner became in ensuing centuries
mercenary forces paid
from revenues of the state or of
feuding private factions.
The Church was able to draw upon
its considerable financial resources to pay for its armies
in the Romagna.

But

the terms of levy had changed dramatically
from those

based upon the feudal oath of homage and
fealty.

The

bonds of personal vassalage, of humility
before the

Church and of alliegiance to community law embodied
in
the king and the lord, became subject in the
fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries to ties of a fundamentally
dif-

ferent sort.

Secular and commercial relations infused

military affairs; their crassest expression was the mercenary system that prevailed in the early Italian Renaissance.

The collecting of funds to pay for such armies

required among princes the convoking of representative

estates and, as in Italy, the investment by bankers of

money accumulated through trade.

The terms of such rela-

tions entailed the development of absolutist practices
of secular dependence upon the landed and wealthy and

upon decisions of princes and their councillors.

The

dissolution of feudal and Christian ideals completed the
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spread of secular, material
practices.
The customs which had
guided the Medieval era-that
the state embodies
traditional law, that political
authority represents the
"good old law" or the
principles
of divine word-had
subjected the monarch and
the political community to a superior
and transcending presence.
The decline of feudal custom
and the attending decay of
Church authority yielded concepts
and practices which
elevated secular political action
to the highest level.
The product was a political
culture stressing innovation
and initiative on the part of
worldly agents: particularly absolutist princes beholden
to no higher authority
and who acted in their own interests
or on behalf of
those most closely allied to them. The
political virtue
embodied in such public and diplomatic
institutions was
one devoid of divine and eternal inspiration;
it was

guided instead by the dictates of wealth, power,
security,
and immediate interests.
It is in this sense that the language of Machiavel-

lian politics constitutes a transformation from the

Christian Commonwealth to the realm of the purely secular.

As we shall see in the pages to follow, such a

politics was not without its constraints and appeals to
tradition.

But the restraints were those that legiti-

mated the work of the
innovator ._ of
founder „ ho created and

^

^^^
iegisiatQr

^

action, and who acted
in rerms
terms of how
ho he
u
perceived the
-cu r i ty of the political
community. The result
&
conception of politics
freed fro m divine or
christian
law and unrestrained
by the natural
limitations that
feudal and Thomistic
conceptions had so valued.

_

CHAPTER III
MACHIAVELLI AND THE RISE OF
THE INSECURE STATE

The claim that violence and
power characterize the
modern state system finds its
warrant in the Machiavellian
tradition.
No one in the history of
political thought
has written so passionately of
power as did Machiavelli.
The prince of legislator seeking
to find and maintain a

polity must not shy away from the
uses of violence in
securing a political space. The secular
conditions in
which politics takes place burdens the
prince by forcing
him to resort to violence as the means
of effecting
his

will.

To secure a political space from rebels
or foreign

armies, the Machiavellian leader bears full
responsibility
for taming the base human nature of man so as
to maintain

his political existence.

Such a burden of political responsibility, however,

can undermine the liberty of those whom it claims to defend.

Such responsibility readily transforms itself into

tyranny or imperialism.

And when responsibility for

judging the appror iateness of political violence is placed
in the hands of he who deploys that violence, we enter

terrain upon which moral discourse cannot stand up to the
unsheathed, glistening sword.
"Realpolitik,

"

the single-minded concern for what is

practical and possible in serving the interests of the
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state, traces its
theoretical underpinnings
back to the
writings of an embittered
and outcast ex-Chancellor
of th,

Renaissance Florentine Republic.
velli (1469-1527), a secretary

It was Niccolo Machia-

to the diplomatic Board
of

the Ten and its legate to
the Holy Roman Empire,
France,
and to the court of Cesare
Borgia, whose writings,
especially "The Prince," were
picked up by later politicians
and theorists as the guiding
light for the view that

statecraft is solely that which
was possible and necessar,
for the state's continued
existence.
That which maintained power over one's civil society,
and that could be
deployed against foreign armies and
states, found intellectual justification in certain of
Machiavelli s writings
whence emerged the image of the Machiavellian
'

prince.

In the pages that follow,

I

outline the basic teach-

ings of Machiavelli and explain in detail
why those who

would brand him a Machiavellian misconstrue
the nature of
his concerns.
Section one outlines the constitutional

and

diplomatic problems that beset the Florentine Republic
after the overthrow of Piero Medici in 1494.

Machiavel-

li' s political career will also be examined to
establish

his ongoing concerns with problems of governance that are

dealt with throughout his writings.

Section two focuses

on the essential categories of political action and legit-

imacy that Machiavelli employed in all of his work.

Here
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I

concentrate on "virtu,"

"ragione." "necessitd,

"

"

ana

£ortuna ,„

n0

state."

The third sectiQn
discusses the political
g ee g rap hy of Florentine
warfare
My concern here is to
discuss the relationship
between
Machiavelli's critique of
mercentary warfare and his
theory of enlightened m ilitary
leadership.
The flnal

section develops Machiavelli's
theory of the state and
of
legitimacy.
it provides a perspective
on both Western

politics and political theory
by which the work of Machiavelli can be appreciated well
beyond the customary assumption that he was but a teacher
of perfidy and evil.
For it is in his work that
realism creates a discourse on
the politics of violence, a
discourse that in the centuries after Machiavelli became the
basis or international
relations among soveriegn polities.

Crises of the Florentine Republic

Throughout the era in which Machiavelli wrote,
the
most important and far-reaching issues were the
form which
the Florentine Constitution ought to take and
the manner in

which the city-state's new political institutions
could be
secured from both domestic factionalism and foreign invasion.

The decline in fortune of the once-powerful Medici

family gave rise to civic strife and to enormous insecur-

68

ities among the competing
Florentine groups.
The overthrow of the
Medici family in 1494 did not
so much cause all this
strife as merely culminate
two
centuries of decline in the
Florentine polity. This
decline allowed problems and
features endemic to the commune to emerge in all their
fullness.
The system of communal governance
in the Northern
Italian city-states had emerged in
the late twelfth

century as feudal relations receded.

1

The erosion of

feudalism, of the agrarian fief and the
indentured
peasant, of military vassalage and the
system of political
obligation through homage and fealty before
one's lord,

occurred earlier in Northern Italy than elsewhere
on the
Continent. With the cessation of the barbarian

invasions

in the ninth and tenth centuries, with the
end of the

recurring attacks by Visigothic and Hun armies that had
for six centuries plagued Lombardy and Tuscany, the
towns

and cities of the once-great Roman Empire began gradually
to flourish in terms of commerce, population, and prosperity.

Unlike the extensive manorial systems of the more

sparsely settled Frankish, Norman, and Germanic feudal
estates, Italian developments in this period were not

centered around the landed castle but rather arose within
the city.

An enormous rise in population around the eleventh

and twelfth centuries
created pressure for an
intensification of agricultural
output.
Swamplands were reclaimed, irrigation techniques
spread, and the threefield system of crop rotation
introduced.
Outside of
Italy other measures were
taken to satisfy the need
for
new lands.
In Germany this need led
to the "Drang nach
Osten," the extraordinary
expansion of Germanic feudal
control of new lands in the eastern
areas.
This imperial
expansion of feudal domains actually
strengthened the
military hold of the lord over his
vassals, for it rewarded loyal knights and their serfs
with control over
newly settled lands. But such outlets
for expanded population and agricultural demand could not
be found in the

crowded and already divided lands of the Holy
Roman Empire
south of the Alps.
Here the result was not the strengthening of feudalism, but rather its rapid decline.
The

fulfillment of feudal military obligations gave way
to

increasingly commercialized efforts to expand agricultural
output.

And with the growth of population centers not

tied to the manorial system, there emerged trade between

country and city as lords sold their products to complete
strangers.

Not only did markets develop in the cities,

but there arose a cash economy, merchants, and bankers to

facilitate trade, for all were needed if the cities were
to be regularly supplied by those on the surrounding farms
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The Crusades of the
early twelfth century
provided
the final impetus for
the expansion of the
Italian citystates.
The various marches
into the Levant opened
the
way both for sea-trade
across the Mediterranean
and for
the virtual collapse of
feudal land tenure; knig
hts abroad
in battle lost control of
their land at home, a process
termed subinfeudation. The
result was that by the late

twelfth century the Italian
city-states were both prosperous centers of commercial activity
and
the home of

merchands and of a growing middle-class
of artisans, shipbuilders, bankers, and lawyers.
The First Lombard League of 1167 emerged
in alliance
against the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa;
via a succession
of wars it forged a nascent state system
demanding an end
to its allegiance to German lords.
The Peace of Constance,
1183,

finally acknowledged this demand, and with it
the

Italian system of city-state governance by commune
was

officially accepted by the Emperor.
The Italian communes of Venice, Milan, Genoa, Lucca,

and Florence were not what we today would call communities
or popular governments.

They were governed by freely

elected councils of the wealthiest and most prominent
citizens.

A group of successful men, usually those noble-

men holding great plots of farmland around the city, but
also including the richest of the new tradesmen, collec-

"

tively held public authority
and exercised it through
the city councils.
The communes decided matters
of taxation and public law. They
also were responsible for
organizing armies, and this they
did by calling upon
agricultural workers and laborers,
who served without pay
but whose services did not have
the public character that
we might associate with citizen-armies.
Infantry were
recruited on the basis of their residence
in the outlying
farms or in the various urban districts.
Each of these
districts, subject to familial rule, would
be called upon
by the commune to supply a certain number
of troops.
The communes of Italy were still based
upon private

authority.

Though law was made by agreement of the coun-

cils, the restricted nature of citizenship,
combined with

traditions residual of feudal ties, created

a

situation

in which noble families still held political control

within their districts or lands.
Town ghettos of noble families organized themselves

on clan lines.

Sworn armed societies, "consorteria

,

staked out an urban enclave and consolidated local rule.
Thus twelfth century Florence was divided up into dis-

crete districts; each noble family built

a huge

stone

tower in its own district that defined its space and
served as an urban military outpost, through which sur-

rounding streets, secret tunnels, and byways were routed .2

in Machiavelli's "Life
of Castruccio Castracani
of Lucca,"
for instanoe, we read how,
on the eve of an attempted
coup, "Castruccio cautiously
fortified the Onesti tower

and filled it with munitions
and with a store of food,
so
that if he had to, he could
defend himself in it fo r some
3
days."
"The History of Florence"
also describes feuding
families, organized by district,
frequently taking refuge
in their towers;
...one party adhered to the Buondelmonti
the
other to the Uberti.
And because these families
were strong in houses and towers and
men, they
fought together many years without one
driving
*
the other out.
,

Despite the public character, then, of communal
governance,
factions and family loyalties remained the basis
of ef-

fective political power.
Commerce and trade gave rise, however, to new social
and political classes.

The aristocratic communes came in-

creasingly under pressure throughout the thirteenth century to share their power with the rising middle-class of
artisans, guild members, shop owners, and smaller merchants.
This new class, called the "populo," appeared throughout
the Italian city-states to demand an expansion of the citi-

zenship lists, the right both to elect and serve on the
city councils, and relief from a tax system which in-

creasingly and disproportionately burdened them.

The

political antagonisms and mistrust engendered by the

"populo's" rise were to mar-v
u
mark fh.
the subsequent
history of
the Renaissance city-states.
The first attempt in
thirteenth century Florenceand in other Italian
city-states-to calm the ensuing
factionalism was to call upon
a government official
who,
brought in from outside the
city-state, was elected by the
competing factions. Such a
system of government, based
upon a powerful "podesta," was
ubiquitous in Northern
Italy until the late fourteenth
century.
time, however, the "podesta" became
besieged by the same sorts of
intense factionalism that had
plagued both the commune and
rule by the "populo."
many cases a concentration of
public powers (and prayers) in the
"podesta 's" hands
helped transform the office into a
hereditary despotism, a
"signoria." The shift towards such tyranny
was often the
sole means of counteracting the growing
militancy of factions and parties vying for power. But the
"podesta" and

m

m

the "signoria" invariably came to power with
their own

private militia at their side.

Private armies, then, be-

gan to flourish as public authority became distrusted
by
all.

And political power increasingly became the object

of open confrontations among the nobility, the middle-

class, the day laborers, and heads of state.

Labor guilds, like the whole clan system of the com-

mune members, were armed societies in competiton for pub-

»«

Power.

„

the middle-class

„

populo „ exued

^

nobi
xty in reprisal for
its politicai
intransigence
aristocrats,
deprived Qf
contract from foreicm
rgn son
soil the services
of private armies
comprised of mercenary
soiaiers. And
>„h where
k
y soldiers
the communes
or "podesta" remained
or returns
returned to power, their
first
task was to disarm the
"populo" and the guilds.
The Italian city-states
could not trust their
own
inhabitants to provide for
their military defense.
The.
rise of mercenary armies
is attributable to
the lack of
Public political unity of
the early Renaissance
city-state.
in lieu of legitimate
public power the city-states
were
marked by weak and fractious
governance vith class power
exercised by ruling families or
held in check by acknowledged despots.

^Uated

_

^

^

<-

,

In Florence the Medici family
held political power,
though it did not serve elected
office.
1378 the

m

aristocratic govenment was challenged
dramatically by the
Ciompi Revolution, a short-lived linen
workers' uprising
against the heavy tax burden placed upon
day laborers and
upon the surrounding towns. 5 Budgetary
problems had long
plagued the Florentine state, and the relative
decline in
export industries resulting from the rise of
Dutch and

Hanseatic League trade cut precipitously into
the local
economy. Heavy indeptedness to the Medici banking
family
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to pay condottieri
and mercenaries and
to subsidize a

flagging export trade
forced a gradual
consolidation after
the Ciompi Revolution.
Both at home and abroad
the Medici
family and its wealthy
partisans came to run the
city-

state,

its diplomatic corps,
one of the first in Europe,

was recruited entirely
from the banking staff,
and after
the establishment of family
rule under Cosimo Medici
in

1434 the interests of the family,
in Italy and on the

Continent, were one and the same
as those of Florence. 6
For the next sixty years Medici
rule was ensured by
its complete domination of
the "Accoppiatori - the list
of eligible property holders
who could legally take part
in government.
But the death of Cosimo 's son,
Lorenzo
Medici, brought to power a weak and
indecisive successor,
his son, Piero Medici.
Once again the voting lists were
altered, as they had periodically been in
earlier centuries of communal and Podestral rule.
,

Fiscal problems also mounted as Florence
sought to

keep its obligations with the other Northern
Italian citystates bound by the Treaty of Lodi of 1454.
The armed

invasion in 1494 by France under Charles VIII, who had
been persuaded by the Duke of Milan, Ludovico Sforza,
to

help him wrest control of the Duchy from the nobility,

only exacerbated Florentine insecurity.

Without a defend-

ing army, scarcely able to contract mercenaries, the

Florentine nobility succumbed
to an uprising of the
"populo." Popular sentiment
against Med c
s
ther whipped up by the
massively popular Christ ian-repub-

^

.

.

licanpreach^gsof Savonarola.

By November 1494 the

middle-class of merchants and
skilled laborers forced
Piero Medici from the city.
On Dcember 22 a guiding
constitution was established by both
the old wealthier
families and by the new middle-class.
The new Florentine Constitution,
more a set of guide
lines for governance than a formal
document establishing

sovereignty and legal rights, prescribed
the composition
of ruling councils, the qualifications
for
serving on

them, and the duties of the particular
councils created
to oversee public affairs.

7

A Grand Council,

of the Commune of the People, was formed.

a

Council

This Council,

the seat of legislative approval rather than a
delibera-

tive body, was comprised wholly of Florentine
citizens.

About one out of every four to five males, 3,000 out of

a

total population of some 70,000, could sit on the Grand

Council to vote on legislation.

Property qualifications

far less restrictive than those prevailing under Medici

rule determined eligibility for citizenship.

new "Accopiatori

,

"

Thus the

still providing the eligibility list

for the Grand Council and its numerous boards, was democ-

ratized along with the entire procedures of governance.

^

The chief executive
board under the Grand
Council
the Si.noria," was
comprised of ei g ht Priors
of Liberty
and chaired bv
a
"r=>^-F~i
uy a banrolaniere
p an
~
re "
Each
°f
these nine offloors served a two-month
term and was elected
by ballots
drawn from the "Accoppiatori
"
Such two-month rotating
terms characterized all
executive board positions
under
the new constitution.
They helped to rotate
the exercise
of political power and
to obviate the emergence
of ruling
factions.
But these short terms,
while justified in terms
of truly republican civic
participation, proved all too
effective only in fragmenting
Florentine political power.
Among the most important
executive boards of the
Republic were the Board of Ten
("Dieci di Balia") for
v,

*

.

diplomacy and command of the army,
a Board of Eight ("otto
di Guardia") to administer
justice, and the Monte
("ufici-

aldi di Monte")

for financial matters.

In 1506 a Board of

Nine ("Nove di Milizia") was also
established to draw up,
but not to command, a native army.

Machiavelli gained his first-hand experience
in
government in 1498 as unelected secretary

to the Board of

Ten.

His detailed communications with the
Board and with

other legates and ambassadors while on diplomatic
mission
to the courts of France's Louis XII, the Holy
Roman Em-

peror Maximilian

I,

Cesare Borgia, and Pope Julius II were

widely read and admired in government circles.

They also

earned Machiav^i
tuavelU the respect and
confidence of the
"Ganfolaniere a vita"
("Ganfolaniere"
1

i

f irst

for life), Pi ero

Soderini; upon his
appointment in 1502 he began
relying
heavily on Machiavelli
as his personal advisor
in diplomacy.
After assuming the
secretaryship of the Board
of
Nine, and until his
removal from his offices
after the
Medici restoration of
1512, Machiavelli played a
conspicuous role in the statecraft
of the Florentine Republic.
The Florentine Republic was
hardly a stable government during its eighteen year
existence.
Domestic conflicts between the older aristocratic
families,
the

"ottimati," and the republican-minded
middle-class advocates of commerce and civic
participation appeared immediately.
The "ottimati," the long-established
Florentine

families who had moderately supported
the Medici regime,
stood for Florentine government by the
aristocratic few,
by those informed by the ideals of civic
virtue among the

well-endowed and enlightened.

They resented the rising

middle-class merchants and tradesmen,

for these new groups

gave voice to a more representative government,

"il governo

largho," and were viewed as unworthy members of
the new

Grand Council.
The great mass of the Florentine populace, the im-

poverished plebian workers ("plebe," "Infima plebe,") was

excluded completely from this debate between "il populo
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grosso" and

-

±1 populo minuto „
over

constitution.*

^

^

However democratizing
the

^

^

Pontine

Re-

public was in bringing
several thousand townsmen
into the
governing circles, the
prevailing language and
practice
of Renaissance politics
provided no framework for
the
incorporation of the masses,
the mob, "il vulgo ,„ into
the polity.
it was Machiavelli s
contribution to modern
political thought that he
provided a secular grounding
for theories of national
patriotism, legitimacy,
'

and

citizen-armies.

These theories formed over the
next four
centuries the rudiments of a popular
constitutionalism

within a recognizably modern state
system.

9

Besides being torn domestically,
Florence, along with
the other Italian city-states,
suffered
at the hands of

foreign invaders.

in Machiavelli s life alone,
•

1469-1527,

Northern Italy was invaded or occupied by
French, Spanish,
Swiss, and Imperial armies, as well as by
roving mercenary
bands organized by Ludovico Sforza in Lombardy
and Cesare

Borgia in Tuscany.
The invasion of Milan in 1494 by French troops
under

Charles VIII illustrated Italian diplomatic and military
weakness.

Italian diplomacy had always been more con-

cerned with trade routes and banking than with protection
of its own land and people.

For several centuries its
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-ty-states had en joy e d

ilranunity

Itauan states m en had
grown

^
^^

from foreign

^

indifferenfc

o

nationai power fcetween
their own
10
the Continent.

thQse

^^^

The patterns of modern
diplomacy afid
relations e merged in the
late fiffceenth

outposts ana tra ding
networks a mong Lond on,
Paris, F1 orenc,
Venice, Rotter d am, and
the nanseatic
Hanseatio tLeague.
0=
Between
France and Plorenrp
f^vlorence, for
instance, there existed
a strong
trading relationship that
became the basis for a
tacit
alliance that greatly affected
the Republic's affairs.
Anti-Roman sentiments, fed by
more than half a century
of
Papal residence in Avignon and
the subsequent ecumenical
schism, encouraged French
ties with those Italian
,

city-

states seeking control of Romagna
lands.
But after the
Hundred Years War (1335-1453)
with England, France became
a

centralized nation-state with an
enormous military capacity,
its strength dwarfed that

of the Italian cities.

The French invasions of Milan and
Naples, the subsequent
creation of the Holy League under
papal sponsorship, and

Florence's failed campaign

to restore Pisa to its control

all severely challenged Florences
position around the end
of the fifteenth century.

The Milanese invasion threatened Italian
security and

.
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underscored its military
unpreparedness.
cessful conquest of Naples

France's suc-

the next year despite military

assistance by Venice forced the
Italian states to rethink
their traditional diplomacy and
to prepare a defense of
their borders. Venice was the
first to recognize this
dilemma after it could no longer
successfully defend its
extensive Neapolitan commercial
interests.
reaction to
the French threat an alliances was
concluded in

m

1495 among

England, Spain, the Holy Roman Empire,
the Papacay, and
Venice.
Known as the Holy League, it constituted
Venice's
concession to the larger demands of European
balance-ofpower politics. Though nominally aimed at
the Turkish

threat to

southeastern Europe

(a

threat made all the more

apparent after the fall of Constantinople in
1453), it was

understood by all really to be targeted against France.
The Treaty of Venice banded these powers together
under

the multilateral promise of aid in case of foreign inva-

sion

11

The protracted and frustrating Pisan campaign focused

attention on a widely suspected struggle of Florence to
retain hold over that small city.
commercial outpost.

Pisa was an important

It lay close the the Mediterranean

Sea near the mouth of the Arno River.

trade passed through the city.

Much Florentine

Pisa had been something of

a Florentine colony ever since the reign of Lorenzo Mag-

.
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nifico.

Domestic uprisings, aided
by the French (1)
however, throated
Florentine hegemony there.
From 1495 to
1509 the Rep ubllc .s me
rcenaries, later aided by
a small
Provincial mllitia , were
engaged .„

^

&

^

supress the revolt and to
ensure Florentine rule.
A
series of treaties, none
of the m conclusive,
was signed
between Florence and France
throughout this period in
an
attmept to limit the conflict.
Florence finally
norence
fH„-„ii
triumphed,
but not before its treasury
was drained
•

due to its inef-

fective-and very expensive-mercenary
army.

12

The failures of the Pisan
campagin illustrated

Florence's diplomatic and military
impotence.
The colonial war, more dramatically than
the French invasion,
showed the profound limits of
Florentine power.
mdecisiveness at home, due to class
antagonisms and a weak
treasury, was exacerbated abroad by
an expensive and
bumbling mercenary army unable to complete

the siege of

Pisa.

For Machiavelli the lesson was
unmistakable;

citizen-army would be far superior to

a

a

purchased militia.

It fostered loyalty and conviction among
the soldiers, and

it required that the government be
legitimate enough to

motivate public participation in both military and
fiscal
affairs
Renewed foreign invasion underscored the city's mili-

f
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tary weaknesses
es.

A1m u the
u
Though
invasions by France under
Louis XII, and soonn thereaf
Pr by
k,
e
rnereafter
Spam
under Ferdinand
and Isabella, never
touched directly upon the
republic's
territory, their ability
to occupy regions of
the Peninsulu, coupled with the
campaigns of Cesare Borgia
in
Tuscany, worsened Florence's
position.
rm,

+.

•

Cesare Borgia, also known as
Duke Valentino (by which
name Machiavelli calls him
in the famous seventh
chapter
of "The Prince"), organized
in the early sixteenth
century
an army seeking establishment
of a papal territorial state,
the Romagna, in the Tuscan Plain
around Florence. He
campaigned with papal blessing from
the Borgia Pope, Alexander VI, who happened to be Cesare
's father.
Cesare

Borgia successfully exploited diplomatic
and military
weaknesses throughout the region of the sort
that Florence
now suffered from.
Before his untimely death in
1503, he

had conquered his way through most of the
small Tuscon

city-states and towns and now stood but
the walls of Florence.

a

few miles from

This latest challenge proved yet

another crisis which helped weaken republican rule.
Machiavelli

'

s

extensive reports to the Board of Ten

show great admiration for the means by which Cesare con-

solidated his power over regions: replacing local rule
that could not be trusted with allies whose support was

assured.

The training and loyalty of his troops and the

>
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decisiveness of his actions
greatly
tine legate.
"The Duke cannot be
considered like other
petty princes," wrote Machiavelli
after a month with
Cesare Borgia, "but must be
regarded as a new power in
13
Italy."
compared to the other Italian

princes, the Duke

alone was a force to be reckoned
with.
Machiavelli admired "the Duke, with his unheard-of
good fortune, with
a courage and confidence
almost superhuman, and believing
himself capable of accomplishing
whatever he undertakes.' 14
Though withholding judgement on his
ethics and the political legitimacy of his rule,
Machiavelli respected
Cesare 8 political skill and the acumen
with which he
enhanced his power over weak princes and
republics.
The passing of the Borgia family from
Italian poli-

tical ascendancy only temporarily relieved
Florentine

problems.

At home,

"il practica," the advisory board of

the most elite citizens, grew in its influence,
and the

overburdened treasury appeared in 1505 incapable of supporting future mercenary adventures.

Small wonder that

the next year Machiavelli, as secretary to the Board of

Nine, took responsibility for recruiting a militia of

20,000 men from the lands surrounding Florence.
The creation of this force, not a citizen-army but

rather a standing militia, helped to complete the siege of
Pisa,

though not until 1509.

But even with the end of

the Pisan campaign Florence's diplomatic and domestic de-

.
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dine continued.

Payments to

^

^
^^^^
^^

x

forestall invasion from
the north proved
tive means of "defending"
the republic, for
persistent
Political and military
pressure
by

^

the city-state on
precarious ground. Th e
ascendancy of
the Medici family to the
Papacy in 1512, combined
with the

continued pressure of the Holy
League, ultimately forced
the republic's demise.
November 1512 the constitution
of December 22 was junked
completely when the old

m

"ot-

timati" conspired with the
Medici family. The Holy
League's troops stood, quite
literally, at the city's
walls, ready to overrun them if
necessary.
it was not
necessary.
Soderin fled the city in panic, as
did many of
the most ardent republicanists
Soon Machiavelli was branded the
"mannerino," the
lackey, of the "Ganf olaniere a vita."
His close association with the discredited Soderini
placed him in Medici
disfavor.
Despite his efforts at building up the Florentine militia his continuation in public
service proved

impossible.

So suspected was he,

in fact, of favoring the

overthrow of the newly restored Medici regime that he
was
briefly tortured and forced to confess his role in
a
sus-

pected coup d'etat.
confess.

There was nothing for Machiavelli to

He never had, nor ever would, conspire against

the Medici.
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Machiavelli.

s

^_ ^ ^^

republican sympathies
neverthelc
.ess
remained wi th him
throughout

^

reticent.

For fourteen ygars
he

^

^.^.^

held in low esteem,
forced to write plays,
poetry, an d
histories, rather than his
diplomatic correspondence.
But he also wrote "The
Prince" and the "Discourses."
The specific themes of
these two central works
we
shall explore in the
subsequent section.
But first we

need to not here how
formative for Machiavelli
s thinking
were his own experiences
in government.
The several crises of the Florentine
Republic provide the backdrop
for
his later writings.
In his work he concerns
himself
centrally with those political
problems the city-state
encountered after the Medici overthrow
of 1494.
Machiavelli 's support of limited republican
government never
left him, and if he writes so
passionately of centralized
authority it is to compensate for the
factionalism ed•

I

demic to the Italian commune and the
later Florentine
Republic.
He reminds the admirer of such
decisive leadership that real power, to be virtuous,
must always embrace
the customs and traditions of the polity
which
it governs.

The Central Concepts of Political Action
It would indeed be difficult to interpret
Machiavelli
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^

as anything but a
villainous teacher Qf
Prince" were the only
work he had written.
Thosw who
read Machiavelli in
such a light, as the
preacher of evil
and cunning, do not by
accident treat this brief
work as
if it existed alone,
as if Machiavelli had
written no
other.
But of course he wrote
many others, and in this
section I explore themes
and concepts that run
throughout
his writings and thought.
By developing the several
categories of Machiavelli- s
approach to legitimacy,
statecraft,
and political action, we
shall see how this early
modern
version of realism emerges from
an understanding of vir-

^

tuous statesmanship in constant
tension

between domestic

corruption and foreign threat.
"The Prince," Machiavelli

•

s

most famous work, ex-

hibits all of his historical knowledge
and analytic skills
from the perspective of a prince and
of great men, both
ancient and contemporary. The choice,
at the ouset, of

the prince's point of view is not for
Machiavelli the sole

perspective one could develop.

Others are available, for

example those from the standpoint of republics
or cities
undergoing corruption. One should on occasion
make use
of these different perspectives, as indeed
Machiavelli
did.

5

vails.

But in this work the prince's point of view preIt is hardly coincidental, one should add,

the work is dedicated to the new Florentine Prince,

that
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The author is practically
begging for a return to political life. What better
manner of demonstrating one's
loyalty than with a work extolling
principalities? 17
The book appeals to the virtues
of a principality
as superior to both a popular
democracy and an aristocratic, oligarchic regime.
The prince alone manifests
the

necessary qualities of leadership and
fortitude, combined
with clearsightedness of intent and
knowledge of

what con-

stitutes the territory's needs.
the populace.

He knows how to protect

And as in the "Discourses," the author

appeals to historical examples, especially
those of the
Roman Republic and of Athens and Sparta, to
illustrate the

principles of virtuous action he is advocating.
The method appears inductive.

As such it has been

lauded as the first modern example of empirical political
science. 18

Machiavelli is careful throughout his work to
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induce from particular
occurrences universal
principles
and to advance then, as
maxims which might guide
the actions of princes. But
one discerns a pattern
in Machiavelli.
principles, however inductively
s
he may have arrived at them.
For he worked within
the prevailing framework of Renaissance historiography.
One finds in his political
writings certain tendencies, and they lead one to
believe his methods were not
as
purely inductive as claimed by
those who see Machiavelli
as a political "scientist."
Like his contemporaries Bernardo Rucellai and Marcantonio
Sabellico, Machiavelli had
a profound sense of the ancient
world as superior to the
modern.
Historical recurrence was widely acknowledged

with respect to the actions of public
men and to the
fates of armies.
History tended towards
no "telos,"

progress in human affairs was

a

chimera.

Instead man was

condemned to periodic ascendance and decline.

Neither

permanence nor evolution marked human affairs.
In their normal variations, countries generally go from order to disorder and then from
disorder back to order, because since Nature
does not allow worldy things to remain fixed-when they come to their utmost perfection and
have no further possibility for rising, they
must go down. Likewise, when they have gone
down and trhough their defects have reached
their lowest depth, they necessarily rise,
since they cannot go lower. 19

—

This cyclical image of human affairs has charac-
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termed

all epochs.

Great men, then
LIlfc;n

can learn
l.
.
from the
actions of outstanding
leaders i n the past,
for neither
human nature nor human
values have processed
or evolved
from ancient days.
Manhi« w «nYs.
Machiavelli
summarizes his views in
"The Prince:"
'

I.

s
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The inductive method of
Machiavelli, then, reflects
certain predilections of
philosophical history that conditioned his views of leadership
and action.
The book is not intended for
anyone, however; these
are not principles of action to
employ at will outside the
context of maintaining a principality.
for underlying all
cf Machiavelli' s work is the need
to ensure stability,
to

facilitate effective foreign policy:
"effective" understood throughout as security of territory
in

the face of

armed invasion, and as protection of
the regime's rule in
its own domain.
Political security is the "sine
qua non"

of good governance.
A built-in ambiguity on this point
persists.

For

Machiavelli clearly emphasizes the dual nature of
poli-

s

tical security.

such security is to be
understood as
both the territorial
security of a particular
province,
region, republic or
principality and-simultaneous
with
this security-as the
continuation of the legitimate
regime's domestic rule. The
overriding concern of virtuous rule, as „e shall see,
is to preserve these two
spheres of security.
The state,

»lo state/' whose security
is the goal of

good governance, entails both

a social

community and a

political regime.

Throughout the late Middle Ages
and the
(early) Renaissance the term
"lo state" referred to both
the territorial estate of an
effective sovereign and to
the rights and powers belonging to
that ruler.
The gradual overturning of feudal relations
and its replacement by
communal of Podestral governance weakened
the proprietary
sense of the state, though, and it became
Machiavelli
'

contribution to political thought that he politicized
the

traditionally possessive and personal conception of
the
Renaissance state.

Machiavelli seeks to locate the state

within the public space of modern urban life.
In his writings Machiavelli tries to root the founda-

tions of the state in the traditions and customs of the

people who are governed.

The prince's power depends upon

the support he receives from the citizenry.

One must have

military strength in order to protect the state, for in-

stance, but such
n power
oowpr lse r,^4not merely some
empirical phenomenon of soldiers and
materiel.
If this were
;

SQ

,

cenaries and fortresses
would fulfill the prince's
requirements,
yet far more is needed
^ternis o f estab lishing legitimate domain,
"even though a new prince^
very strong in armies, he
must have the inhabitants'
favor when moving into a new
21
province."
protect the
province one will also need the
continued respect of the
inhabitants.
"Even though you have a fortress,"
warns
Machiavelli, "if the people hate you,
it does not protect
you, because the people when they
take up arms never
.

^

lack

foreigners to aid you." 22
is essential to a prince.

Thus "the people's friendship

Otherwise in adverse times he

has no resources." 23
A particular kind of respect is required,
then, to
allow the prince to protect "lo stato." it
is
fear,

neither hatred nor love, which gives rise to
respect from
the people; "from such fear flows respect, and
this the

prince can hope to bring forth more than love itself." 24
These themes emerge in the famous sixth chapter of

book three of the "Discourses," "On Conspiracies."

After

discussing every conceivable manner of overthrowing a
regime and of assassinating princes, Machiavelli concludes
that,
Of all the dangers that can appear after the
deed, there is none more certain or more to

be feared than when
the people love the
6
for *his, conspirators
rhavTn!;"
have no remedy, because
they can nevpr
eVer
make themselves safe from
the peop?e?2§

The prince seeking support
of the citizenry has to
express, embody, and at times
simply appear to embody,
traits peculiar to politics.
One nutfU&JjQt hc lever
and
powerful, strategic and forc
eful f ginn inq and
The
Prince must be a fox, therefore,
to recognize the traps
and a lion to frighten the
wolves." 2 ^ One must be able to
act generously, in a liberal manner,
with mercy, with

jH^

truthfulness, seriously, and religiously.

..

But for a

prince, "it is not necessary actually
to have all the
above-mentioned qualities, but it is very
necessary to
27
appear to have them.'
This familiar litany of the cunning
prince, however,

does not suffice to enumerate the qualities
of successful
rule.
For the prince's ability to be good, and
his knowledge of how not to be good, are not enough
to secure a
state, nor a citizen's respect

Machiavelli suggests that

a

A Even

in "The Prince,"

ruler can best consolidate

his hold of the state by promulgating laws that conform
to the customs and traditions of the territory;

"The

principal foundations of all states, the new as well as
the old and the mixed, are good laws and good armies." 28

Only good laws, in conjunction with good armies, will

.

enable the prince to
protect his do ra ain in both
politics
and diplomacy.
His vigorous and decisive
action, his
Prudent consideration of the
constraints in which he
operates, can help him overcome
the vicissitudes
of

history and nature and thus
to secure "lo state."
He can,
in other words, overcome
"fortune" through use of
"ragione"
and thereby manifest "virtu"
for
the glory and strength

of the state.

"Fortuna," invariably translated
as fortune, is the
realm in which non-rational forces
hold sway over history
and politics.
it embodies far more force and
sweep than
mere luck or fate; "fortuna" encompasses
not just one or
a few people in its dramatic
consequences but affects
whole regions, continents, even eras.
In reversing trends
of history, it establishes a whole new
design of human

affairs
One should distinguish between events of
nature, such
as floods, plagues, and famines, and those that
affect the

course of human events through shifts in power and prestige.

"Fortuna" implies the unforeseeable character of

this latter class of events.

The status of leaders, so-

cial classes, armies, and governments remains subject to
the vagaries of public life; it is the sudden turnabout
in political and military affairs not fully within human

grasp.

The force of history constrains human action, and

.

^

control it.

Neither a product Qf
God's will nor punishment
for earthly sin,
"fortuna- in
te Maohiavellian framework stands
as a profoundly secul
ar
coonept.
History as an immanent
category embodies itself
in "fortuna;" "Things
come up and events take
place
"

against^which the Heavens do
not wish any provision
to be
made."
They sweep over human
affairs like a river

surging over its banks,
establishing its course anew.
Cesare
Borgia, for instance, who
profited from "fortuna" in his
attempt to establish a Papal
state throughout Tuscany,
was towards the end of 1503
suddenly its victim. His
father, Pope Alexander VI, suddenly
died, and then the
Florentine state unaccountably held
off his armies when
the Borgia Duke took ill and died.
The Tuscan Plain was

suddenly freed of Borgia rule.
and unknowable.

Thus "fortuna" is fickle

Those who ride well upon its crest may

some day find themselves in its trough.

Machiavelli

warns us that "any prince who relies exclusively
on Fortune falls when she varies." 30
The fate of a Guelf leader plotting against the

Florentine state in 1378 exemplifies "fortuna' s" curious
ways
Piero degli Albizzi received no aid from the
greatness of his house or from his longstanding reputation: for years he had been honored
and feared above every other citizen.
Once
when he was giving a banquet to many citizens,
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Yet "fortuna" does not always
turn so regularly as
Ixion in Hades, chained to his
revolving wheel. 32 its
very unpredictability provides
man with a moment of

political recognition: the consciousness
that timely action might yet seize the day and
reverse the direction of
events apparently immutable.
...it is very true, according to what
we see
in all histories, that men are able
to assist
Fortune but not to thwart her. They can
weave
her designs but cannot destroy them.
They
ought, then, never to give up as beaten, because, since they do not know her purpose
and
she goes through crooked and unknown roads,
they can always hope, and hoping are not to
give up, in whatever fortune and whatever
affliction they may be. 33

But "fortuna" does not determine human affairs;
she

only alters their course and delimits the sphere in which
human action might be decisive.

Especially when one's

fortune is on the rise, political action can lend a shape
to events.

But such opportunities for action are limited,

and when fortunes are in decline man seems to act in vain;

.
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How much of political
history results from bold
initiative, how much from fate
or mere chance? Political
man is condemend to insecurity
about when to act decisively, or whether one's
efforts have made a difference.
As I am well aware, many
have
now believe human affairs so believed and
controlled Sy
Fortune and by God that men with
their prudence cannot manage them—yes,
more,
that
men have no recourse against
the world's
variations.
Such believers therefore decide that they need not sweat
much over
man s activities but can let
Chance govern
them... I myself now and then incline
in
some respects to their belief.
Nonetheless,
order not to annul our free will
I judge it true that
Fortune may be mistress
of one half our actions but that
even she
leaves t^e other half, or almost, under
our
control

m

"Fortuna" requires that a prince master her
to the greatest degree possible.
Here he must use "ragione:" the

mental ability to reason and deduce particular
actions
from the chaos of politics and history.

Not a product of

personal desire or will, "ragione" entails the dispassionate comprehension of the political vortex confronting
the prince and the state.

It was the characteristic

Florentine term for the rational quality of mind which de-
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cides

and directs statecraft
atecraft.

Ragione," the reasoned

alternative to rhn'^i
Christian Lhumility or
resignation," com .
bmed prudence with analytic
i
powers- it indicated
fwwers,
ind. , the
ability to deduce the
appropriate particular
from the
universe of action,
with "ragione" one
dispenses „i th
rllusory hopes and
overwhelming fears to
uncover patterns
of human behavior in
politics and warfare,
with inconsistencies and superfluities
revealed, a continuity
is
arrived at; therein lies
the basis for actions
that will
ameliorate the conflict. With
•ragione" one tames

"forThe cry for it calls out
against the feeling "of
helplessness in the face of
non-rational forces." 36
"Ragione" stands opposed to
"fortuna" from the standpoint of rational and deliberative
policy-making. But
sometimes "fortuna" works so
dramatically that there remains no time for relying upon
"ragione." Sometimes the
very force of circumstances compels
men to strike out
almost impulsively, certainly boldly,
against "fortuna."

tuna."

Such compelled action occurs in the
sphere of "necessity," necessity.
Renaissance Italy "necessita" was
said to have developed when the build-up
of adverse circums tances became so great that no
free choice to act rema ined.
Rational human calculations like those of "ra-

m

gione" were rendered ineffective and inadequate
before the
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overwhelm

force of events.

Under "necessita" act
ions

emanated not from careful
reflection but from a
spontaneous, reactive impulse
that inchoately
comprehended
exactly what had to be
done and that began to
do it
In
the struggle to tame
"
"fortuna," ragione ,„ tne
contempla .
tive dimension in relatively
guiet times, gave way to
"necessity » the impulsively
active dimension.

Acting from "necessita,"
thought Machiavelli, was
more certain and forthright
than acting from "ragione"
or
from mere fancy. Machiavelli
explains this when speaking
of where a republic may be most
securely established.
And because men act either through
necessity
or through choice, and because
ability appears the more where choice has less
power
it must be considered whether
for the building of cities it would be better
to choose
barren places, in order that men,
forced to
keep at work and less possessed by
may live more united, having becauselaziness
of
poverty of the site slighter cause for the'
disJ7
sensions
,

.

.

.

The coarseness of a people's life renders
it less

subject to corruption and more subject to the
bare necessities of existence.
In fact, when a people is reduced
to its most basic condition it responds most fitfully
of
all.

Witness the Britons, driven off their island by the

Germanic Angles under King Vortiger.

These dispossessed

inhabitants, being deprived of their native
land, of necessity became courageous and decided that though they had not been able to
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"Necessita" drives men to
action.
Motivation under
it i. the strongest
affect an army can know;
on the battlefield it powerfully
conditions the outcome of
battle.
8
hen
anCient leade
of armies
knew ;ho P er f SUCh
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freeing their enemies from
it.?.39

Fighting out of necessity,
fighting desperately for
one's own land and state,
creates not only fierce warriors but a war whose cause is
just.
the Machiavellian world, citizens and soldiers
know no greater good
than public life in their own
city-state. When this is
threatened they respond with a fervor
not merely vigorous
but ethically sanctioned.
Machiavelli articulates this
in the form of a plea for military
aid made by a leading
exiled Florentine citizen to Duke Filippo,
a mercenary
leader; the exiled plotter seeks reconquest
of his city
from the hands of the tyrants who now occupy

m

it.

In the body of a republic what illness can
be
more serious than servitude? What medicine
is
more necessary than that which relieves it
from this disease? Only those wars are just
that are necessary; and arms are holy when
there is no hope apart from them.
I do not

.
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know what necessity can
be greater th„n
0 " hat hol ^ss =an
surpass
£ takes
S£"ithat which
any man's native city
It is therefore most
certain that onr
cause is holy and just.
40
For Machiavelli, these
concepts of "fortuna,"
"ragione," and "necessita"
are internally related.
None
would make sense without
the other unless we
were to
distort completely the
purposes they serve in Machiavelli- s work.
"Portuna" alone would place
history beyond
conscious human agency.
"Ragione" by itself would be
mere
contemplation, outside of a
temporal and political
realm.

And "necessita" alone would
be sheer expediency: just
that
sort of instrumental rationality
so detested by anti-Machiavellians
Men within this conceptual
framework are not intrinsically evil; nor are they without
scruples.
But "necessita" in the face of "fortuna" may
force the prince's hand.
Cruel acts that eliminate usurpers
or that instill fear in
the hearts of a newly conquered populace
are occasionally
required to ensure the state's security.
Deceptive or

violent acts to rectify an otherwise overwhelming
situation may be demanded, then, by "necessita." And

for this

alone the prince must have recourse to acts of
political
evil.

But the capacity to commit evil when "necessita"

demands it is distinguished from always acting evilly.
The prince
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Men are not by nature
villainous, though they
have
the capacity to do evil
if their power is
threatened o r
their territory endangered.
But the virtuous prince
do es
not seek out the mere
accumulation of power.

Rather, h e
seeks glory in the eyes of
the people.
Glory is to be
found in legitimate political
power, and only "virtuwill help the prince and the
republic attain it.
The
prince who is completely cunning
and terroristic does not
manifest "virtu" and cannot hope
to achieve legitimate
power.
Success on the battlefield, always
a prerequisite
for secure power, does not exhaust
for Machiavelli the

achievements that give rise to "virtu."
In the broadest sense "virtu" is the
skill and cour-

age by which men come to dominate human
events and "fortuna." it indicates the innate quality of the
prince that
helps him to overcome "fortuna" and by which
innovations
of established political structures are made through

statecraft and arms.
Throughout "The Prince" Machiavelli
,
43
are predominantly
warriors.

1

s

men of "virtu"

They emerge unscathed in

the face of extreme danger by exhibiting in battle the

special qualities of foresight and strength of will, de-

.
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^
^^^

cisiveness and determination,
and bravery
Military prowess is an
essential
Qf
manifests "vi^." for
given
unpredictabmty

^

^
^

^

»f=rtuna» ana the primacy
of territorial security
Power is ever safe without
ultimate recourse to arms
when
necessary. But one who
does not litest "virtu"
may also
gam power, and though the enjoyment
of power be shortlived it still may be
sought unvirtuously
Maohiavelli>
however, condemns this
possibility. Agathocles,
_

for in-

stance, the anoient Prinoe
of Sicily, achieved his
pQsi .
tion by ruthless am bition
a nd by slaughtering
his opponents, whether senators,
civilians, or soldiers.
He then
maintained his power by suppressing
civil strife and by
attacking the Carthaginians.
Machiavelli comments on his
rule
It cannot, however, be called
virtue to kill
s fellow-citizens, to betray
friends, to
be without fidelity, without mercy,

one

without
religion; such proceedings enable one
to
sovereignty, but not fame... his outrageousqain
cruelty and inhumanity together with his
countless wicked acts do not permit him to
honored among the noblest men. We cannot, be
then, attribute to Fortune or to virtue
what
he accomplished without the one or the
other. 44
"Virtu" comes from the Latin "virtus;" the
"virtus"
of the citizen was his "manliness:" character that
quali-

fied a man for citizenship and that led to effective
civic

participation.

in the Machiavellian framework that "vir-
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tus» becomes the quality
of personal force
and energy
manifested by a leader „ ho
c omm ands
g ood "fortuna" and „ ho
deals effectively and nobly
with whatever "fortune"
br mgs.
"Virtu" is that political
quality which secures the
particularity of the polls within
the
i-iie betting
settino of »a universal
"fortuna" that is inherently
destabilizing.
it thus
transcends the capacity simply
to wield the instruments
of
power for the sake of maintaining
»lo state."
For the
virtuous man has an intuitive
grasp of the republic's
first and foundational principles.
His striving for
these, most conspicuously in
military affairs, but also
in domestic politics, elicits
both support for his actions
and the desire of the populace to
follow him.

"Virtu" manifests the strength and vigor
from which
political actions arise.
It is a prerequisite for leadership that becomes established collectively
by first postulating, then exemplifying, the coherence of
the political

community.

Government could not function, let alone ex-

ist, without it.

"Virtu," the principle of secular spiri-

tual dynamism that underpins the polis, is inspired
among

citizens by acts of leadership, of which courage in battle is the most enobling.

This movement of republics back toward their
beginnings is accomplished also by the mere
excellence of one man, without reliance on
any law that spurs people on to action; yet
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and their
that good men wish

These are two senses
of "virtu," then, in
Machiavelix's work.
Th e flrst one primarily
Qf „ The
the basically nonmoral
action of the prince who
secures »lo
state" in the face of
impending doom. Here the
innovator
imposes order upon "fortuna,"
and "ragione" supplies
for
him the practical dimension
which "virtu" carries out
in
statecraft. The second sense
of "virtu" places the virtuous leader squarely within
the political community.
Through the institutionalization
of civic virtue by means
of "good laws and good armies" 46
he establishes legitimate
rule.
Here the republic or principality
is provided a
secure foundation from which develop
commerce and trade in
civil society and animated public
political activity in

^

,

which all citizens partake.
This second aspect of "virtu," which
relates the innovator working against "fortuna" to the
innovator working

within a political community with customs and
traditions
to affirm, is the most important conceptual
transition

from "The Prince" to the "Discourses."

In the former

Machiavelli presents all he knows from the standpoint of
the prince and of great men; in the latter his perspec-

tive is that of the affairs of the world in general, and
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of the Roman Empire
in particular
F
CUiar
th
The concept of
"virx
tu" is expanded:
from thee skillc,
skills and policies
of the military commander to
the
ne soii-it=
spirit that guides
the republic
-

.

^

"

n

'

"public.

«-

is developed

4.

ideal of active
citizenship in the

Machiavelli

the realm which embodies
"virtu."

,

s

^^^^^ ^

The "Discourses" is the
work where Machiavelli
develops fully his concepts
of active citizenship
in the
republic.
unlike principalities,
republics are democraaristocracies, or elective
monarchies having legislators who make laws governing
a people's security.

ts,

Principalities are ruled by
administrative arms of the
prince who himself is sovereign,
whereas republics are
constitutionally founded and governed
by laws, under which
sovereignty the legislators preside.
Very often, Machiavelli notes, an overlapping system
of limited rule will
enable a state to avoid the Polybian
degeneration
of

government, from monarchy-tyranny to
aristocracy-oligarchy
to democracy-anarchy.

The Florentine Republic enjoys
such

mixed system; the legislative chamber,
the Grand Council, has an appointed overseer, "il
Ganfolaniere a vita."
Good laws result from public disagreement and
debate
between the nobility and the people of a republic.
And it
a

is

"animo," political soul, the vital core of political
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action, 48 that impels
men to public
puDxic spiritedness
snirif^
and that
conduces man to l iberty
Animo „ is
energi2ing
of action inherent in
political man.
The drive behind the
desire to excel in politics
and warfare, it impels
men to
greatness and to defense of
the polls; without it
"virtuwould cease to appear.
But "animo" differs from
"virtu"
by its being essential
to, indeed, definitive
of, human
nature as Machiavelli knew
it.
"Virtu," then, characterizes "lo state- whereas
"animo" is characteristic of
man
But private ambition often
undermines "animo," the
spark of politics.
The force that impels political
action, that characterizes
republican liberty can easily
become corrupted by fortune seekers
who display excessive,
.

private ambition.

..

^

^

Machiavelli calls this "ambizione."

Ke

accords it an instrumental quality
that is not to be found
in "animo." 'Ambizione" expresses
the self-serving desire
to accrue power and wealth in
competition against others

that benefits not the public but the purely
private sector.

By its very nature "overreaching and overweening," 49

"ambizione" poses a major threat to the liberty of
the
republic; it results in forms of personal or class
domi-

nation whereby politics becomes suppressed.

"Ambizione,"

whether manifested by individuals, classes, or states,
destroys politics and public life by orienting all action
towards private fain of wealth and power.
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in do m estic politics
the "ambizione" of
the nobility
tends to constitute a
greater threat to rep ubl
i C an liberty

than the "ambizione" of
the common people.
The only effective constraints on the
appetites of one class
appear
to be the appetites of
the other.
Thus republican liberty
is always marked by some
domestic conflict. To the
question which class, the nobility
or the people, should the
guardianship of liberty be entrusted
to, Machiavelli has
no consistent answer.

There is, then, a tension inherent
in the structure
of the republic.
Liberty is a precarious phenomenon.
Both "fortuna" and domestic political
strife may threaten
it.
But civic virtue and public discipline,
inspired by
"virtu" and flowing from "animo," can
secure the republic's moorings.
I say that those who condemn
the dissensions between the nobility and the people
seem to me to be finding fault with what
as a first cause kept Rome free, and to
be considering the quarrels and the noise
that resulted from those dissensions rather than the good effects they brought
about; they are not considering that in
every republic there are two opposed factions, that of the people and that of the
rich, and that all the laws made in favor
of liberty result from their accord... Nor
can a republic in any way reasonably be
called unregulated where there are so many
instances of honorable conduct; for these
good instances have their origin in good
education; good education in good laws;
good laws in those dissensions that many
thoughtlessly condemn. 50
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But "ambizione," or
excessive ambition, threat,
:ens
the very foundations
of the
ne re
remihUn
k undermining
P ub lic by
the
customs of liberty
libertv wh-i^K
which arouse civic virtue
and which
are embodied in the
laws.
The delicate balance of
republican liberty can be
upset completely through
the corruption of public spirit;
"...where the matter is not
corrupt, uprisings and other
disturbances do
no harm.

Where it is corrupt, well-planned
laws are of no use,...^ 1
Such corruption develops from
powerful factions that
fragment the political community.
The wealthy cl;.asses
and those whose power is founded
on personal influx
lence
rather than on merit and legally
sanctioned sources give
rise to this corruption.
By deceiving the people and
doing them wrong with impunity, the
unrestrained passions
of men corrupt the once virtuous political
community.
The Roman people, for instance, once
corrupted, began,
...in awarding the consulate, no longer
to
consider ability, but favor, putting in that
office those who knew best how to please men,
not those who knew best how to conquer enemies.
Then from those who had most favor,
they descended to giving it to those who had
most power, so that the good, because of the
weakness of such a procedure, were wholly
excluded from office. 52

The corrupted republic also begins to seek empire.

Only an expansionary goreign policy that enlarges the

republic's domain and that brings in more resources to
satisfy widespread demand can result from such corruption.
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The desire for power
ana wealth by the
nobility
sxtates external expansion;
and fro m the standpoint
of
the people empi re is
oraved so as to a randi
2 e the regg
public.

But even if the one
republic is not i mp erious
from
corruption, surely see
others will be. We
confront once
again the uncertainties
of diplomacy over which
"fortuna"
reigns.
And to the insecurities
of statecraft we add the
uncertainties caused by
"ambizione" as the product of
corrupted "virtu." The republic,
then, which desires the
security (if not the aggrandizement)
of its own existence
must struggle even harder
against "fortuna," and follow
"necessita," in anticipating
diplomatic currents. A
tough, forecful, perhaps even
expansionary foreign policy
is needed to forestall the ambitions
of other states and
to ensure its own safety.
Republican politics and the

desire for liberty as manifested in "animo"
motivate the
state here to maximize its security in
a sea

of "fortuna"

and "ambizione."

How much harder, then, to ensure such security
when
the republic itself suffers corruption!

"From all the

things explained above," writes Machiavelli, "comes
the

difficulty or impossibility of maintaining

a

government

in a corrupt city or of setting up a new government

Ill

there „53

^^-Z^iitic^ofa Citizen- Army
The corrupt nature of
Italian .ilitary practices
Plays a central role In
Machiavelli s thought. After
1494, after the first French
invasions of Charles VH1
into Milan and Naples, the
once-powerful Italian citystates fell defenselp^c;
f^^a
erenseiess to0 foreign
armies.
Swiss infantry
under contract to France fought
the armies of the Holy
League.
The tactics of Italian mercenary
warfare proved
ill-suited to fend off either the
French or the League's
armies led by Spain. Though cities
like Florence sought
an alliance with France, and while
other cities sided
with the League, the armies of Italy were
largely en+-

gulfed by wave upon wave of invasions.

The European

armies took to battle in Lombardy and Tuscany.

avelli this constituted

a

For Machi-

political and military disaster

that could only be counteracted by reforming
Italian

practices.

The politics of rebuilding the Italian system

of warfare thus became a central theme of his work.
The genius of Machiavelli

1

s

"The Art of War" is that

it construes warfare in terms of political relationships.

He studies here not simply weapons and tactics but also

the political conditions
in which good armies
might preserve good states. while
at one level he details
ad
absurdum military formations,
the size and shape of encampments, and proper techniques
for walling

in a city, at

another level he relates the
structure of
infantry to a citizenry animated

a

well-trained

by love of its republic.

To reform the system of
warfare endemic to Renaissance
Italy, then, one had to
reform the

political relation-

ships of which armies are a
part.

That meant both devel-

oping a theory of legitimate
public violence and establishing state institutions and
practices responsible for
executing it.
in Machiavelli s work, particularly
in
•

"The Art of War," that entailed a
citizen-army.

At the outset of his dialogue Machiavelli
disputes

the prevailing view of an unbridgeable gulf
between citizenship and military life. The ancients knew
no such in-

compatibility between public action and affairs of war.
When called upon the Romans would join the army, and
when
the war was over they would, like Cincinnatus, return
to

their fields or cities.

But in the modern age, in Renais-

sance Italy, custom preaches that the refinements, dress,
speech, and demeanor of the city are totally at odds with

the accoutrements of war.

warrior cannot be

a

Custom here sees that the good

good citizen, that a tradesman or

scholar has not the character demanded of modern combat.
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A gulf opened up between
the military professional
and the
citizen, a gulf f inding
justif ication
taste for the brutalities
of army life.

^

Machiavelli does not dispute
the horrific character
of Renaissance warfare.
But he does mistrust the
consequences of citizens turning
away from activities so
central to public security.
For it is just such popular
antipathy to organized violence
that seems to legitimate
the reliance upon professional,
mercenary warriors and
upon despots trained in the
arts of war.
Such reliance
upon professional soldiers can
only perpetuate a state's
corruption and insecurity, for the
government has not a
virtuous army defending it.
If not overrun by foreign
armies it will be betrayed by its own
forces as they constantly seek out new wars or impose their
own tyranny.
...he will never be reckoned a good man
who
carries on an occupation in which, if he is
to endeavor at all times to get income
from
it, he must be rapacious, fraudulent,
violent,
and must have many qualities which of necessity make him not good; nor can men who practice it as a profession, the big as well as
the little, be of any other sort, because this
profession does not support them in time of
peace.
Hence they are obliged either to hope
that there will be no peace, or to become so
rich in times of war that in peace they can
support themselves. .and from not wishing
peace come the deceits that the generals
practice against those by whom they are employed, ... 54
.

War, then, is too brutal to entrust to private citi-
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^

-ns,

in their concern
f

egos,

in their recurrent
search for grandeur and

„

boQty>

^

power-

over other armies,
over whole regiQns they
will lead more likely
to tyranny than to
security against
mvaders. War, then, being
too important for
private
citizens, must return to
the responsibility of
the state
It must become a public
matter, for only states,
led by

councils of citizens, can
conduct warfare in a manner
appropriate to defeating
aggression which win not arouse
mistrust among the populace
and dissension among polltical rivals.
...because this is a profession
which men cannot live virtuously by means of
at an times
it cannot be practiced as
a profession except'
XCSpt
by a republic or kingdom; and
neither 0 f
these, when they have been
has ever allowed one of its well-regulated
citizens
jects to practice it as a profession, or subnor has
any good map ever engaged in it
as
his
special
idl
F
profession. D

Signorial governance, replete with its
privately recruited armed guards surrounding a
hereditary or foreign
despot, had for too long marked the Italian
city-state's
response to the crisis of the commune.
Domestic dissension had perforce led to the disarming of
citizens and
the dependence of the state upon mercenary
armies for

defense in the North Italian plains.

Citizens grew too

comfortable in their pursuits of wealth and had developed

115

an abhorence of th*» ^v-^
the arts of war,
mU ch to the detriment
of the state
Mot-o tt-i-ii
More
wilUag to pay an added
levy than to
*.

•

volunteer themselves
ves for duty, too
absorbed in the diefates of a chn'cf
Chrrstran moralxty that
preaohed oonoiliation
-ther than fitness in
war ,"
-,

.

the civic

^

^

early modern Italian
city-state had abandoned
mii itary
-kill, and had developed
in their stead a
trained warrior olass. with the
teohnioal sophistioation
of new
weapons, particularly huge
cannons and hand guns
(..arquebuses"), the tasks of war
increasingly had become the
exclusive preserve of
specialists, professionals,
and

tose troops more concerned
with their own private
advancement than with love of country
or city.

The politics of a citizen-army
depends entirely upon
organizing an obedient, well-trained
infantry force, one
that emulates Roman tactics and
that will avoid the corrupting influence that so beset
the Italian mercenary
armies. And here we see not simply
some longing for antiquity; rather we see an appreciation
of the role played by
courageous soldiers who can be recruited,
trained, and
called upon in wartime and who would prefer
returning to

private affairs as soon as their triumph afield
secured
the state.
"Men,

steel, money, and bread are the sinews of war;

!

If,

but of these four the most
necessary are the first two,
because men and steel find money
and bread, but bread and

money do not find men and steel." 57

Machiavelli

•

s

pre-

ference for infantry, for battle
formations and tactics
organized around the shock-power
of men, emerges clearly
in

"The

Art.

of

W.i r

.

"

In 1506, during the siege of
Pisa, Machiavelli had

organized

militia of 20,000 men from the
provinces surrounding Florence.
In his treatise he articulates
a

the

concerns that guided him then and that
reside at the
heart of all good armies.
peacetime one needs no
standing army, only a relatively small core

m

of soldiers

guarding fortresses and cities.

Armies, on the contrary,

are drafted for purposes of fighting decisively
in battle.

Conscripts, drafted from the countryside, comprise

the best infantry.

since most of contemporary warfare

required long marches, encamping, digging trenches, building bridges, and having to live for months at a time
out

of doors, those already accustomed to such a lifestyle

wore most naturally suited to army life.

The wise general

shunned foreign volunteers, for they have left their homeland for reasons of exile, disloyalty,

fortune hunting, or

to escape punishment; these men, though able to fight

,

cannot be trusted to obey the orders necessary for successful Lnfantry tactics.

Citizens should assemble and
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train periodically in peacetime,
but not to the point
where they will be diverted
from their jobs at home.
During service they receive a
modest pay, but upon re-

turning from battle they lose their
salary, though not,
suggests Machiavelli, their weapons.

And leaders, cap-

tains, responsible for command of
each district are to
be rotated periodically lest
personal allegiances between

soldiers and leaders arise to endanger
the state.
In Machiavelli

envy of all Europe.

's

time the Swiss infantry were the
In Switzerland, owing to the cold,

icy, mountainous terrain, cavalry had
never been devel-

oped as systematically as in France or Austria.

Orga-

nized by cantons, democratically electing their own
leaders, Swiss soldiers had developed battle formations

that made them nearly invincible.

The Swiss tactics of

pikemen and halbrediers were perfected to the point of

transforming the whole European art of war in the fifteenth century.
Granson and Morat

In battles against Burgundian cavalry at
,

for instance, in 1476, the organized

shock tactics of Swiss infantry easily overwhelmed a nu-

merically superior army led by mounted knights and supported by foot soldiers and heavy guns.

58

The Swiss infantry formation relied upon ten rows of

pikemen.

Marching solidly in rank, perhaps 250 abreast,
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they held out before
the,

a

wooden rod so me eighteen

feet long that was
fitted with a steel-pointed
head
The
compactness of each row upon
row of infantry enabled
thei
P^es to extend out over four
lines of soldiers.
The
Pikes in the front line
extended the farthest,
those protruding from the second
line some three feet less,
and
those of the third, fourth,
and fifth lines correspondingly less.
Behind this first phalanx
of five rows of pikemen stood yet another, though
less densely organized,
ready to setp in in full
formation as the first phalanx
gave way, stepped aside, or
retreated.
Behind this second phalanx line, and between
the battalions of pikemen,
stood men armed with halbreds,
a sharp ax edge on one
side, a metal hook on the other,
affixed to an eight-foot
wooden shaft.
The mere sight of such an army
afoot must
have terrified an advancing army. The
first ranks of

pikemen, with their pikes held out at
full length, advanced as if a moving wall of spears: the
rear ranks, with

their pikes held upright, appeared as if a
marching forest.
Behind and between them one saw row upon row of
gleaming
metal.

When cavalry were halted by the phalanx of pike-

men the halbrediers stepped in and with two hands swung
their halbreds through the armor of the knights.

Plate

armor, less than l/64th of an inch thick, proved no pro-

tection against these lethal axes.
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The key to Swiss tactics was
the pikemen 's ability
to force knights to dismount.
In "The Art of War,"
Machiavelli expalins why horses
cannot be made to charge
into the lines of pikemen, and
why they halt and throw
off their riders.
Nor should anybody be astonished
that a knot
of infantrymen can resist any
charge of cavalrymen because the horse is a
perceiving animal which recognizes dangers and
is unwilling
to entre them.
And if you will consider the
forces making him go forward and those
holding
him back, you will see without doubt
those
holding him back are greater than those
urging
him on, because the spur drives him
forward,
but on the other hand the sword and the
pike
keep him back.
So... a knot of infantrymen is
secure against cavalry, indeed it is unconquerable by it... If you wish to experiment
with this, attempt to run a horse against a
wall; seldom will you find, no matter what his
impetus, that he will run against it. 59

Swiss infantry comprised a formidable army indeed.

Their pikemen and halbrediers wore little armor; at most
a light breatplate and not even a helmet,

for any undue

weight would retard their march into battle and thus
diminish their shock momentum.

Their line formation and

their order of retreat to let through the halbrediers

entailed a truly rigorous adherence to precise tactics:
tactics that other European armies were incapable of emulating

.

Machiavelli

'

s

admiration for Swiss tactics did not,

however, prevent him from criticism.

For when the Swiss

.
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met up with other
infantry they proved not
terribly
adept at close battle.
Their e mp hasis on long
weapons
wrelded only with two
hands and their disregard
for ar mor
rendered them vulnerable
to early sixteenth
oentury
Spanish infantry ar me d with
shields, short knives, and
swords.
The difficulties of the
Swiss mercenaries in the
employ of Louis XII, when
in battle with Spanish
infantry
during the Italian campaigns,
highlighted this problem for
»
Machiavelli.
The Art of War „ he suggests
fantry with Spanish weapons,
weapons copied from the
Romans

m

Machiavelli

^.^

's

respect for well-trained infantry
led

him not only to recognize the
shortcomings of cavalry; it
also led to his crituqe of artillery.
In the early sixteenth century the technology of cannons
and firearms had

not progressed to the point where these
weapons were reliable instruments of battle. 60 The first
cannons, cast in
bronze or iron, were enormous, clumsy, and
fickle tools of
war.
Owing to the necessity of casting thick gun
barrels,

cannons until the Thirty Years War (1618-48) weighted
from
four to thirty tons, had to be hauled by dozens of
oxen,

required at least

a

dozen men to load the shell (more

often than not a stone!), and could only be fired after

waiting more than hour for the breech and barrel to cool
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down from the last

f iring .

shells were

^^

^

^

cannon by huge deposits
of gunpowder placed
directly in
the breech, and the
enormous heat generated
from combustion would often cause
the cannon to crack or
explode
after just a few firings.
Beyond these problems, the
cannon had very limited range:
no more than 1,000 yards,
and this with little consistency.
Little wonder, then,
that Machiavelli complains of
how, with the exception of
besieging a city by battering its
walls

for days or weeks,

the cannon was a weapon hardly
to be called upon by a
general trying to outwit an army
on the battlefield.
The
clouds of smoke these early cannons
bellowed forth often
obscured the attacking army's own view;
its
shot was

terribly inaccurate, often firing shells
that landed
short upon the very army deploying artillery.

The cannon

itself was immobile or absurdly clumsy afield,
and it all
too frequently lured generals to neglect the
more funda-

mental art of infantry. 61
Tactical formations for encampment, marching, and

fighting required, in Machiavelli

'

s

view, rigid organiza-

tion; only when each man knew his role and perfomred it
in cooperation with his fellow soldiers could an army be

successful and virtuous.

In his discussion of camp life,

for instance, Machiavelli specifies the size, shape, and

structure of quarters for armies in the field.

A camp

is best thought of as
"a movable

city;""

±-

^^

Precisely, its streets have
names, each block of
tents
is numbered, each
inhabitant has an address.
The general
Presides literally at the
center of this camp, and
by
dispatching his aides to each
corner of the symmetrical
city he can establish a form
of social control.
He can,
for instance, prevent
contact between soldiers and
outsiders who might spy on or
conspire against him. Nightly
checks on the whereabouts of
each soldier will assure that
one can neither flee nore neter
furtively without immediately drawing the attention of
the general.
And harshly
enforced laws for all violations of
camp rules will instill fear of love of country does
not already govern
soldiers' actions.

Obedience is also assured by paying soldiers
only
two-thirds of their pay when they serve in
the field.

The remaining third remains deposited with
the paymaster,
to be remitted only at war's end.

And all booty collected

in warfare becomes not the private property of
the soldier

collecting it but rather the public property of the entire army.

Valorous men should be financially rewarded,

however, if they are the first to scale the wall of a

besieged city or recapture

a

flag taken by the enemy.

But too great an opportunity for economic gain will dis-

tract an army from its duties.

In 1439,

recounts Machi-
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avelli, Niccolo Piccino,
in command of the
Milanese army
occupying Verona, lost the
city's fortress when Count
Francesco descended upon him
while the defending soldiers
were busy looting. when
Niccolo

^

tUrn his soldie
toward
he gave orders to prepare
for defense.
But he was tQo
^ ecause
I
barricades cutting off his castle
were
not
made, and in ther lust for booty
and ransoms the soldiers were scattered,
he could not bring them together so that
quickly
enough to prevent the Count's
soldiers
from reaching the fortress and
thence
descending into the city. Thus the
Count
triumphantly regained Verona, with
shame
to Niccolo and harm to his soldiers. 63

^

Vernn^
Verona,

Obedient soldiers, then, remain reliable
in battle.
By keeping them away from sources of
private
gain the

general knows his troops are ready to fight
for the
state's safety, not for their private
aggrandizement.
Infantry tactics and obedience, however, are
not the

only arts of war at which
adept.

a

general and his army need be

Sophisiticated strategems, maneuvers of outright

deception, will often enable an army to steal a victory
or to retreat without suffering a rout.

The art of de-

ceiving your enemy about your own intentions is crucial
to successful warfare.

Numerical superiority alone in

arms or men will never suffice to decide a battle when

human intelligence is at work guiding armies.

Here we

encounter warfare not as the clash of metal against metal
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but as the human
struggle of vi rtu0 u s
and clever men
seeking advantage over
their adversaries.
What do stratagems in
warfare look like? when
an
encamped army wishes to
deceive an ene my about
its size
the wise general will
not alter his camp routine
after
receiving reinforcements or
upon losing many men.
Do not
tell anyone but the
narrowest circle of confidants
exactly
your intentions for tomorrow's
battle, for your own men
fight best when instructed
only at the last moment, and
in
this manner you obviate the
problem of spies or informers
getting early word of your
formations.
Do not dispatch

ambassadors in noble garb; disguise
them, instead, as
servants or commoners who can thereby
gain valuable information surreptitiously. Machiavelli
also suggests the

strategem of "disinformation," though
he does not describe
it as such; plant mistrust among
the enemy by spreading
in

your own camp rumors of your plans and
then allow some
prisoners to escape with false word of what
you plan.

When on campaign in search of an enemy
on the march, send
off some men to attack the adversary's homeland,
when

besieging a city on the brink of starvation, allow a
fattened -up cow to be captured by the townsmen; when they
slaughter it and open up its belly they will see how well
fed is your army, and they will despair even more of
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their pli ght

Should your own auguries
on the eve of
battle turn out to be
unfavorable, dece i ve your
troops
and interpret the signs
positively lest your men
fall into
doubts about their fate.
if you need tQ ford a
while retreating, instead
of having half of your
army
stand by idly waiting to
cross, send the, to the
rear so
they can build a diversionary
fire or ditch that will
stand in the way of your
pursuers. And do not hesitate
to confuse the opposing
army; send into battle,
.

^

for in-

stance, elephants or camels,
or have your men scream
wildly as they charge. All of
these measures will give
you a psychological advantage
and enable you to throw the
enemy off stride. 64
In the cultivation of such
strategems, as well as in

developing an infantry required for
warfare, the mercenary
system had left the Italian city-states
in a backward condition.
They stood helpless before the far
superior
forces of France, Spain, and the Empire.

The Machia-

vellian general, skilled in the art of war,
had thus not
only to lead his troops; he had actually to
create them.

Only then would Italy emerge as

a

serious contender in

the politics of Renaissance Europe.
be recruited,

If infantry could not

if men would not obey a general,

if generals

would not learn the tactics of modern warfare, then all of
Italy, no less than each of her city-states, would be
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rendered impotent.

The decline of
Florentine greatness
"as due to a ne leot
g
a mong its citizens
of
war so crucial to
security in the early
modern world
The Rom ans. concern
f or mounting
a fit a r my h ad
given way
to a civic humanism
of intellectual li
fe that disdained
the life of the soldier;
annuity's contempt for the
pursuit of wealth and
private status had been
replaced
hy the ethic of
commercially minded middle
and artisan
classes.
The resulting disregard
for good armies had
contributed greatly to the
ease with which foreign
after 1494, had overrun
Italy.
„ ords which MaohiaveU
had placed in the mouth
of a Lucchese nobleman,
when that
republic was attacked by
Florence in 1437, returned
to
haunt all of Italy.

^^

^

^
.

^

U
ament
hSn that the att ^k us,
^
?
that they assault
our towns, that they
11
SS
lay Waste our
try
trv
But who of; us is so foolish counas to
wonder at it? 65

°L

'

'

T

The vicissitudes of "fortuna"
had now turned against
Florence, and with it against all
of Italy.
Small wonder,
then, that each of Machiavelli
s major works concludes
with a passionate cry for the
creation of political unity
transcending the old bases of the Italian
city-based communes.
The political disputes and feuds that
had made it
impossible to mobilize a militia could only
be overcome
•

127

by uniting the walled
city with the provincial
far,, and
the warring city-states
with one another. The
creation of
a Public militia
required ties of patriotism
and love that
transcended the geography of
late-medieval politics:
a

militia built not upon guilds,
noble families, or competing urban elites but upon
nationwide ties of common
language and culture. Only
under the leadership of a
virtuous general could such a
new polity survive in the
world of the early modern European
state system.

Machiavelli

'

s

Legacy

The claim that violence and power
characterize the modern state system finds its warrant in the
Machiavellian

tradition.

"Realpolitik

,

-

"Staatsrason

,

-

are two views of

international relations that have emerged in the
wake of,
and that first found support in, the writings of
this

Florentine diplomat.
No one in the history of political thought has writ-

ten so passionately of power.

seeking to found and maintain

The prince or legislator
a

polity must not shy away

from the uses of violence in securing a political space.

Machiavelli

*s

work, of course, especially "The

Prince," abounds in counsel to the manipulative political
leader who is impelled by ambition and who searches for
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glory by becoming the head
of state.
But though a wouldbe tyrant may f ind
license in Machiavelli s
do so only at the price
of misconstruing the
larger purpose of those writings.
For Machiavelli s realism
is
considerably more complicated
than one finds by pulling
out this or that quotation
from his most-read work.
,

Machiavelli, in fact, was not

a

^^^

Machiavellian.

His

work in its entirety displays
remarkable ambiguity about
the use and propriety of violence
in founding and maintaining a state. While having no
doubts that a well-run
principality or republic had to be founded
by the use of
force, Machiavelli repeatedly stresses
that without good
laws and respected institutions, sufficient
arms and
resolute leaders are to no avail. The language
of political virtue that informs a well-run state is
not that of

military conquest but of

a

people's willingness to defend

when necessary the land and laws they respect.

To found

such a state the forceful prince must not shy away from

eliminating corruption and greed.

But Machiavelli repeat

edly makes clear that a state based entirely on violence
is tyrannical and unworthy of merit.

avellian leader, whether

a

In short,

the Machi-

prince or a republica, must
I

always agonize about the political nature and consequences of the force he uses in securing and maintaining a
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polity.

-

exploration of MachiavelH-s
thought reveals
the power available
to the statg

^

can achieve.

^

^^

Because violence and
war may be abused
by
leaders, a virtuous
prince or
or,a sagacious
ca
leader will fiind
it neither wise nor
useful tQ rely

^

enxng or using the.
in seeking to preserve
Power,
security, then, is not
alone dependent upon
military power. ta d while
a state would

^

^

itself, it would never
be served well by arming
to the
hilt in an attempt to
intimidate adversaries.
To recast this slightly
in terms more familiar
to
modern statesmanship, the
Machiavellian leader is compelled by the nature of the
secular state to balance the
quest for legitimate policies
with the need to establish
the credibility of his
willingness to resort to arms
should the polity's security
be threatened.
The "virtu"
of which Machiavelli speaks
so often stems from the knowledge among a polity's citizens
that a state is able to
preserve its liberties and institutions
should an attack

—

whether by domestic conspirators or foreigners—
ever be
launched upon them. Such virtue is political

insofar as

it pertains to the recognition that a
set of political

values exist, are widely acknowledged, and are
cherished
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dearly by a populace

-sofar
tl0n

And

^^^

as adherence to those
values entails an obliga-

indGed
'

.

3
'

WUli

^

SS

'

of a people to fight
for and

defend their own country
when necessary.
This should not be mistaken
for militarism; it is
rather patriotism on constant
guard.
A republic or principality unable to raise a
citizen-army, that must in
its
stead rely upon mercenaries
paid by and contracted through
condottieri of dubious allegiance
who merely seek commercial gain, is a state
neither legitimate nor likely
to
preserve for very long what few
liberties it may have.
Foreign powers and potential
rival claimants to power will
be dissuaded from launching
attacks on republics or principalities only when these are imbued
with virtue.
Virtue also enhances the respect one
requires in di
plomacy.
The daring legislator, in the act of
founding
the state, had to rely upon strategic
violence, a selective economy of force, that through one
quick dispatch
established the political space upon which a
state, a new
state, arises.
Machiavelli counsels in this regard
that

it is better to use violent means only at
the outset, at

the moment of founding a state; this will impress
the

doubtful and confirm to your supporters that you are
interested in establishing a political realm rather than

ruling over it tyrannically
for decades.
Political
Power is best secured by creating
the impression of your
willingness to resort to
force- If need be-to defend the
state.
The prince, l ike the
republican leader, cannot
avoid wearing the mask of power
to create the appearance
of resolve.
The best way to ensure the
peace is to prepare for the possibility of war.
But the levels
of

armaments and national mobilization
required to create
this appearance should never be
enough either to absorb
all your resources or to make a
potential adversary believe you seek to conquer him.
The Machiavellian statesman, while willing to resort to force,
is most of
all

concerned to preserve the political virtue of
the polity
over which he rules.
Above all, then, Machiavelli was concerned with
the

political purposes of violence.

In this he establishes

the theme of a discourse which has resounded throughout
the whole realist tradition.

The dilemma of the states-

man's responsibility to secure the peace by preparing for
war has vexed all those since confronted with the tools
of political power.
As the pre-eminent theorist of political-military

strategy, Machiavelli devotes equal attention to the do-

mestic purposes served by well-prepared armies.

He is

acutely aware throughout his work of the polity that

.
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adroit princes and mo
tivated infantry serve.
The character of his political-military
strategy, however, is one
construed entirely in terms
of power as force and
public
mobilization.
It is a strategy that
concedes nothing to
those traditions of just-war
theory that had served for
a
millennium to shape thinking
about war.
It is a strategy,
too, stripped bare of
those cultural constraints
that had
informed chivalry and feudal
warfare. The entirely secular
terms of this discourse on
public power ushers in an erawhich we are still in-of power
in the state and power
among states measured in terms
of existing and potential
force

CHAPTER

IV

FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE
POLITICS OF THE BALANCE-OF-POWER

One of the most famous
critiques of Machiavellian
statesmanship, of the cunning and
artifice perpetrated
by the ambitious prince, was
written by a man who soon
after completing his devastating
work proceeded, in
1740 as the new King of Prussia, to
violate every ethical
norm he had expressed in his early
study.
On the day
King Frederick II set out to conquer
Silesia, his personal secretary, Charles Etienne Jordan,
wrote him from
Potsdam.
"some critics think that this venture
is in

direct contracdiction to the last chapter
of the
Antimachiavell'.

'

Der

1,1

Indeed, it has long been considered an
intellectual

oddity— and

a

profound hypocrisy--that the enlightened

philosophical moralism of the young Crown Prince could
be so thoroughly violated by the First Silesian War
of

1741-1742, the invasion of Saxony at the outset of the
Seven Years War (1756-1763), and by numerous breaches of

treaties binding Prussia to France or the Empire.
as

I

But

want to show here, Frederick the Great's apparently

devastating critique of Machiavelli
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"The Prince" con-
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tains within it the terms
of that very "Staatsrason"
which the King subsequently
deployed in his-admittedly-

expedient realist statesmanship.

i

want< then

,

to

„.

Plore within Frederick's
ostensibly moralistic critique
of Machiavellism the basis
of what became in the course
of his reign an enlightened
absolutism based upon military power.

After examining briefly "Der
Antimachiavell " I
develop Frederick's version of
"Staatsrason" within the
context of eighteenth century European
balance-of-power
politics.
Of particular interest here will
be the ef,

forts of the Hohenzollerns in Brandenburg-Prussia
to

consolidate and expand their patchwork state
after the
era of religious wars.
The geographical disunity
of

these lands scattered across the North German Plain
was

overcome under the direction of

a

state whose political

unity and economic development were entirely dependent
upon the consolidation and perfection of Europe's most

disciplined standing army.

Section two explores the

nature of contemporary warfare and the efforts undertaken by the Prussian state to maintain
army.

a

competitive

Section three looks at the evolution of the Prus-

sian state in terms of the relationship between the

political-economy of state building and preparing its

army for combat.

My thesis here is that
preparation for

war played a decisive role
in shaping the Prussian
state.
I also show how a
political-economy of mercantilism imposed restraints on the wars
that could be fought.
The
fourth section extrapolates from
the experience of
Frederician Prussia and examines
the inherent instability
of a balance-of-power state
system that relies upon
limited warfare. Prussian success
in mobilizing the
state for war, I argue, was but a
compact version of what
is guaranteed uner realism:
continued efforts at intensifying warfare through technological
advancements, ex-

panding the size of armies, and more vigorous
mobilization
of public resources.
A brief epilogue explores
the

general European crisis that arose when the national
armies of post-revolutionary France brought total
warfare
to the continent.

My point in developing this chapter is to trace the

evolution of standing national armies in the era of the
European transformation from absolutism to the modern,
nascent republican state.

Recurring efforts to train and

discipline ever larger and better equipped armies rendered
unstable

a

balance-of-power state system.
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"Der Antimachiavell"

A year before his accession
to the kingship of Prussia in 1740, the twenty
seven year old Crown Prince

of
the Hohenzollern Dynasty
composed a scathing attack on
the dictates of ruthless
statesmanship as expressed by
Machiavelli in his most famous
work, "The Prince."
The incarnation of the
perfidious prince had long
been an object of intellectual
derision when young

Frederick put pen to paper.

2

During the two centuri*.es

after Machiavelli there had proliferated

vast lit<
:era-

a

ture arguing for a more moderate and
honest diplomacy
than that of the Machiavellian prince.
But the literary
achievements of Juan de Vera, Abraham de
Wicquefort, or

Francois de Callieres had done little to
efface the reputation of this singular product of the Florentine
Renaissance.

Indeed, quite to the contrary, for the over-

whelming emphasis in such works upon the genteel traditions of courtly respect and admonishments to negotiate

politely, disdain threats, and adhere to treaties and

international law made Machiavelli
all the worse off by comparison.

1

s

prototypical prince

3

A standard view of the immorality and cruelty charac-

terizing the Machiavellian prince can be found in Shakespeare's Third Part of King Henry the Sixth

.

King

"
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Richard III, formerly Duke of
Gloucester, reveals
intentions in a famous soliloquy:

hi,

Deceive more slyly than Ulysses
And, like a Sinon, take another could,
Troy
I can add colours to
the chameleon,
Change shapes with Proteus for
And set themurtherous Machiaveladvantages,
to school.
Lan I do this, and cannot get a
crown''
Tut, were it farther off, I'll
p i uck it down.

4

In writing his tract against
Machiavelli, Frederick,

who could not read Italian, relied upon
lation published in 1696.

a

French trans-

The embitterment of the French

over their short-lived subordination to
Catherine de
Medici in the mid-sixteenth century had its legacy,

in

part, in their complete contempt for those Italian
move-

ments associated with her family.

This cultural residue

did not bode well for balanced assessments of Machiavelli:

neither for the prevailing view of his work nor for the

subtlety with which his work was translated into French.
Moreover, outside of Machiavelli

'

ticularly the bawdy theaterpiece

,

literary works, par-

s

"Mandragola

,

"

his other

works, especially the "Discourses" and his studies of

Florentine republican constitutionalism
unknown, even in Frederick's day.
a few,

these works were overlooked.

were virtually

And even if known to
The result, so repre-

sentatively embodied in Frederick's "Der Antimachiavell
was outrage at the instrumental and cruel lessons of

,

s
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statesmanship found in one work:
"The Prince."
Small
wonder, then, that throughout
Frederick's work he
neither locates "The Prince"
within Machiavelli
"ouevre" nor considers the
nascent modern secular vocabulary of public life captured
in such concepts as "virtu,"
"necessita," "fortuna," "ambizione,"
«

and "animo."

the contrary, Frederick explores
"The Prince" as

On

work
hopelessly immersed in the bloodstained
politics of the
northern Italian Renaissance.
a

"Machiavelli planted the seed of corruption
in the
life of the state, and he undertook to
destroy the rules
of sound morality." 5 He has written "one
of the most

dangerous books of all those in circulation." 6

His

single-minded concern for how one man can conquer and
hold
power over a subject and terrified people is an outrageous

violation of all concerns for justness.

In codifying the

sanguinary politics of his age, he has broken the trust
that must bind a good ruler to his people.

The pettiness

of his egoistic rules for holding on desperately to

political power is an outrage perpetrated upon those whom
he rules and an affront to all those who today seek just

guidance in their conduct of statesmanship.
Frederick's work sets out to refute, chapter by
chapter, the teachings of this ignominious monster.

He

"
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wants to counter those courtiers
and kings who still
insist upon admiring Machiavelli
s work as the paradigm
of effective statesmanship.
Against those flatterers,
careerists, would-be spies, and
diplomats who find in'

spiration in "The Prince" for their
craft, Frederick
seeks to undermine their traditional
argument that

Machiavelli has, if not ethically, at least
pragmatically
--albeit tragically— expressed what pricnes
do, must do,
and should not do.
The author of "Der Antimachiavell
wants to represent the interests of the
true princely
rulers against their own denouncers and to
save them from
the most incisive objections.
It is, after all, the

single task of rulers
humanity.

to work for

the well-being of

In its name he undertakes this critique. 7

A cursory reading of this early work by the future

Prussian King reveals an enlightened view of the purposes
of politics.

The book is literally peppered with moral-

izing passages attesting to the noble and humanist values

which inform the actions of contemporary kings.

No one

who reads this book can come away unaware of how hard the
Crown Prince strives to articulate in contrast to

Machiavelli an explicityly moral conception of royal
power in the service of public welfare.

Yet anyone who

knows the political history of Prussia under Frederick
the Great will look back in amazement at how contradictory
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his writings appear when
compared with his subsequent
actions.
Gerhard Ritter, in his biography
of Frederick
the Great, has noted the
peculiar place this early work
assumes.
"it is of significant
biographical interest,"
wrote Ritter,
as an expression of the unlimitedly
hopeful and
optimistic frame of mind in which the
awaited the hour of his coming to poweryoung man
in orin
nSW Sp ° Ch f human ha

ness

PPi"

°

*

8

"Der Antimachiavell" is also a work
filled with the

favorite ideas of enlightenment Europe.
see,

But as we shall

the work as a whole belies the claim it
makes at

the outset to provide a clear alternative to
Machia-

vellism.

Ritter sees the work as that of

a young,

overly

intellectually ambitious prince who articulated in varied
form the kind of enlightened sense of public responsi-

bility that proved impossible to adhere to under the
stress of statesmanship.

Q

But where Ritter sees a ten-

sion between Frederick's "Antimachiavell" and his later

works, others detect the tension within this one work.

Friedrich Meinecke's account of the doctrine of "raison
d'etat" analyses Frederick's essay as embodying the same

political-intellectual dilemma that marked his whole
career.

Frederick stood poised before two models of the

state: the humanitarian state and the power state.

The
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conceptions resided side by side,
and though the latter
predominated the former never
disappeared entirely.
"Der Antimachiavell" was
Frederick's most explicit attempt to articulate the enlightened
basis of humanitarian

absolutism.

Shorn of divine right, repudiating
the inherent virtues of dynasticism, Frederick
sought here to
"demonstrate the possibility of meeting
moral demands
for the entire realm of state life." 10
Yet a careful assessment of Frederick's
appeals to

conscience and to the moral strivings of
princes reveals
them to be the product of varied theoretical

standpoints:

a touch of liberal social contract
doctrine,

a

smattering

of natural law theory, here some remnants of
idealist

philosophy, there

a

pastiche of enlightenment thinking.

The result is a grab-bag critique of a caricature of

Machiavellism from the standpoint of an embarassed absolutism.

Meinecke quite correctly notes that Frederick's
concepts of diplomacy largely abandoned the moral standpoint he adopted to criticize Machiavelli.

But as

Meinecke is less willing to acknowledge, Frederick's work
on the internal affairs of state also abandoned the hu-

manitarian ideals he set forth in "Der Antimachiavell"
as worthy of a modern ruler seeking justice and prosper-

s

ity for all his
people.

Throughout "Oer Antimachiavell
"
Frederick reiterates
that the real purpose
of the king or prince
is that of
Ultimate arbiter for disputes
within the state. Machiavelli, he argues, proceeds
from an unduly narrow
perspective: that of classifying
extant regimes into various
forms of monarchies and
republics, and of inquiring
into
how princes achieve or maintain
their power.
it would
be more instructive to
examine the reason why people
have felt compelled to call
upon princes
to rule them.

The inhabitants would never
willfully impose a tyranny
upon themselves. On the contrary,
they have opted col-

lectively-if tacitly-for governance by
which they may
flourish, not by which their ruler
might enhance his
power at their expense.

Frederick reminds the reader that public
power in his
day, as distinguished from the private
factionalism
of

medieval and early Renaissance Europe, stands
over and
above the disputes that wrack a people.
It becomes
a

king

or prince to administer the law, enforce the
peace, and

punish transgressors with celerity.

As a neutral party,

then, the king is obliged to hold his subjects to the
law.

Frederick, however, never connects this conception of

responsibility to either Hobbesian or Lockian arguments
for a social contract.

His critique of Machiavelli

'
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comparative method, and his
own pref erence-at least in
the first chapter-for a
developmental account of the
sources of government, fall
short of grounding his conception of political authority
in a social contract
binding upon the ruler. Yet
elements of such a theory
can be found scattered throughout
his work. what

Hobbes

and Locke each described, in
varying terms, as an anarchical state of nature in which life
(Hobbes) and property
(Locke)

were perpetually subject to violation
by greedy
or criminal men, Frederick refers to
vaguely in terms of
the barbarian conditions of central
Europe as
it was

overrun by peoples from the east and north.
suggestive reference to

a

But this

European state of nature re-

mains unconnected to any subsequent social contract.

In

the absence of such a social contract in history,
however, one could develop a theoretical argument about
what
a compact might look like to those in a state of
nature.

Yet both models of social contract, the historical

and the phenomenological

,

were anathema to Frederick.

The radical implications of investing popular sovereignty
in those who voluntarily agreed to contract for govern-

ment were intolerable to the Crown Prince.

For contrary

reasons, Hobbes' argument must have seemed equally unac-

ceptable.

The inviolability of absolutist rule resulting

.
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from a primitive people who
permanently placed all public
power in the hands of a sovereign,
lest their own lives
continue to be "solitary, poor,
nasty, brutish, and
short:" this, too, contradicted
the Frederician spirit.
For this critic of Machiavelli
strove throughout his life
to inspire in himself and within
his concept of states-

manship a profound sense of caring
for his people, for
the fair administration of justice,
and

for the fallibil-

ity of princely rule.

His constant reference to the king

as "Schiedsrichter," as referee or
arbiter, reflects a

concern for the impartiality of the state as
institution.

a

political

if Prussia under Frederick the Great did
not

exactly conform to this vision— and it did not—
it came
closer than any other Continental absolutism.

But how-

ever impartial was its administration of justice, Prussia
was not a polity founded upon the liberal conventions of

contract
Most conspicuous in Frederick's self-effacing view of
his own power is the profound regard he had for the

state's sovereignty

sonally embody

—a

sovereignty which he did not per-

but to which, instead, he devoted him-

self slavishly throughout his forty-six year reign.

Un-

like the courtiers and dynastic flatterers who over-

whelmed the Bourbons at Versailles, Frederick disdained
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in court life the opulence
and decadence reserved for

kings convinced of their divine
right to rule.
coronation was a simple and inexpensive

affair.

His own

His

mistrust of dynasticism is also
reflected in the fact that
he fathered no heir to inherit
Prussia's kingship and
expressed no concern for being unable
to do so.

Nor did

Frederick hold any peculiar regard for
the virtues of
princely stock. He treated his own brothers
with harshness,

for instance, when they failed him in
the course

of battle.

His own writings place overwhelming emphasis
upon
the need to work for the welfare of the state.

As he

wrote in his "Political Testament of 1752," "the ruler
is the first servant of the state." 11

In a letter

written at the outset of the Seven Years War, when
Frederick's army faced the combined forces of Austria,
France, and Russia, the King wrote a memorandum to his

minister expressing the priority he placed upon the
state's well-being, if necessary beyond that of his own.
If it should be my fate to be taken prisoner,
then I forbid anyone to have the smallest concern for my person, or to pay the slightest
attention to anything I might write from my
place of confinement.
If such a misfortune
should befall me, then I shall sacrifice myself for the state, and everyone must then
obey my brother; I shall hold him, and all my
ministers and generals, responsible with their
heads for seeing that neither a province nor a

ransom is of fprpH

-f^v

™.

t

Also characteristic of
Frederick's work is his constant reference to the basic
equality of those who inhabit each country. while
acknowledging, as did Montesquieu, the varied national
characteristics and skills o1
people based upon differences of
climate,
terrain, the

arability of land, and access to
riparian and oceanic
trade, Frederick calls upon
princes and kings to respect
the inherent equality of all
those people whom
one

governs.

Rejecting the view that any one class,
by vir-

tue of its aristocratic bearing
or religion, is superior
to any other, he insists that the
inhabitants of Europe
are all to be regarded as worthy of
equal treatment.

But as with social contract theory, Frederick
does not

examine the deeper consequences of his rhetorical
commitment.

Natural rights theory informs his view of

natural equality and poses restraints on public authority.

But nowhere does Frederick acknowledge a citizen's

claim to rights based upon this natural equality.

The

constraints on state power are entirely self-imposed.
The varieties of Frederick's moralism include a

healthy measure of enlightenment optimism.

At any

moment one expects him in "Der Antimachiavell " to embrace

wholeheartedly Abbe C.I. Castel de Saint-Pierre's plan
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of 1712 for perpetual
peace in Europe.
Though Frederick's optimism does not
lead him to endorse such
an

early idealist conception
of world peace, he nonethel
ess
manifests great faith in the
just and ethical charact er
of rule in what he saw as
an era of increasing
religious
ou;
and political tolerance.
He had great faith
in a series

of developments that emerged
from the Counter Refo rmation and its bellicose aftermath:
the growth of the

experimental sciences; the impact of
voyages in teaching
Christian states the value of comparing
other moral
values; a willingness to put aside
the religious conflicts between the Church and the
ecumenical congrega-

tions—and between Lutherans and Calvinists—
that had
torn Europe apart for a century and a half;
and revulsion
at the habitual barbarism that had afflicted
northern

Italy during the Renaissance and Germany during
the

Thirty Years War.

These have now triumphed, notes

Frederick, in sharp distinction with preceeding centuries, in the form of a contemporary statesmanship that

rules by virtue of reason. 13
But this reason is still exercised by princes and

servants of the several sovereign states, not by inter-

national jurists.

The culmination of natural law theory

»
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in the form of Hugo Grotius

•

I^w_of_Wa^and_P^

pub _
lished in 1625, finds no
place in the Frederician stat
e
system.
Much more was he indebted
to theorists of a
"state of war," to a theory based
upon the need for
competing sovereign states to
reserve for themselves all
measures in defense-or pursuit-of
their interests. And
though Frederick concedes throughout
"Der Antimachiavell
the need to conduct wars more justly,
he reserves for the
state the right to conduct preemptive
wars and to undertake conquests of adjoining lands to
which the prince has
claim or prior title.
In the era of dynastic politics,

however, this is tantamount ot ignoring
just-war theory

altogether.

It was a common strategy to dredge up
docu-

ments or past claims to lands prior to undertaking
their
conquest.

This is exactly what Frederick did in 1740 to

justify his seizure of Silesia.

Continental diplomacy in seventeenth and eighteenth

century Europe was characterized by these competing
claims.

Indeed, an essential part of balance-of -power

politics involved competition over lands of the Holy
Roman Empire and central Europe.

In the wake of the

Treaty of Westphalia, the agreement among the European
powers that ended the Thirty Years War in 1648, the Holy
Roman Empire was shorn of the fragile unity to which it
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had clung since the Golden
Bull of 1356.
The Emperor
relinquished to the imperial
diet the right to declare
war, a move that enhanced
the power of the electoral
princes.
Switzerland and northern Italy
were excluded
from the Empire.
Prussia and Sweden were
granted lands
along the Baltic coast-lands
that had previously been
Danish and Polish domains.
France gained control
of

Alsace-Lorraine, and Spain's domination
of the Netherlands virtually disappeared after
the course of the
Eighty Years War with the Dutch,
1568-1648.
The overall
effect of the Peace of Westphalia was
to usher in

an era

of recognizably modern struggles in
European diplomacy:
French preeminence on the Continent,
consolidation of the

scattered lands under Hohenzollern control
in BrandenburgPrussia, Russian struggles along its western
border with
a crumbling Polish state, Austro-French
rivalry over

northern Italy, the decline of Spain as

a

European power,

and the decline of religious strife as a basis of
conflict

between principalities.

By repudiating the principle of

"cuius regio, eius religio"

("he who rules a territory

determines its religion"), a principle embodied in the
Peace of Augsburg of 1555, the religious map of Europe
was renedered fixed

,

or at least immune to changes in the

political control of territories.

The terms of European

diplomacy shifted onto a secular plane.

Naval powers now
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began to clash with one
another Qver access
Land powers began to
struggle for control of those
principalities within the Holy
Roman Empire.
Sovereign
states comprised for the first
time a system of European
i
14
diplomacy.

^

-a

•

This secular diplomatic network
ushered in at
Westphalia provides the backdrop for
Frederick's thinking
about statesmanship.
it provides, too, a context
in
which to appraise his refined "raison
d'etat" in the era
of European enlightenment.

A good example of this refinement can
be found,
curiously enough, in Frederick's discussion

of the bar-

barism

of hunting. 15

He fulminates for pages over the

inumanity and cruelty of this sport which so
fascinated

Europe's nobility.

The diatribe makes three points:

that contrary to Machiavelli

'

s

claim, the skills acquired

in the course of hunting have little to do with
the arts

of virtuous warfare; that the aristocratic luxury and

leisure of this sport exhaust

better be expended

resources that would

in cultivating a state's economic

and martial strength; and that the whole activity is an

inhumane violation of nature.

In spending three quarters

of its spare time chasing wild animals through the forest,
the king's court exhibits in residual form all the worst
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features of those barbarian
and bloodthirsty cultures,
against whose debased
conditions the modern state
of
Europe rightly appraise their
civilization's progress.
In that curious mixture
of ethics and expedience
that marks his entire
"Antimachiavell - Frederick here
argues that the disgusting
proclivity for hunting actually undermines national security.
Not only is the whole
matter morally repulsive; it also
distracts from the
,

imperatives of economic and military
development.
Herein
resides the real strength of the state.
The courtly
preference for the chase and hunt reflects
an antiquated
understanding of what comprises the arts of
warfare.
indeed, in wartime, as Frederick concluses,
nothing could
be more disastrous than for an army to idle
away its time
in search of game--as officers were wont to do
between

maneuvers in the field.

This would only encourage idlers

and deserters to flee from the more severe tasks at
hand.

Frederick's striking argument about so common an

activity relfects what is really the larger purpose of
this early and apparently idealistic work: not, as he

himself would have us think, to condemn all of Machiavelli's teachings; nor to locate moral reflection at the
center of diplomacy.

It is,

rather, to update and render

suitable to the balance-of -power system the unrelenting
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realism which Machiavelli in
"The Prince" had first articulated in terms of political
power personally held
within a singular state.
"Der Antimachiavell " thus
works
on two levels: an explicit
moralism, and an underlying
"etatism."

I

want to suggest here that the
first level,

the ethical or moral critique of
Machiavellism, is at
times a kind of attractive window
dressing, at other
times a casuistic rationale for breaking
treaties, ini-

tiating warfare, mobilizing

a

citizenry, and devoting

all political and economic resources
for the purposes of

territorial expansion.

The window dressing makes

Frederick's absolutist militarism palatable.

And the

casuistic argumentation allows realism to return
through
the back door after having been dramatically escorted
out
the front.
It was not misguided idealism and youthful naivete

that led the Crown Prince to write so ennobled

a

critique

of Machiavellian strategy, only to see him as King of

Prussia violate every one of his own (earlier) precepts.
There is, on the contrary, far more continuity between
this work and his later efforts

— at

— with

both pen and sword

relentless state-building at the expense of allies,

neighboring lands, and his own peasantry.

For beneath

the explicit if motley moralism of this early critique of

.

Machiavelli is a subtler,
more unified, realistic
appraisal of what "reason of
state"

calls for in the diplo-

macy of eighteenth century
Europe.
It is a realism which
reserves for itself the right
to initiate aggressive
wars, to break treaties,
conclude in the midst of warfare
pacts with enemies against
recent allies, and to mobilize
on a permanent wartime footing
the industrial, agricultural, and civic resources of
the state.
it is a realism
which acknowledges as supreme the
concept
of state sov-

ereignty in domestic affairs and which
repudiates international law as an expression of
Christian or secular
natural law theory.

it is a realism,

too, which absorbs

within the absolutist, early modern state
the principles
of securing and expanding public power
and
terrain.

While refusing to locate political power in
the hands of
a virtuous prince, it articulates a theory
of military

preparedness suitable to the competition of rival land

powers--each of them with similar imperial interests, each
of them striving internally to mobilize their resources
in the inherently unstable and militarist international

system known as the balance-of -power

Standing Armies and the Limits of Absolutist Warfare
The specific nature of the new international state

•

system for which Eredericx
wrote only becomes
when we examine
transformations since Machiavelli
the scope and intensity
of

^^^^

-

the ruler.

^

s

day

^

These transformations
are evident in thre e
related areas of political
life: i n the expansion
of warfare; in the ability of
the state to claim for
itself the
he
lives of its inhabitants
as in indispensible
resource upon
poi
which it expected to draw;
and the efforts of the
state to
manage its political-economy
so as to enhance the industrial and agricultural resource
base of its military.
The
political structure of absolutism
was founded upon the
intimate connection between
militarism and mercantilism. 16
Each of these two spheres was
overseen by a professionally
trained corps of bureaucreats whose
fiscal and managerial
acumen enabled the state to mobilize
its resources and to
maintain its position in the competitive
balance-of-power
state system that characterized
eighteenth century Europe.
The professionalization of Continental
warfare marked
off the absolutist era from the post-feudal
mercenary era

which it succeeded and from the era of total
national warfare which followed. 17 Machiavelli had written
in an epoch
of mercenary warfare when the arts and artifices
of battle
played a crucial tactical role.

Even as he expressed the

then-progressive idea of citizen-armies, his conceptions
of the arts of war--of deploying strategems, of relying

on pikemen, of shunning
firepower and artillery,
of cultivating superior oratorical
skills as one basis of
virtuous leadership, and of
disdaining professional

soldiers-

were all deeply rooted in
the contemporary technologies
of warfare and in the
scale of political
institutions.
The largest armies of
fifteenth century Europe
numbered
ten to twelve thousand
soldiers. 18 Rarely were the
Italian city-states able to muster
armies of more than half
this size.
Frederick, by contrast, came
to power in an
age when national armies averaged
100,000 men and a single
battle would involve 50,000 on
each side.
They were professionally trained, led into battle
under the guidance of
career officers, equiped with castand wrought-iron field
guns and muskets manufactured in large
industries, and

provisioned by well stocked fortresses
strategically located throughout the frontier.
Gunpowder, cannon, and arquebuses had only
gradually

been integrated into the armies of Europe.

had not revolutionized mercenary warfare.

Their advent
The Italian

condottieri concerned themselves primarily with recruiting soldiers, not armaments.

strued as but
cavalry.

a

The new weapontry was con-

supplement to pikemen, infantry, and

Machiavelli

*

s

mistrust of firepower was moti-

vated, as we have seen, bu both tactical and political

concerns.

Tactically, the cumbersomeness of artillery and

the early muskets impaired
the

Qf

tically, they tempted
princes and states to
neglect cultivating loyalty among their
men.
The arts of mercenary
warfare involved training
men for close combat,
encamping
them safely, and feeding
them from the land or from
nearby
markets.
Their weaponry did not vary
markedly from the
everyday tools of farm life.
The limited size of their
armies and the proximity of
their battles to towns and
cities meant that extended supply
lines were not necessary.
And the close range of their
direct combat could be
overseen directly by a single
commander who saw the entire
battlefield.
Two hundred years of developments
in technology and
in the resources available to states
brought about enor-

mous transformations in the arts of war.

The war system

of early eighteenth century Europe called
for the combined

efforts of matallurgists, geometrists, clothiers,
recruiters, military police, architects, navigators,
and
farmers.

Their salaries and the goods they provided were

all paid for from public revenues extracted from
the

state's inhabitants.

All of these were overseen by a

military career-staff whose job it was to discipline
troops to endure the rigors of extended maneuver and to
stand up in the face of enemy firepower while delivering

with regularity its own volleys and cannonade.

,

'
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Frederic, criticized in
"Der Antimachiavell "
the relevance
of Machiavelli-s ccncepticn
of Machiavelli s conception
of the arts of war.
The prince's
skills are not those to

be cultivated by carefully
observing the terrain while
hunting or through the zeal
for virtuous warfare.
Machiavelli. s pedantic evocation
of steeling oneself for
the
hardships of warfare hardly meets
Frederick's need to
organize, train, and lead mass
armies

entirely dependent

upon the combined resources of
their country.
Much of this criticism is unfair,
however.
Frederick's own military writings composed
after he became
King of Prussia come very close
to emulating many of
Machiavelli's principles. Knowledge of
the land,

instance, is still a key element of
generalship.

for

m

the

"General Principles of War" of 1748, Frederick
admonishes
the statesman/commander-in-chief to study
maps, to survey

personally— with the air of local guides— mountains
streams, and fields, and to familiarize himself
with rock

formations, readily defensible positions, swamps, and
forests.
a

He recommends, too, that one know in advance of

campaign which cities are particularly suited for forti-

fication and which, by contrast, are indefensible.

This

ability to perceive and utilize terrain for purposes of
battle was referred to by Frederick as "coup d'oeil," the

"talent to recognize in
one look at the land
the advantages which it can offer
to an army." 19

Frederick, however, finds
"The Prince" exlusively
concerned with aspects of
military leadership and not

at

all attentive to building
up the kinds of military
infrastructures necessary for modern
warfare.
War cannot be
mastered by preparing oneself
mentally for the rigors
ahead and by training a band of
farmers and day-laborers
for a few weeks on a rotating
basis.
Frederick derides
the Machiavellian prince's
fascination with the glory and
spirit of warfare, as if it were
something for which one
could prepare by establishing a martial
atmosphere in
court life.
It is a wonder that the writer does
not feed the
prince soups served in trench-like tureens
pies
in the shape of bombs, and tarts in
the form of
bastions; and that he does not have him
attack
windmills, flocks of sheep, and ostriches ... 20
It is not only Frederick's ignorance
of Machiavelli s
'

"The Art of War" that enables him to make such
an observa-

tion.
a

As we have seen, Machiavelli was well aware
of how

reliable army of politically enthusiastic citizens was

necessary to replace the derelict mercenary warriors who
had become the scourge of Renaissance Italy.

But the

concern for cultivating civic virtue placed, according to
Frederick, undue emphasis upon motivation and not enough

emphasis upon institutions.

Discipline, believed Fred-

.
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erick, could be instilled
in an army, but only
through
means of rigorous training
and enforcement.
A disciplined
army, however, would do a
country no good in the absence
of adequate supplies of food,
clothing, gun powder, and
armaments. An exclusive focus
upon princely power and
patriotic zeal would not enable a
country to compete in
the early era of standing national
armies and mobile
firepower.
The armies of Louis XII with
which France had
sought in 1498 to overrun Italy would
scarcely suffice to
compete effectively in Europe under the
Bourbons, Habsburgs, and Hohenzollerns
If a skillful army commander like Louis
XII were
to appear today, he would recognize
nothing
would see that one conducts war with countless He
troops whom, because of their multitude, the
land would not supply with sufficient
provisions
Moreover, they would be maintained by their
princes in war and in peacetime.
In his day

one waged decisive battles, one dared stunning
operations with a handful of men whom one sent
home when the war was over.
Instead of iron
armaments, lances, and matchlock musckets whose
deployment was familiat to him he would find
uniforms, flintlocks, and bayonets: a new art of
war, with innumerable new means for the attack
and defense of fortresses.
He would experience
that these days it is just as difficult and
necessary an art to supply troops as it was in
an earlier day to defeat the enemy. 21

—

—

—

The enormous expense and effort required to supply

and train a regular corps of soldiers became, as we shall
see, a central object of Prussian political activity.
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But already we can appreciate
the difficulties imposed
upon a state by the need to
maintain a regular army and
to
provide in peacetime a
professionally staffed standing
force.
The extraordinary financial
burden placed upon
states already constrained
fiscally by the restraints of
a
mercantile political-economy was
exacerbated by the sheer
manpower requirements of modern
warfare.
The advent of gunpowder had greatly
reduced the
feudal and medieval reliance upon
cavalry.
English armies

during the Hundred Years War had already
shown, as at
Agincourt in 1415, that reliance upon the
long-bow instead
of the heavier, unwieldy crossbow enhanced
the value of
infantry over cavalry.
The widespread integration
of the

matchlock musket and then the flintlock into
European
armies helped further undermine the massed cavalry
charge
as the leading edge of attack.

war was now armed infantry.

The chief instrument of

Gunpowder had revealed the

vulnerability of mounted knights in armor.

The gradual

development of light field guns had also left the feudal
castle vulnerable to attacking forces.

These transfor-

mations in the technology of warfare had exposed these
medieval institutions as inadequate.

The face of battle

was increasingly forged by industrial manufacturing, and
the same growth of population that provided the labor

.
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power for industry led to
increases in the size of
armies.
The development of manufacturing
and trade centers attracted peasants from
the land, and the dynastic
houses were becoming more capable
each year of establishing administrative control of
their lands.
Continentwide agreement in the Peace of
Westphalia regarding the
borders of competing countries provided
a framework within
which each state could mobilize its
people on a secular
basis
The social composition of European armies
changed

accordingly.

it was no longer the right of lords
to round

up their vassals for a forty day levy as provided
for in
the feudal oath.

Nor did it suffice to pay condottieri

for the adventurers and roaming warriors comprising
the

mercenary ranks.

It became incumbent upon the royal

houses of Europe to introduce professionally trained

staffmen as the core of an army whose basic manpower was

provided by conscripts and paid national volunteers.
The Thirty Years War was the last European conflict in

which condottieri and mercenaries played

a

major role.

The Swedish forces under command of King Gustavus

Adolphus, for instance, were comprised almost entirely of

mercenaries recruited from the very lands of central
Europe they conquered.

Albrech Wallenstein, commander

of the Imperial-Catholic League forces, was the last great

European condottiere; after
recovering the rebelli,-OUS
Bohemian territories for the
Habsburgs he offered hi,s
servioes to the anti-i mp erial
ooalition of Franoe and the
Protestants. He was soon
assassinated by factions loyal
22
to the Emperor.
In the aftermath of the
Thirty Years War, countries
began to build up their own regular

forces and then called

upon mercenaries only to supplement
their ranks.
State
efforts were concentrated upon the
scientific education
of a regular officer staff and
upon the recruiting and
disciplining of national forces.
A range of strategic considerations
dictated the move
towards standing armies. Technological
advances in producing mobile field artillery on a mass scale
required

that a state plan investments in a web of
mining and

metallurgical industries.

Required, too, were enormous

amounts of wood with which to feed the furnaces used
in

smelting ferrous ore and in casting bronze or forging

wrought iron.
Gradual improvements in lighter armaments yielded

a

flintlock musket far easier to load than the arquebus or

matchlock musket fired by means of an exposed cord fuse.
The flintlock proved far more adaptable to battlefield

conditions that its predecessors because it did not have
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to be lit to fire.

But the widespread
incoroporat ion of
the flintlock required of
an army an intimate
familiarity
with its weapon so as to
maximize accurate firepower.
By
coordinating the loading, aiming,
and firing of its guns
among two or three lines of
armed infantry, an army could

achieve a considerable advantage
over less disciplined
forces whose volleys maintained
neither continual pressure through successive waves of
bullets nor complete
coverage of the battlefield.

Coordinating artillery barrages so that
they cleared
the land before an advance of infantry
of cavalry
re-

quired carefully cultivated skills in geometry.

A whole

science of ballistics developed standardized
tables accountin for variations in the angle of fire, the
diameter
of the barrel, the weight of the cannon ball, and
the
size of the gun powder charge.

At the very least the

science demanded of gunners that they be able to read

charts

— not

lic schools.

a

widely shared skill in an age without pubLong before Europe adopted a public school

system, in fact, it spawned special academies devoted to

artillery and naval sciences, the forerunners of the
early nineteenth century war colleges.

Artillery and flintlocks also demanded of armies
extensive supplies of munitions.

Frederick reports, for

instance, that during the Seven Years War a single cam-

.
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paign-usually lasting about two
months-consumed

th,
iree

times as much gunpowder as
Prussia could produce in a
23
Year.
indeed, it was the complete
dependence upon gunpowder, shot, cannon balls,
and land mines that forced
European armies to rely so heavily
upon well-stocked
magazines and fortresses strategically
placed along the
frontier.
in addition to the magazines,
the provisioning
of armies required extended
supply-trains that slowed
down the progress of the very forces
they kept supplied.
When Frederick was forced to abandon
the siege of Olmutz
in Moravia in 1758, he retreated with
a convoy of 4,000
wagons; fully half of his army had to escort
the supply
train.

24

in 1708, during the War of the Spanish
Succes-

sion, the Anglo-Dutch army under command of
the Duke of

Marlborough had 3,000 wagons and 16,000 horses for 38
guns and mortars.

The supply-train stretched out for 30

miles 25
•

,

The coordination of supplies to sustain an army of

50,000 required efforts in such diverse fields as road-

building, carpentry for carriages and bridges, weaving,

medicine, and cooking.

All had to be overseen by a

small army of accountants, administrators, and police.
The military strategies and tactics characteristic
of warfare in absolutist Europe led to an elaborate if

peculiar system of engaging the enemy and then withdrawing

—
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in such a manner as
to minimize one's ri
sks and losses
to try starving out an
enemy in the field: not
so much to
defeat him militarily as
to occupy the land he
currently
,

patroled.

A ritualistic, chess-board
pattern of war
emerged because of concerns
by mercantilists and fiscal
agents to reduce where
possible the costs of war in
terms
of men and materiel; the
limits placed on the intensity
and scope of warfare in
Frederick's day were those imposed by the instruments of war
and by the politicaleconomy that sustained it.
The intensity of firepower had
markedly increased
since the Renaissance, but the
limitations of new armaments were still conspicuous. Muskets
could fire a shell
no farther than 200 yards, and even
within that distance
it was notoriously inaccurate.
Artillery fire, though

the object of scientific inquiry, was still
rendered un-

certain by a number of factors which no army could
have
claimed to master: variations in humidity affected
the

explosiveness of powder charges; wooden gun carriages

would collapse as the gun recoiled; cannon shot fre-

quently fragmented in the barrel; fine adjustments in the
angle and line of fire still required the efforts of
several men; the loading of cannon through the barrel

breech loaded field guns were not deployed until the
early nineteenth century

— still

consumed precious time;

and the sm0 oth bore
of the gun ba rrelrifleiS ordnance
was unknown until the
^-nineteenth century-made ac _
curate fire difficult
because

^^^^

^

flew.

The proliferation of
defensive measures, particularly
xn the arts of fortification
and road obstruction,
generally limited offensive
measures and induced armies
to
emphasize prolonged sieges,
caution on the battlefield,
and penetrations into enemy
lands no further than allied
fortresses and magazines could
supply through internal
27
lines.
Moreover, the unreliability of
troops recruited
for the most part under
compulsion meant that vanguard
forces, wide flanking operations,
and maneuvers designed
to harass the communication
and supply lines of enemy
armies could only be undertaken at the
risk of losing
one's men through desertion.
"The land means the same to the soldier
as the

chessboard means to the chess player who
wants to move his
pawns, bishops, and castles." 28 Throughout
his military
writings Frederick emphasizes caution in militiary
en-

deavors.

The primary need is not to confront the enemy's

forces directly but to wear them down and attack them
only

under the most favorable circumstances.

Otherwise one

should avoid confrontations, especially when operating,
as was Prussia in the Silesian Wars and the Seven Years
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War, in enemy lands under
the burden of manpower
shortages.
Frederick was in agreement on
this point with the
famous military tract of
France's Marshall Maurice de
Saxe, "My Reveries Upon
the Art of War." Saxe's
work,
written in 1732, focuses upon
the need for good fortifications, the wisdom of delaying
one's campaing until
the fall months-in order to
force the enemy to exhaust
his resources while on maneuvers
-and of cutting off his
supply lines rather than attacking
directly.
Saxe goes
so far as to deny generals any
leading role in battle;

tactical maneuvering of one's forces in
the midst of
fighting leads to confusion and complicated
arrangements.
Above all, Saxe stresses the simplicity
with which
land

wars can be fought.

He even mocks those strict dis-

ciplinarians who exhaust their troops on the
parade ground
and do not trust their men to fight well
without train-

mg. 29
If Saxe underplays the importance of trained
infantry,

it is because he mistrusted relying upon weapons as
inac-

curate and of short range as the modern flintlock.

He

still believed that at close quarters the force of closed

infantry formations could be decisive

— as

indeed it could

be, providing the infantry were able to approach.

Forces

accustomed to marching in cadence would generate the mo-
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mentum necessary for cln.in.
Y
closing.

30

,

,

Unless favorable cond

._

tions for such tactics
were present
e
present, Saxe
concluded, there
was no use in going
to battle
trie.
u
On flat
fi»* unbroken
on
land such
tactics were unworkable.
un
on hillv
niiiy land, uhowever,
in
inclement weather, or when
an army could surprise
its
adversary, these formations
would work without having
to
resort to massive bombardments
and musket volleys.
Saxe
recommended a war of positions;
one that relied upon
simple
maneuvering in the field and
that did not risk or expend
men and armaments.
»i do not fabor pitohed
battles,
especially at the beginning of
a war," wrote Saxe,
"and I
am convinced that a skillful
general could make war all
his life without being forced
into one." 31
,

Frederick, though less confident
about evading
Pitched battles, displayed a similar
reluctance to engage
his forces.
But he acknowledges, too, the need
at times
to marshal one's forces for a
decisive and annihilating
blow.
The greatest defensive skill of a general
is to
starve out his enemy. That is a means by
which
he risks nothing but can win everything.
For
this it is necessary thourh cleverness and
adroit maneuvering to exclude as much as possible the element of gambling. Hunger conquers
a man more surely than does gallantry.
But the
seizure of supply trains of the loss of magazines does not alone end a war; only battles
lead to a decision.
Thus must an army apply
both means to achieve its war aims. 32
^

^

As we shall now see, Frederick's recurrent efforts to

16 9

intensify mobile firepower
«=x
xn search of
in
v
nf *decisive
battles
at times ana places of
his own choosing too,
p laC e wlthin
a larger context of
absolutist war as one of
positions in
whrch direct engagements
were generally avoided
and only
sought out infrequently.
» To win a
battle means fcQ
an enemy to abandon his
position."" Frederick's military
writings reflect this tension
between the war of positions
and the war of decisive
battles. 34

^

Clausewitz later observed how
warfare in this era
was devoid of its most elemental
feature: a tendency
towards extreme exertion.
G
U
°f W
farS thUS became a
In wh^h
whrch the cards were dealt by time tru * game
and by
accident.
effect it was a stronger form of
diplomacy, a more forceful method
of negotiation, in which battles and sieges
were the
principal notes exchanged.
Even the most
ambitious ruler had no greater aim than
to gain
a number of advantages that
could be exploited
at the peace conference. 35

m

^

m

r

Siege warcraft exemplifies the most
sophisticated

form of the chess-board pattern of early eighteenth

century military strategy— and of its political
dimension.
Bourbon France, under the direction of its chief military
engineer, Sebastien le Prestre de Vauban (1633-1707),

erected

a

series of massive stone fortifications along

the eastern frontier. 36
The walled-in cities of the Italian Renaissance had
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Proven no obstacle to the
monstrous field cannon brought
in by the French which
shot away for days at
their facades.
The medieval castle, l
ike the walled-in citystate of northern Italy,
could not hold up to cannonades.
But warfare in absolutist
Europe did not consist
of be-

sieging cities; it consisted
of besieging fortresses.
Vauban personally oversaw
construction of entirely different enclosures.
Fortified buildings were erected
at
the center of serrated,
irregularly shaped walls, several
feet thick, some 20 feet high,
forming a polygon in the
interior yard. At each exterior angle
of the polygon
special bastions extended out. Heavy
cannons mounted
atop these bastions gave defenders a
commanding strategic
position.
These bastions, in projecting out, also
af-

forded defenders control of the land and of
the various

defensive earthworks they had constructed around
the
fortress.

About 100 yards away from the main fortress

the defenders would build a series of earthern outworks.

They would dig

a

trench around the whole fortress.

In

this trench, some five feet deep and ten acrosss, they

would implant wooden palisades: stakes of wood nine feet
long set three feet deep in a row along the trench floor.

Meanwhile, the dirt dug out of these ditches had been

piled up above the inside wall and would form

a rampart,
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an extended m ound,
running the entire length
q±
trench along the side
facing the fortress.
The effect
of these concentric
outworks was effectively
to double
the steepness of the
trench wall nearest the
fortress,
inside the rampart, leading
up to the base of the
fortress
walls, a sloping "glacis:
of earth and stone provided
yet another hindrance to
attacking armies. Land mines,
"fougasse," were occasionally
used in the trenches and
along the sloping glacis, but
they proved unreliable in
wet weather.
The outworks, however, and
the new design
of angular, relatively low
fortress walls that could not
easily be battered by distant cannon,
worked well.
They
worked not because they made fortresses
invulnerable;

^

they worked because they raised the
costs of besieging
a fortress and forced commanders
to evaluate whether the

protracted battle over a well-fortified position
was
worth the cost of his men and armaments.
These fortresses were frequently located along

rivers or streams deep enough to bear traffic and supplies.

This facilitated access to provisions and re-

lieving forces during

a siege.

It gave a commander lines

of supply and communication while on campaign.

And from

the standpoint of defense, it enabled the besieged, via a

system of dikes and moats, to flood the entrenchments

.
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when advancing armies
closed in.
These fortresses, then
were impressed
what has come to he
known as the inherent
strength c £
the defensive.
But these fortresses
were not
,

^

invul-

neralbe to attack.

The diaiectics of offense
and defense
always sees to it that
each new offensive weapon
gives
rise to a defensive
countermeasure and that apparently

secure formations and
armaments can be overtaken in
time

Vauban himself proved this with
his extensive work
on the art of siegecraft.
A system of trenches would
enable an advancing army to creep
up on a fortified position.

Light, mobile field guns had to
be brought within
range of the fortress walls without
themselves being

vulnerable to counter-battery attacks from
artillery
mounted upon the bastions of the fortress.

These for-

tress guns could carry further than those
available to an
army on the march.
It was no small achievement
for an

attacking force to place its field guns behind
mounts and
man-made parapets, behind which artillery was stationed
in such a manner that the cannonade from the
fortress

either slammed into the parapets or flew over completely.
Mortars, with their high angle of fire, were more suited
for siege warfare than long-barreled howitzers which

fired at a lower angle.

To lob mortar into
a besieged

fortress reguired that
these guns be brought
within five
hundred yards-a distance
easily covered by enemy
guns of
the fortress.
Moreover, one had to
establish supply lines
for those mortars and
for those who tended
them.
Thus the
system of trenches. Concentric
circles closing in on the
fortress enabled the army to
creep up.
Corss-trenches
connected these concentric ditches
with one another and
provided a path for supplies and
reinforcements.
An at-

tacking army would also bring up
the planks needed to
carry the defensive outworks.
If the besieging army was
better supplied than the

forces within the fortress, the
defenders always had the
opportunity to surrender peacefully— in
effect, handing
over their position. But if the besieged
forces had
good reason to believe that a relieving army
was on the
way, they would be willing to persist in
defending their

position.

In siege warfare,

then,

lines of supply and

communication were essential: lines of supply to maintain
the firepower of guns; lines of communication to find
out
the positions of allies and adversary armies.

visioning of men and armies has always been

a

The pro-

feature of

warfare, though by no means on the scale of eighteenth

century armies.

But a fundamentally new feature of war-

fare was the need to maintain secure lines for maintaining
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one's guns and for
communicating with allied
forces.
The
new war of positions,
m0 reover, placed an
entasis on
avoiding battles until the
most favorable conditions
obtained.
Military tactics were part
of a
political-xnili-

tary strategy in which
outmaneuvering an army or inducing
it to surrender through
attrition were worthy goals.
Setpiece battles were infrequent,
and while they remain for
us the most dramatic of
encounters, indeed, while armies
trained themselves to win them,
a good part of an army's
time on campaign was spent in
more mundane fashion.
The

military heroism immortalized in books
about decisive
battles overlooks much of what men in
arms really did. 37
One could call these "labor-intensive"
wars.

Con-

sider the effort of building the
circumvallating trenches
for siege warfare.
Soldiers whose muskets were unusable
at distances beyond 200 yards had to spend
much of their

time digging earthworks and reinforcing their
position.

A very common tactic, for instance, to block off roads
or

hinder infantry was to build "abatis."

A battalion would

cut down several hundred trees and scatter about one-third

of them on the path.

They placed the remaining trees be-

tween their own position and trees already scattered.

By

arranging this larger group of trees so that all the
leaves and branches faced an oncoming enemy and all the

trunks faced their position, they could create

a five foot

.
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high wooden parapet, behind
which they could hide and
still fire mortar or musket
MOreover; they wQuid ci
p
off the lightest branches
and file down the remaining
ones until they became sharp,
a well-made abati could
close off a defile completely;
it could also protect the
rear of a retreating army.
_

.

In the face of fortified
positions, offensive oper-

ations tended to proceed methodically.

The immediate goal

was to accumulate the materiel needed
for a campaign along
the frontier, then to move out with
extended supply lines.
The heavy dependence of all Continental
armies upon for-

tresses and magazines both limited mobility and
provided

easily identifiable targets of operation for offensive
actions

Warfare not only occurred on a chess-board pattern of
capturing fortresses, occupying land, and defending positions and supply lines.

It was also a seasonal affair.

Winter weather presented insuperable obstacles to an
army on the march.

Forage for horses was usually unavail-

able in the field and had to be carried in supply trains.

Rivers otherwise used for transport would freeze or clog
up with ice.

Supply trains had great difficulty nego-

tiating icy roads and mountain passes.
far more vulnerable to illness.

The troops became

Unless they were close
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to their cities, armies
on campaign made
wintercamp in
the field or in their
fortresses.

Beyond the limitations
on war imposed by the
climate
domestic labor shortages
hindered the ability of
states to
strengthen standing armies.
Particularly
in Prussia,

with its sparsely settled
and newly reclaimed lands
in
East Prussia, Junker landholders
were reluctant to release for military service
the
servants, peasants, and

farmers needed to work the land.

Restraints on the availability of
manpower and equipment constrained Europe's armies.
Limitations imposed by
climate and population were exacerbated
by economic considerations.
Indeed, the economic autarchy of
mercantile
doctrine placed severe fiscal restrictions
on the ability
of European states to wage extended warfare.
The inherent

limitations on public expenditures imposed by
mercantile

doctrine conspired (so to speak) with the need to
preserve
national labor power for agriculture.

The result, re-

flected in the military strategy of the day, was to place
the emphasis in wartime upon preserving one's forces and

not taking bold, risky initiatives.

Instead of decisive

strikes upon the enemy's forces, strategy preached seizing
land and thereby expanding one's resource base for con-

ducting future wars.
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It is within this
larger context of li
mited warfare

that Frederick the Creafs
tactical innovations can
properly be understood as
attempts to maximize mobility
and
firepower while simultaneously
restricting deployments of
manpower and equipment. His
contributions to the development of military strategy
were not those of a revoltuionist.
His work, for instance, on
artillery was but a
continuation of methods introduced
a century earlier by
King Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden
during the Thirty Years
War were not integrated at even
the divisional level; nor
were they part of an army with
light infantry and wellorganized cavalry able to move quickly
after the field
guns had prepared the ground with
cannonades.

Briefly stated, Frederick broke up the
traditional
column march formations into several discrete
divisions
advancing on parallel or adjacent lines. 38

Each division

was assigned light cavalry and artillery batteries
to form
up at the front of the lines.

By lightening the carriages

and by relying solely upon lighter cast iron guns rather

than the heavier

— but

less costly--wrought iron guns,

Frederick was able to develop horse-drawn artillery that
could easily be moved and re-aimed in battle.

He favored

the howitzer with its shorter barrel over the traditional

long-barreled field gun; despite its shorter range, the
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howitzer's lighter weight
afforded

a

degree of mobility

unattainable with the heavier
guns.
Frederick's artillerists had also devised
carriages with their own racks
for powder and ammunition,
decreasing somewhat their dependence upon fixed supply lines.
The increased mobility
enabled the Prussian howitzers
to be placed at the leading
edge of battle and then
repositioned.
it also enabled
Frederick's army to withdraw quickly
from a position
without running so great a risk that
its guns would be

captured by the enemy.
Frederick's greatest tactical maneuver was
the

oblique order— the "refused" wing.

Here he would arrange

his battle lines so that one side was favored, so
that
one side would fill up its forward line with infantry
and

light cavalry from the other side of the line.

At the

Battle of Leuthen, for instance, in Austria in 1757, the

Prussian army used a hill in the middle of the battlefield
to deceive the Austrian forces into believing that

Frederick would attack from his left.

By sending a small

force behind the hill into an area only partially visible
to the Austrians, Frederick lured Marshal Daun to order

his forces to the right in anticipation of

a

full attack.

But the main part of Frederick's army was really preparing to advance on its right.

Daun, though knowing of

.
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Frederick's oblique order, had
let himself be outmaneuvered. with 33,000 troops,
the Prussian army outflanked
the Austrian forces of 63,000
and took a third of them

prisoner
This "refusal" of a whole wing of
an army, of marching divisions lining up to favor
one side
of the line of

battle while refusing to offer battle with
the other side
of the line, required that the oncoming
columns

"peel off"

when commanded into formations of artillery,
infantry, and
cavalry.
The formation of such battle lines
required

exceptional degrees of artillery mobility.

It also called

for well-disciplined troops marching steadily in
even pace,
in "Gleichschritt

manders.

,

"

and ready to respond to field com-

Often, as at Rossbach in 1757, the commanders

were unable to decide until the very last minute which
side was to be favored.

The whole point of the oblique

order was to concentrate your forces on one side of the
line against half of the enemy's forces.

With the adver-

sary spread evenly across the whole front, his strength

would be diluted at the point which your leading edge attacked, and half of its forces would seek to engage the
side of your line which you chose instead to "refuse" in

battle.

Until the Seven Years War it was customary to

conduct battle with an extended front line.

But Prussia,
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only aided by „ anoverian
regimentSj
three of Europe s most
.

^^^

and Austria.

The oblique order
partiauy compensated
the small size of Prussia
s army by only
offering
on one side in the hope
of outflanking the ene
my
For Frederick, the key
consideration in deciding
whether to offer battle was
if his army could attack
the
enemy's weakest point.
if he could not attack
the most
vulnerable position, if instead
there were enemy guns
commandinqy tne
the ni±ls
hillc nr
or flat tterrain providing
no cover
for feints and maneuvering,
it was better not to attack
at all.

^

,

.

In one paragraph, Frederick
summarized his tactics:

Doubtless you will have noticed that
the
constant principle I follow in all my
attacks
is to refuse one wing or to engage
only a
detachment of the army with the enemy...
This
disposition gives me the advantage of risking
only as many troops as may seem appropriate,
and if I notice some physical or moral
obstacle in my way I am free to abandon my
plan, pull back the columns of my attack
into
my lines, and withdraw my army, placing it
under the protection of my artillery until
beyond range of enemy fire. The wing that
has been nearest to the enemy then falls back
behind my refused wing, enabling the latter
to support and cover me when I am defeated.
If I then defeat the enemy, this method
enables me to achieve a more brilliant victory; if i am defeated, it reduces my losses
considerably. 39
Nor was Frederick any less straightforward regarding
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the political and economic
motives underlying such a
cautious approach to decisive
battles.

Our wars must be short
and intense.
We must
ng thSm
P
A Sl ° W d rawn-out war
eventually un^
anv
undermines our excellent
discipline
depopulates the land, and exhausts
our resources. 40
The morale of national
recruits proved far less inclined for war than Frederick
had hoped.
The armies of
his day were beset by deserters
and those intolerant of
-

military discipline.

-

'

Between 1717 and 1728, for instance,

the Saxon infantry lost forty two
percent of its men

annually to desertion.

During the Seven Years War the

armies of Austria, France, and Russia
suffered 212,000
41
desertions;
in the course of the war, in other
words,
they lost to desertion a body of troops
equal to their

average number of national volunteers and
conscripts in
service at any given time during the war.
One look at an average infantryman's life in
wartime

would reveal the good reasons for desertion.

expected to march while loaded down with

He was

a five foot

musket, a 55 pound knapsack, sixty shot and several pounds
of gunpowder, and he had either to carry tent stakes or

part of the tent itself.

He was also obliged to do double

duty as general laborer whenever wagon trains and artillery bogged down in mud or when abatis, entrenchments, or

camps had to be built.

It is small wonder that unitl

.
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World War one, accidents,
illness and starvation killed
more European soldiers in
wartime than did direct exposure to enemy fire. But if
the daily
toil of the

Prussian "Landsknecht" was
oppressive and exhausting, his
duties in the throes of battle
were of another order of
magnitude
The ingenious idea in 1701 of
converting bayonets

that plugged up the mouth of the
musket into ring bayonets
that fitted around the musket mourth
revolutionized in-

fantry tactics.

The advent of the ring bayonet,

with its two and

a

half foot blade,

replete

enabled infantrymen

to combine functions that had previously
been carried out

by separate units of pikemen— who fought
close-in— and of

musketeers,

who fired in battle line and who had to con-

vert their guns into bayonets before engaging in close
fight.

With the ring bayonet, however, infantry could

both fire and advance.

In effect,

a commander did not

have to choose now between pikemen and musketeers.

Armed

infantry now combined both firepower and mobile shock.
The tactical formations of the oblique wing, the

need to coordinate all three weapons groups

— artillery,

infantry, and cavalry--and especially to get infantry to

master their weapons and charge head-on with their bayonets all put a premium on discipline.

But inculcating

discipline would often lead inadvertently to discontent

.
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and desertion.

Indeed
indeed, =4at times the Prussian
officer
expended more effort
effnrt «=»4i
patroll lng his own men
than in
patrolling the frontier.
*.

"One of the most
essential duties," writes
Frederick
"of generals commanding
armies is to prevent
desertion."
He suggests the

following measures:

1.
2

3*
4
4.

By not encamping too
near

a wood or forest
considerations require it
rGl1 S6Veral times^aUy
Bv
9 ° Ut fre
hussar patrolsto
scour the country
.
around the camp.
Rvnplacing chasseurs in the
By
wheat fields
n g
d ° Ubli
the

^^/^tary
tll^

PostTatl

5

^t

i

^
^

^

y

t0
treU(3then the cha in.
Bv not
t
Wing thG
soldie
to wander about
and
that thS officers conduct
Iheir
their troops to water and
forage in formation
By punishing marauding
severly? sine
S
the source of all disorders
0t drawin<? in the guards
placed in the
wTi?
marChing da ^ s until the troops
are
underarms?

tn' °T

6.

'

8

^

f
ri ^ orous P^ishment, the
sold
° r division on days
of march
9. By avoiding night marches unless
there is absolute necessity for them.
10. By sending hussar patrols forward
on both
flanks while the infantry pass through
woods.
11
By placing officers at both ends of
a defile
to force the soldiers to return to
the ranks
12
By concealing from the soldier any
retrograde
marches you are forced to make, or by making
use of some specious pretest that would
flatter
him.
13
By always seeing to it that the necessary
subsistence is not lacking, and taking care that
the troops are supplied with bread, meat, beer
and the like.
14. By examing desertion as soon as it creeps into
a regiment or company.
Inquire whether the
soldier has had his bounty, if he has been given
'

?P^o7'
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cap^i^L^^V^^-s,

"

the

COnduct
account, however*
no
SLSd ^f rS be an y On
ation of strict d1«S?
"laxplxne
Perhaps you
will sav fhfi ;u
l0nel WlU give
his
attention but thif
0 "^In a
army everything
g
eot i? n to
-ake it a P pear that an
that ?f*
15 done 13 the
work of a single man?42 tha?
-

i

-

^

^st^V"

^

-

Discipline was to be strictly
enforced on campaign,
in his "Military Testament
of 1768" Frederick argued
that
a commander must
punish all thievery, desertion,
acts of
insubordination, any
uy negiect
nealerf n
off *„4-i~
duties or abandonment of
posts, the discarding of
ammuniation, refusal
to shoot

during exercises, and not shooting
on the battle lines
43
when ordered.
Yet it does not seem to have
occurred to
Frederick that severe disciplinary
procedures required to
train an army and keep it disciplined
contributed to the
desertion which he hoped-with severe

measures-to prevent.

Patriotic ties had little to do in the
Frederician

view of warfare.

in lieu of widely shared civic
and

military commitments to the politics of the
Prussian
state, Frederick, like all commanders of
land armies in

Europe at that time, believed motivation had to
be

drilled in, created by constand exercise.

The driving

force was less the love of one's country than the
fear of

failing to carry out orders.

Because there are far more

soldiers than officers, observes Frederick, men of the
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^

"can o„ ly be kept
in order by
„
ave a greater fear
of their officgrs
than of
dangers to which they
are exposed." 44

^

^

Frederick never resolved
the problems of desertion
and lac, of discipline.
Much of the dilemma,
he pointed
out, was inherent in
the kinds people who
join armies or
were involuntarily recruited
from the provinces to fi
g ht.
Such people constituted
the dregs of the
land, good for

nothings who did not want
to work at home and who
do not
want to work on the battlefield.
They are vulgar folk who
simply want to indulge their
base inclinations with impunity under the protection of
an army standard.
They
are the disobedient offstrping
of peasants and urban
laborers: wild fellows, loose with
whatever little money
passes through their hands, and
disrespectful
of all

civil norms.

Perforce they were contemptuous of
their
officers, a class recruited exclusively
from noble families.

With such crews to work with, concludes
Frederick,
it is no wonder that desertion afflicts
his
forces;

luckilly, all the European armies had to face
the same

problem.

45

Frederick, in agreement with Machiavelli, had
argued
that "the best forces a state can have are comprised
of

native forces." 46

But this, he concedes, reguires an

—
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extensive population if the
country's agriculture and
nascent industrial economy are
not to be hindered through
loss of labor power.
In the absence of a sufficiently
large population to supply recruits
for the army, Prussia
would call upon mercenaries. But they
should never comprise a main fighting force; rather, they
should provide
support to divisions by forming their own
regiments.

But

they should accustom themselves to the same
order, dis-

cipline, and trust demanded of conscripts.

Most impor-

tantly, a state should never so neglect conscription
as to

rely upon mercenaries for more than half the army's

fighting

strength.

Yet during the Seven Years War,

Frederick has to call upon mercenaries to the extent that
by 1762 they comprised two-thirds of his fighting regulars.

However, it was far more than the reliance upon mer-

cenaries that enabled Prussia, with English and Hanoverian aid, to endure seven years of warfare against the

three most populous European countries.
In his own discussions of political-economy and in

his writings--so characteristic of all the Hohenzollerns

on the need to build strong, well-financed standing forces, Frederick reveals a structure of political concerns

far more incisive and better developed than that found in
"Der Antimachiavell

.

"

His work reveals an enlightened

187

absolute

shorn of personal
poiUicai glorification
which the state as an
objective and autonomous
unit of
international relations
fully mobi li ze s the
society over
whxch it presides in the
name of competing with
other
states.
this respect Frederick's
work builds upon
elements of political life
which Machiavelli had
sketched
out in narrower terms of
the civic ties and the
psychology
of virtue that underlay
the state and princely
power.
The
institutions of the state itself
become in Frederician
Prussia more important to the
ruler than the political
psychology of its leaders and
citizens. What need of

^

m

patriotism in a well-disciplined army?

The truly virtuous

modern ruler achieves, power not by
cultivating

supportive political atmosphere but by
creating institutions
a

designed to enhance the economy and, in
turn, the professionally trained army.

The Prussian State Between Mercantalism and
Militaris m
The Hohenzollern principality of Brandenburg,
one of

nearly three hundred in the Holy Roman Empire, emerged
after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 to become the basis
of modern Germany.

Though neither the largest nor by any

means among the more prosperous of the German principalities, Brandenbrug, or Brandenburg-Prussia, under the

guidance of several perspicacious rulers and kings

— from

188

the Great Elect o r

Frederick wiUiam (ruled
i64o _ i688)
Km g Frederick the Great (ruled
1740 . 1786) .. was able
tQ
develop into a competitive
ive continental
Conti^f
,

i

year of Freder
r-v
redenck

1

power.

^

By the

c
s

accession, the Hohenzollern
lands of
Cleve-Brandenburg-Prussia
,n been
k
y Prussia had all
united politically
into the Kingdom of Prussia.
Although
i

^^

pean countries were more
populous, Prussia fielded the
third largest standing army. 47
The i argely agrarian
semi-feudal economy was overlaid
in some
,

towns and in the

more populated western lands
with

commercial class.

a

rising market-based

Prussia also enjoyed the

beginnings of

industrial development through
ferrous-ore and coal
mining.
Under the aegis of a landed,
military-minded
class comprised exclusively of landed
nobility, Prussia
overcame its geographical scattering across
the North
German Plain from the Rhineland to the east
Baltic littoral.

Prussia was able to forge its consolidation

through imperial conquests and diplomatic maneuvering
and
was able to expand into neighboring principalities and

the

lands of other kingdoms because of its army and the artic-

ulation of its social structure and economic strength in
terms of military power.

Popular wisdom in the late

eighteenth century coined

a

"Most states have an army.

phrase for this phenomenon"
The Prussian Army has a state."
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"

POUtiCal

-lers, the

in - house

of the Hohenzollern

memoranda

-station,

political . miuta

^
^

each Hohenzollern
left to his successQr
to posterity, reveal
f or us the
Of office as the
princely house
kilities of p-m
co
„
Prussian
power.
v_>j_

^

^

^

-;

^^

The rules for court
life written between
1546 by the Blector Joachim
of Brandenburg
mealtimes and the organization
of kitchen work.
Fully
two-thirds of this "Hofordnung"
reveals a fastidious
ooncern for recording and
controlling food consumption
in
the roayl court. Joachim
I! discusses preparation
of
each meal in the most
'detailed terms.
Table arrangements,
how to purchase fish, the
distribution and preservation
of spioes, management of
the house key, the precise
number of people allowed into the
kitchen, the evening

„

distribution of "sleep-drinks"-each
of these issues is
accorded the same kind of attention
as is devoted in the
last third of the "Hofordnung" to
accurate bookkeeping
and the prompt repayment of household
48
debts.

That Joachim II overlooks in this one
document any

questions of securing defenses or raising an
army betrays
a problem pointed out nearly two
hundred years
later by

Frederick the Great in his own "Denkwiirdigkeiten
zur
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Geschichte des Hauses
ra n^
u
63 n
Bra
ndenburg."
Until the reign of
the Great Elector,
Frederick
win
reaerick William,
the Hohenzollerns
were simply unable to
defend their
fh^ r crown lands with
uerend
anything but hastily recruited
^
Y recrnif^ m
mercenaries.
Johann Sigismund
(ruled 1608-1619), f or
instance was only
salaries of 400 cavalrymen,
1,000 infantrymen, and 2,600
,

^^^^

footsoldiers-and then only for
three months annually.
During the entire Thirty
Years War the 7,000-11,000
men
fighting behind Brandenburg
standards were paid out of
Spanish and Imperial treasuries.
Georg Wilhelm, Elector
of Brandenburg (ruled 1619-1640),
was only able to raise
6,000 men of the 20 000 he called for in
1638 49 Lacking
a competitive standing army,
Brandenburg
,

.

had to suffer,

suring the Thirty Years War, the indignity
of seeing
Swedish troops enter Berlin.
In the Peace of Westphalia
Sweden was able to secure lands coveted by
Brandenburg:
lands at the mouths of the Oder, Elbe, and
Weser.

In marked contrast to the "Hofordnung Kurfiirst

Joachims II von Brandenburg 1542/46," the "Political

Testament" of the Great Elector, written in 1667, details
"how the entire state must be led." 50

rain from Joachim II

*

s

The shift in ter-

recounting of court life to the

stately survey of military, fiscal, and diplomatic affairs conducted by the Great Elector is reflected in
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Frederick the Grpaf
Great

«c
s

avellian "principini."

d 1S m 1S sal of the
petty Machi-

The
me Great
GrM * Pn
^
Elector
writes his son

about political deliberation
a
iteration, administrative
acumen,
Protestant P
pietv
ety, and
anH the need
to construct impregnable
fortresses throughout the
lands to which the
Hohenzollerns had gained title
after Westphalia: Cleve,
Halberstadt, Magdeburg, „ inden
and Wgstern pomerania
calls for establishing full
administrative rule over
Prussia, a land to which
the Hohenzollerns had
gained
title in 1618, but which they
would not politically command until the aftermath of
the Swedish-Polish War of
1660, when Poland finally relinquished
its claim to
Prussia.

^

,

_

^

In 1653, by arrangement with
the Brandenburg Estates

holding crown lands, the Great
Elector extracted
tribution of 530 Taler every six years,

a

con-

to be paid by the

Junker landholders of estates.

They were now granted

complete administrative rights on the land
they held— in
exchange for the land tax. Over the next
century and a
half, in fact, the rights accorded the Junker
lords came
to be embodied in the "Landrate," the local
councils.

These "Landrate" remained distinct from the state-ap-

pointed administrative hierarchy of the local commissaries,
provincial chambers, and the central agency, the General
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Directory.

the "Landrate" represented
the local nobility;
in fact, the nobility
alone served on these local
councils.
These "landrate" assumed
responsibilities
foi

policing their own districts,
and the full control thi,-S
allowed them over peasants' lives
ensured the semi-feudal
class status of the Junker nobility.

The rigid legal and

political separation of nobility from
serf was duplicated
in the army developed by the
Prussian state. Nobility
were recruited directly into the officer
corps while the
serfs, peasants, and common laborers
filled the ranks of
the "Landsknechte." The army thus embodies
the economic

and political divisions of feudal labor. 51
The Hohenzollern -rulers made impressive gains in

expanding their fiscal resources.

In 1667 the Great

Elector introduced the first excise taxes on luxury goods

purchased in the ciries.

Foodstuffs and homemade clothing

were excluded, but imported spice, silk,, and tobacco were
all subject to the tax.

At the same time the state began

to create an infrastructure fcr trade in the towns and

for the settlement of underpopulated lands.

A major

canal running from the Oder to the Spree allowed for

riparian trade between Stettin and Berlin.

Inhabitants

of towns were encouraged--at times, subsidized
on land eastward.

— to

settle

The creation of a regular postal system

.
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enabled eulturl and

«

rcial ties to develQp
within

Brandenburg-Prussia
The state treasury
flourished.

From 1640 to 1652,
the state disposed of an
annual average of 192,000
Taler;
over the next ten years
this fi gure nearly doubled.
1673, three years after a broader
excise tax was introduced, the state treasury,
the "Staatskasse » collected
402,000 Taler.
Fifteen years later, when the
Great Elector's successor, Frederick III
(ruled 1688-1713), reached
the throne, the "Staatskasse"
collected 2,257,000 Taler.
Thirteen years later, when the Elector
Frederick III was
recognized by all of Europe as Frederick
I, King
'

m

,

of

Prussia, the state treasury collected
3,800,000 Taler.
By the time the Crown Prince Frederick
became King

Frederick II in 1740, the Prussian "Staatskasse"
could
count on an annual income of 7,000,000 Taler. 52
An overwhelming proportion of the Prussian budget
was

earmarked for military preparedness.

my of the Frederician state was

a

The political-econo

paradigm piece of the

absolutist era in terms of its ability both to supply an
army out of public revenues and to use the army to create

new markets.

Not only were armies used to conquer ad-

jacent territories and navies used to settle overseas
colonies; the armed forces themselves became an internal
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market.

They beca.e not only the
most conspicuous beneficiary of public revenues,
but also served as an
engine
of national development
and industrialization.
The Great Elector left to
his successor, Frederick
HI/I, an army of irregularly
raised recruits numbering
53
28,500 men.
Three-quarters of these troops were
infantry, fifteen percent of them
comprised the cavalry, and
the remaining ten percent were
responsible for garrisons
and fortresses.
Unlike the "Landsknechte
whose pikes,
bayonets, and muskets were supplied by
the state, cavalry
had to provide their own horses and
equipment.
,

»'

Until the death of the first Prussian King,
Frederick
I,

in 1713,

the structure of the Prussian Army remained

little changed from the later days of the Great
Elector.
Indeed, as Frederick the Great regretfully notes in
his

own assessment of the House of Brandenburg, the proclivity
of Frederick III/I to spend

a

good part of the dynastic

income on court life, ostentatious public spectacles, and
fancy uniforms for his bodyguards contributed little to
the Prussian state. 54

But it did dazzle the other courts

of Europe enough to convince them of Frederick's claim to

Prussian lands that Sweden, Poland, and Russia had also
coveted.

But when the Brandenburg Elector became King of

Prussia, his state was in

a

precarious position.

Fiscal
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irresponsibility and

a

general neglect of the army had

allowed Prussia to fall far behind
its rivals Austria,
France, Russia, and England.
English titular claims to
Hanover, Saxony's royal claim to
Poland, the Habsburg
hold over Silesia, Lorraine, and the
lower Netherlands,
and the French presence up to the
Rhineland left Prussia
in a vulnerable position.

The Peace of Utrecht in 1713

ended the War of the Spanish Succession and
forced Spain
to withdraw from the Netherlands.

But in doing so the

peace treaty raised Austria to a position just behind

France as the second most powerful European state.
In 1667 the Great Elector,

Frederick William, had

drawn up military plans for the conquest of Silesia. 55

At

the end of the War of the Spanish Succession, however,

Prussia had no army on the scale required to pursue such
a policy of linking its scattered lands and acquiring new

resources

— particularly

Silesian coal and ferrous ore.

The "Sergeant King," Frederick William

I

(ruled

1713-1740), took over the Great Elector's work in strength-

ening the Prussian Army.
universal male obligation.

He instituted the principle of

Anyone leaving Prussian ter-

ritory to avoid conscription would be treated as
tary deserter.

56

Frederick William

I

built up

a

a

mili-

system

of cantonal recruitment that became the basis of Prussian

conscription until the military reforms after 1807.

57

Though numerous cateaoriss
tegones of exemptions were
introduced
during the Sergeant
King's reign-exemptions
for sxilled
laborers, the educated,
professionals in law and
medicine
clerg yme n, and the
nobility-the principle of the
Prussian state arrogating
the right to call upon
its inhabitants for military service
had nevertheless been
established.
Under Frederick William the
standing army increased
58
from 30,400 to 63,200.
with the tenth largest territory in Europe and only the
thirteenth largest population,
Prussia's peacetime standing army
now stood as the fourth
largest.
Munitions plants were constructed in
Potsdam,
and to obtain the saltpetre
required for gunpowder, special "Saltpetre Men" were sent
throughout the country to
search cellars, barns, and birdhouses.
While France had
enormous caves filled with saltpetre, and
England imported
it from India,

Prussia, like many European landpowers,

was forced to rely upon the yields of its agents
in the
field.

59

The resource-base of Prussia under Frederick William

did not favor an armaments industry.

A shortage of tim-

ber wood and coal left Prussia at a serious disadvantage.

Heavily forested countries like Sweden and Russia could
develop first-rate cannon industries; light, mobile cannon had to be cast at temperatures far above those needed
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-

soften the heavier
wrought _ iron into
ana England because
of
,

fcheir

_

^

coiUerieS;

able to cast lig ht
guns on a scale
impossibie
™e Prussian lands in 1713 were
not rich in ferrous
ore
The basic strength of
the Prussian Army had
to be
supplied through tactical
ingenuity and b y exploiting
its
own population to the
most strenuous degree.
Frederick
WUliam I, in his "Political
Testament" of 1722

^

,

had

admonished his successors not
to permit Prussian troops
to serve as supplements
for neighboring-or
alliedstates.
The subsidies paid by other
states for this
military assistance may be
tempting, but it is far more
important to maintain the population
and not to waste
one's soldiers in foreign wars:
"when your land is depopulated you have great difficulty
in conducting
war again.
The well-being of a sovereign
requires that his land be

well-populated." 60

Frederick the Great shared this con-

cern that Prussia have a population large
enough from
which to recruit a competitive army without
having to undermine the resources and labor-power required
for public
wealth.
"The strength of a state is its population
count and not the extent of its borders." 61

Indeed, in

his "Political Testament of 1752" Frederick reveals
that
he kept lists of births and deaths throughout the country
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so that precise
calculations of Prussia's
population lay

readxly within reach on
the eve of war. 62
The census
proved essential to the
cantonical recruitment
systemthe more so because despite
the universal character
of
obligation only a small
percentage actually served.
As Frederick calculated
in his own "Military Testament of 1768," only one-ninth
of the population was even
eligible for conscription. Of
4.5 million

Prussians, half
were immediately ruled out
because they were women. 63 of
the remaining 2,250,000
men-Frederick having presumed,
probably incorrectly, that war did
not disproportionately
affect the male population— over
half were ineligible
because of old age, youth, and physical
handicaps.

Frederick calculated that in the whole
country one would
find one million "weapon-capable"
"waf f
(

enf ahige

"

)

men.

An average mid-eighteenth century wartime
Prussian

army of 160,000, if fully drawn from the ranks
of the

native population

(

"Landeskinder "

percent of the eligible males,

a

)

,

would involve sixteen

percentage of the popu-

lation sufficient to cripple the Prussian economy by

denying it agricultural labor power and skilled workers.

Frederick decided that the cantons can provide up to
70,000, enough for a peacetime standing army, and that in

wartime he could recruit another 25,000 from the cantons,
the rest supplied by foreign armies or mercenaries.

a

.

These figures reveal the
population pressures of
Prussia, pressures felt in
varying degrees by all of
the
Continental labor-intensive land
armies.
Of 4.5 million
inhabitants, only 95, 000-2. 25
percent-could be spared
for service as fighting
regulars. 64 Prussia, like the
other Continental powers, recruited
upwards of half its
infantry from the mercenary
underworld of

Europe—

class of criminals, the slow-witted,
adventurers, and
the homeless.
The Prussian Army was organized
around its trained

officer corps and around the men culled
through the cantonal system of recruitment.
The ability to conscript
peasants and day laborers and to pay for their
equipage
from state treasuries reveals in full form the
alliance
between mercantilism and militarism which enabled
Prussia successfully to compete in the Continental

balance-of -power
At the outset of Frederick the Great's reight the

Prussian Army consisted of 83,000 men, of whom one-third
were mercenaries.

Eighty-six percent of the state budget

was devoted to the army, and a thorough network of tax

officers combined with the frugality of the Hohenzollern
House to create a military reserve
200,000 Taler.

—a

"Kriegskasse "

— of

By the end of Frederick's reign in 1786,

the standing army numbered 100,000 Prussian natives, a
70 million Taller reserve filled the "Kriegskasse," and
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the Prussian state had
almost doubled in size by
acquiring 30,000 square miles
of land in Silesia, West
Prussia, East Friesland, and
65
Linden.

Frederick's state-building, both
domestically and
territorially, was based upon his
use of the the "Kriegskasse," the war treasury.
"Never spend all one's
in-

come," he wrote in 1752
J./3Z,

built up to sustain

a

"=;n
so

fhaf
that 4-u«
the treasuries may be
*.

war of four years' duration." 66

The war treasury was funded through
the excise tax and

through the "Kataster:" the assessments
due from peasants
on the land.

The tax commission oversaw the excise;
the

provincial treasury collected the "Kataster."

Additional

revenues were generated by the postal system, the
occasional debasing of coinage, through fees paid for
the use
of crown lands, and by tarrifs on imported goods.

About

one-tenth of all revenues were set aside for the "Kriegskasse"

and the rest of the funds paid for general public

programs including maintenance of the standing army.
The economic

policies of Frederick the Great em-

bodied a classic form of mercantilism.

The whole object

of fiscal policy was to generate a budget surplus while

enhancing economic autarchy.

The "Political Testament of

1752" clearly expresses these concerns.

sessed no riches like those of Peru.

Nor

Prussia posdid

it
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en 3 oy the prosperous
trade of Creat Britain
or the United
Netherlands. Onl y through
strenuous work could one
hope
to keep up with the,.
Only by pro tectin
g markets fro,
-ports could internal trade
be encouraged.
When Prussia
Produced domestically what
otherwise would be

ported,

gold remained in the land
and the balance of trade
generated a surplus. Excise
taxes on luxury goods could
also

help discourage unnecessary
expenditure and provide incentives for developing more
useful industries.
En-

couraging migration to newly
settled, undeveloped land
could stimulate agriculture.
The population

could be in-

creased by attracting skilled laborers
from foreign
countries.
sixty thousand wool spinners were
needed,
Frederick observed, and by offering
them a "gift of cottage, a garden, and enough pasture for
two cows," they

could be drawn in from Saxony, Poland, and
Mecklenburg. 67
Tax exemptions should be encouraged for needed

industry and manufacturing.

Frederick William

I

had

already written that no foreign wool should be purchased
or consumed in Prussia. 68

He had also made great strides

in creating the infrastructure of economic development.

He had, for instance, overseen construction of Prussia's

first weapons plant

— in

Potsdam

— and

had organized

regular surveying of state lands.
Frederick the Great continued this development, and
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he used the standing army as
the basis of new markets,
all subsidized by taxes that
fell primarily upon the

shoulders of the peasant class.

Soldiers were quartered

in cities rather than in
fortresses so that they could

spend their meager income— 1.5 to

2

Taler per month-

on goods rather than waste it on
gambling.

The uniforms

they required stimulated the wool
industry, and providing the army with stocks of corn and
wheat gave the

government new means of controlling prices.

If a poor

harvest led to rising prices, the grain would
be put on
the market.
If Poland tried to undersell Prussian
farmers, the state would buy up quickly and thus stabilize the price.

An excise tax imposed upon luxury goods was used to

stimulate domestic industry and to shift somewhat the
tax burden to the more privileged classes.

Bread, beer,

and meat were not taxed, but Prussia imposed an excise
on all foreign luxuries which could be domestically produced:

"fabric, scarves, stockings, hats, glass, mirrors,

lace, and jewelry." 6 9

To establish domestic production

of some of these goods, Frederick had porcelain manufac-

turers brought to Berlin, where they built up
trade.

a

thriving

To reduce Prussia's import of silk, he had

thousands of mulberry trees planted in church yards and
public gardens, whence

a

native industry emerged.
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The revenues generated
from taxes helped build
up
the aoy, and this in
turn enabled Prussia to
sei 2e and
hold new territories:
Silesia, for instance, which
Purssia gained in the First
Silesian War, and which it
successfully defended in the
Seven Years War.
Rich
ferrous ore and coal supplies
there provided an early
stimulus to Prussian industrialization.

Unlike Brandenburg during the
Thirty Years War, the
Prussia of Frederick the Great was
able to compete with
the Continental armies.
During the later stages of the
Seven Years War, for example, Prussia
was able to sustain
the rigors of a protracted war of
attrition
and to

emerge from it geographically intact.

The mercantile

policies of Hohenzollern absolutism had yielded

a

mili-

tary force fully capable of playing a major role in
the

balance-of-power machinations that characterized European
statesmanship.

On no occasion was this more evident

than during the three partitions of Poland.

Austria,

Prussia, and Russia agreed by treaties to carve up this
land for themselves.

The partitions of 1772,

1793, and

1795 left the Kingdom of Prussia united from just east

of the Weser River to the west bank of the Nieman in

Lithuania.

With its eastern territories consolidated,

Prussia could now turn to the west: to the Rhineland.
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The Politics of

th^^^r^IIl^

in his "Political
Testament of 1752," Frederick

takes note of two political
realms with which the statesman most continually occupy
himself.
The internal ad-

ministration of

a

country involves maintaining
its go-

vernmental forms; the administration
of justice, wise and
frugal financial management,
maintaining a disciplined
army, and overseeing civil
peace are all components of
domestic politics that occupy a
statesman's time. By
contrast, "the whole political
system of Europe" commands
his attention in foreign policy;
here the statesman

seeks "to secure the state, expand
its possessions in
accepted, customary ways, and to increase
his own power
70
and reputation."
Some of these foreign policy goals are
inconsistent

with one another.

As Frederick found out during the

First Silesian War, the pursuit of territorial gain
by

means of war could endanger the security of the (Prussian)

state.

And it is far from clear

"Der Antimachiavell"

— that

— after

the pursuit of princely power

constitutes the kind of strength that enabled
compete in Continental diplomacy.
whole indicates

a

reading

a

power to

Frederick's work as a

kind of institutional politics that he

did not see in Machiavelli

1

s

prince and that emerged only

205

with the absolutist state.

"a prince should be the first

servant and the first official
of his state." 71 Moreover, the prince (or king)
had this responsibility within
a state system of other
sever iegn states, each of which
recognized and accepted its competitive
nature.

The

limits placed upon their own power
by mercantile policy
and considerations of population
were furthered by a set
of tacit agreements regarding the
scope of warfare they
would rely upon.
The era of limited warfare was perfectly
suited to

balance-of-power diplomacy.

The persistence of such a

state system required a relative homogeneity
of cultural
and intellectual ties, as well as agreement on
the terms
of estimating power.

The relative homogeneity was pro-

vided by a Christian framework that recognized and

tolerated

a

degree of religious freedom that the Counter

Reformation had not known; and the accounting of public
power facilitated estimates of

a

country's ability to

wage war.
Other indices were subordinated to or subsumed

within this criterion.

Population, the extent of terri-

tory, finance, and the balance-of -trade were construed
in terms of their potential expression in terms of mili-

tary power.

Other indices were available, and it was
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not as if they were iqnored
xgnorea.

q f3f „ n
States
competed economic-

ally for access to the
Near East and colonies,
like
America and India, rich in
resources and unfinished
goods.
Princely houses also competed
for reputation and
dignity.
Saxon princes seeking the
kingship

of Poland,
like Frederick III assuming
the kingship of Prussia in
1701, constituted efforts at
enhancing royal prestige
through means of bloodless
competition.
But frequently
such competitin became the object
of warfare.
The wars
of the Spanish, Austrian, and
Bavarian successions all
developed from such a politics of
prestige to absorb the

military energies of Europe.

So, too, did the colonial

wars, of which the most significant was
the Seven Years
War, during which Britain defeated France
for control of

North American colonies.
War became the decisive means for arbitrating the

political differences of states when treaties collapsed
or alliances reversed.

As the Treaty of Westphalia or

the Treaties of Utrecht and Rastatt (1713-1714) had
shown, war was by no means the only manner of settling

accounts.

But the threat of military intervention, the

shadow of warfare, loomed ominously over the terrain on

which diplomacy proceeded.
The possibility of war as an ultimate arbiter under-

,
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Pinned the whole era of the European
balance-of -power
even if war was not always resorted
to, and even as wars
were essentially limited insofar
as they did not seek

unconditional surrender and total destruction
of the
enemy's country. As Frederick once
wrote, "the peaceful
citizen should not even notice when the
country takes up
arms."
Indeed, it was the very limits of
absolutist
warfare that allowed states to go to war so
frequently.
The state system of the balance-of -power
was not

quite Hobbesian.

The framework for diplomacy was by no

means a natural condition of unmitigated competition
among anonymous, sovereign states struggling for access
to goods and resources.

Certain rules prevailed and

provided a regulative network within which states conducted their foreign policy.

The basic aim of such a

system, observed Frederick, is to ensure that "the superi-

ority of some rulers is compensated for by the combined
strength of several other powers." 72

The international

system was guided by the view that "no one state shall

predominate." 73

To this end a statesman resorted to

alliances, intervention, the breaking of treaties, negotiations, and when necessary, war. 74

To this extent the

balance-of-power resembled the competitive state of
nature which both Hobbes and Locke saw as characteristic
of unpolitical society.

But diplomatic custom and the

208

limits of war assured that the
international system did
not degenerate into the brute
struggle of untamed "competition," "diffidence," and "glory"
that Hobbes has seen
in the state of nature.
Despite the absence of any arbitrator or international police force
the rules of conduct
were self-imposed, by the participants
themselves.
It was not a system that could
properly be termed

lawless.

To be sure,

no sovereign presided.

it was anarchic in the sense that

But the politics that did emerge

respected— for instance— rules for prisoners of war and
for cease fires so that diplomats might be accorded
safe

passage to the negotiating table.

Besieging

a

city did

not take place without first asking the urban populace
to surrender.

The calculus of political power, however, became one
of military force.

Intentions about what to do with such

power were construed in terms of the ability to enforce
an equilibrium through alliance and through resort to

limited warfare.
The decisive measure of this power was the popula-

tion of

a

country.

Frederick's recurring concern over

the population of Prussia reveals how the warfare of his

day was dependent on available manpower.
The early era of standing armies was still very much
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an era in which battle
assumed a human form.
The general's ability to assess
the battlefield personally
consti-

tuted one of the arts of
war.

Artillery could not fire

cannon balls from distances
beyond the horizon, and men
confronted within immediate
range the forces that threatened to destroy them.

The speed at which an army
de-

livered annihilating firepower
allowed opposing forces
time to think: to regroup and
fight on or to retreat in
fear.

The innacuracy of musket and
cannon and the limited
ground their firepower covered meant
that battles never

achieved total form; that they remained
instead within
the scope of human reason, within a
battlefield bounded
by space and time.
Though men killed one another with
weapons, they had to wield those weapons within

the sight

and hearing of each other.
This human scale of eighteenth century warfare
was

not simply in terms of how one experienced it.

The

statesmen of Europe construed their military power in
terms of fighting regulars.

The significant exception

was provided by naval warfare.

Here the number of ships

of the line comprised the decisive index.

But the land

powers of the Continent, the countries competing with
armies, invariably construed their power in terms of the

number of soldiers.
"It is one's first duty as a citizen to serve his
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country."

5

^

these

^

his "Political Testament
of 1752."

^

^

He is writing about

his own obligation to serve
his country, but these
words
could just as well have been
used to denote the role
Played by citizens-or inhabitants
-of any state. if
the concept of citizenship
is understood in terms of
the
rights held by a people within a
polity, however, then
the great majority of the
Prussian population in the

eighteenth century could hardly claim
to enjoy the status
of citizenship.
Elections for public office were unheard
of— except for the electoral princes and bishops
of the
Holyo Roman Empire choosing an Emperor.

The officials

and administrators of the Prussian state
were appointed;

retired officers, the nobility, and those privileged

enough to have received training in law or accounting

comprised the hierarchy of government.

The local nobil-

ity selected members of the "Landrate" from its own
ranks.
In military matters we find a legal obligation to

serve in the army

— with

certain exemptions for the edu-

cated, the clergy, the nobility, and those whose skills

or entrepreneurial status rendered them indispensable to
the economy.

Peasants and unskilled laborers, in other

words, bore the brunt of Prussian conscription.
The constraints of population and the mercantile

economy combined with the limits of military technology

.
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to keep wars from achieving
a level of total
exertion.

Thousands nonetheless died in
these limited wars.
The
disciplinary procedures introduced
into the Prussian Army
had as their goal to enable
soldiers to stand firm in the
face of battle and shoot back.
Frederick bemoaned the
losses of his men but could not
succumb to his fleeting
emotions.
He persisted along with his
European colleagues in adhering to the norms of
balance-of -power
politics in relying heavily upon the army.
He thus
acquiesced in the demands of a state system
which claimed
on its behalf the duty of peoples to risk
their lives—
indeed to lose their lives— in the name of
securing their

homelands
But armies were not used merely for defensive pur-

poses, to thwart aggression.

Armies were more frequently

used to seize neighboring territories, to lay claim to

colonies and foreign crowns, and to join with partners in
wars designed to restore to Europe a modicum of balance.
Politics in the balance-of-power was not that of

discourse, debate, or domestic interests competing in the

public sphere.

It was not the politics of mass movements

and people mobilized with and against one another.

Nor

was it representative government in a state reflecting
the diversity of opinions of its citizens.

In an era

devoid of mass media, in an age when most men and women
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were illiterate and without the
franchise, there existed
few opportunities to find out for
oneself what was going
on politically in the capital.
in the absence of liberal
institutions there existed no opportunity
for the overwhelming majority of peasants and day
laborers to express
their will— much less develop one— on
public affairs.
The public sphere was a narrowly delimited
realm of the

king's advisors— invariable drawn from courtiers
and
small group of nobility.

a

There developed in these courts

and dynastic circles a household politics.

For the ma-

jority of the populace, however, the politics of the

balance-of-power was that of the state conducting its
own policy.

It is no accident that in German the same

word covers both politics and public policy.

In the

German view these two activities of "Politik," so
separable in the liberal and democratic traditions, are
one and the same, ordered by a centralized state, carried
out by professionally trained bureaucrats.

There remains

for most of the inhabitants little to do by serve on be-

half of those instruments of policy and implement deci-

sions already made.

Those who served in the conscript

armies of Europe participated in the balance-of-power,
but only by offering

— on

in the name of the state.

demand of the king— their lives
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The balance-of-power
arose because of inability
of
any one state to prevail-and
because collectively the
other states would not allow
any one state to prevail.
The limited nature of early
modern European warfare
perfectly served this conception
of diplomacy.
Restraints imposed by population,
resources, and the poli-

tical-economy of mercantilism guaranteed
that no one
power could marshal sufficient manpower
and materiel to
mount an overwhelming assault and create
an imperium.

The art of war, as Clausewitz later
noted, was indis-

tinguishable from diplomatic prudence.

War and peace

admitted of no gradation insofar as the constant
threat
of limited war helped maintain a delicate
political-

military balance.

The balance simultaneously deterred

aggression and enabled a state or alliance to go to war

without endangering the existence of any state.
vided a convenient framework for mutual expansion

It pro,

as

when Russia, Prussia, and Austria dismantled Poland.
And it provided a rationale for the mobilization of a

country

— to

harness its resources in defense of its

foreign policy interests.
But this reliance upon warfare as an instrument of

arbitration proved inherently destabilizing for the very
same balance-of-power in whose name it was restored to.
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As Frederick's own efforts
in Prussia show, the
struggle
to enhance one's military
power in the n ame of sustaining

competitiveness in diplomacy
established what can only
be called a "ratchet of
escalation;" each country strives,
step by step, in response, to
catch up with its rivals
and to form ever more powerful
coaltions
at new levels of

potential violence.

Postscript: Napoleonic Warfare
In 1772,

a

French nobleman and poet, Comte de

Guibert, criticized the limitations with
which contem-

porary wars were fought.

"But let us suppose," he

speculated,
that a people should arise in Europe vigorous
in spirit, in government, in the means at its
disposal, a people who with hardy qualities
should combine a national army and a settled
plan of aggrandizement.
such a people would
not be compelled to limit fighting by financial calculations. We should see such a
people subjugate its neighbors and overwhelm
our weak constitutions like the north wind
bending reeds. 76

Guibert dismissed the likelihood of such

power emerging.

veloped in France

a

military

But within twenty-five years there dea

military force with far more intensity

and ambition than anyone could have imagined.

The style

and politics of Napoleonic warfare transformed Europe's

armies, and with them, European politics.

.
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The levee en masse, the
nation at arms, expanded
the scope and intensity of
warfare, setting the stage for
that total warfare which
Clausewitz analyzed in On War
Lazare Nicolas Carnot a French
military engineer during
the first two French wars
against the Coalition of European Armies, described the spirit
and tactics of the
.

,

Revolutionary Grand Armee

.

"No more manoeuvres, no more

military art but fire, steel, and patriotism." 77
On 23 August 1793, the National Convention
published
a law

which effectively announced the advent of
total

mobilization
The young men shall fight, the married men
shall forge weapons and transport supplies;
the women will make up old linen into lint;
the old men will have themselves carried in
to the public squares and rouse the courage
of the fighting men, to preach hatred against
kings and the unity of the Republic.

The public buildings shall be turned into
barracks, the public squares into munitions
factories .. .All fire-arms of suitable calibre
shall be turned over to the troops: the interior shall be policed with shot guns and
cold steel. All saddle horses shall be
seized for the cavalry; all draft horses
not employed in cultivation will draw the
artillery and supply wagons. 78
As Clausewitz later acknowledged, France's new style
of warfare constituted more of a political revolution

than a revolution in military tactics.

The amassing of

artillery, the relentlessness of pursuit, the willingness
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to confront head-on the
Coalition armies rather

lan
thi

harass their supply lines were
only made possible by a
degree of mobilization unknown
to European armies.
The
half a million Frenchmen who
volunteered for the first

defensive war found themselves within
in wars of conquest.

a few years

involved

in part motivated by their new-

found freedom, in part driven on by
the entirely new
officer corps which had replaced the
aristocratic career
officers of Bourbon France, the Grande Armee
swept

readily through northern Italy, the Netherlands,
the
Rhineland, Hesse, Saxony, and Bavaria, and then on
to

Berlin and Vienna.

A planned invasion of England was

called off, but the French Empire undertook

a

blockade of

the European Continent to close off British trade.

In

1812, with 300,000 troops already in Spain, Napoleon be-

gan an invasion of Russia which was supposed to culminate
in the Czar's surrender.

With 375,000 men, 100,000

horses, and a supply line 250 miles long, the French

forces sought to complete their Continental Empire by

annihilating the main Russian Army.
The political restraints of balance-of-power diplo-

macy were shattered by France's aims.

Napoleonic war-

fare exposed the limits of absolutist armies.

It com-

pressed into a few years time far more changes in the
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intensity of warfare than
had been achieved over
the
preceding century and a half.
The professional standing
army, the ..state within
a state," now became
a nation at
arms. What Frederick the
Great could only strive
for.
Napoleon had achieved.
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CHAPTER

V

CLAUSEWITZ AND THE POLITICS OF
TOTAL WARFARE

The principles of warfare on a
national scale that

Bonaparte brought to Europe after the
French Revolution
transformed military thinking. The rigorous
methodicism
of earlier military strategists, of Vauban
s detailed
plans for siege warcraft, of Guibert's chessboard
'

pat-

tern of war, was swept aside by the need to plan
strategy
for armies far larger than any absolutist general
staff

had ever been prepared to handle.

Dynastic politics and

bureaucratically controlled armies became transformed
by the wars of whole nations.
The mobilization of the French citizenry by the

likes of Carnot posed an immediate threat, both poli-

tical and military, to the Continental governments.
The size of the French revolutionary army and the reck-

less abandon and strategic brilliance of its commander-

in-chief, Napoleon Bonaparte, brought to the Lowlands,
to Prussia, Spain, Austria, and even Russia the possi-

bility of

a

European French Imperium.

Only by under-

standing the nature of this new, total warfare in Europe
could the states beyond the Rhine hope to forestall the
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French military revolution
from overtaking them.

Clausewitz's Realism

Carl von Clausewitz, 1780-1831,
a Major General in
the Prussian Army, director
of the War Academy in Berlin
from 1818 to 1831, articulated
the principles of total
warfare embodied by Bonaparte's armies.
his lectures
at the War College, in numerous
political essays, and in
his historical writings, Clausewitz
examined both this
new strategy of warfare and the responses
to it that

m

statesmen would need to make if
to be restored.

a

balance-of -power was

In his most famous book,

On War

,

a

massive, uncompleted tome that was published
only post-

humously, Clausewitz formulated an understanding of

warfare which has shaped for subsequent generations their
thinking, and their politics, of the military.

it is a

work that still shapes, or at least forms the starting
point, of political-military strategy today.
By developing from the concept of absolute war an

appreciation for the immanence of political relationships, and by explaining how policy-makers are respon-

sible both for deciding to resort to war and for its

conduct—even under the most extreme military condi-

"
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tions-Clausewitz accorded realist
statesmanship the
full burden of conducting
national warfare.

Neither
professional military men nor
everyday citizens of the
state did Clausewitz deem
responsible for matters of
war.

Instead, he locates all responsibility
in the
hands of a commander-in-chief and
the state's cabinet.
Even under the most optimal of
political conditions, as
we shall see, Clausewitz foresaw what
he called the

"military genius" as the one man most
qualified to wage
total war responsibly. Yet responsibility,
for

Clausewitz, meant that political considerations
always

guided the movements of

a

state's military machine.

But what did Clausewitz understand to be properly

political?

What does it mean to say, as Clausewitz

wrote in On War

,

that warfare is "a continuation of

political intercourse, with the addition of other

means

.

Clausewitz located himself firmly in the tradition
of political realism.

His work revolves around a view

of war's propriety as an instrument of national policy,
as an instrument for resolving fundamental differences

between states: securing territory against foreign
threats, seizing new lands, or establishing allied con-

straints on states that seek gains which might chal-

.

lenge the balance-of -power
The dictum about warfare
as the continuation of
politics, surely the most-quoted
in all of military
strategy, contains within it
the kind of ambiguity
that nourishes endless debate.
it proclaims that poll
tical considerations underlie
all warfare, but it suggests, too, that the realm of war
constitutes a world
quite unique, that resort to war
entails a fundamental
shift in the terms of interstate relations.
it is not
mere politics to disarm the enemy in a
violent engagement.

In the shift from diplomatic notes and
the bar-

gaining table to the clash of arms on the battlefield,
two nations interrupt their political relations and

dramatically alter their form of intercourse, but they
do not alter the political character of their policies

The legalistic severance of formal diplomatic rel

tions betokens a deeper shift of terrain.

The shift

from parchment to gunpowder means that political dis-

course gives way to political violence.

When nations

confront each other by means of their armies, the pecu
liar nature of war threatens always to override the

guiding hands of statesmen.

The political conflicts

between states become the occasion for an accompanying

2
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political struggle within
each state for ccntrcl
over
military policy. It is in
his ability to contain
and
delimit the nature of war
itself that the true statesman
displays his greatness.
The path of war's eruption
is strewn with diplomatic
notes, broken bargains, and
shredded documents. When war
itself breaks out it leaves far
behind these remnants of
political activity.
it explodes into a fireball,
against
which the shapes of human figures
are scarcely discernible.
Yet despite its drive for autonomy
war always

retains a certain human quality, one that
prevents it
from achieving an absolute form: a quality,
too, in which
rational intent and purpose maintain, if in veiled
form,

their guiding role.
Certain kinds of politics, however, Clausewitz

dismisses at the outset.

The realist's universe is closed

to particular forms of political action.

pages of On War

,

In the first two

Clausewitz argues that those of weak

constitutions or pacifist souls should make way for the
stronger of heart.

Kind-hearted people might of course think there
was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat an
enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of war.
Pleasant as
it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed:
war is such a dangerous business that the mistakes which come from kindness are the very
worst
.

3

.
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Later on in his study
Clausewitz presents in more
vivid terms the consequences
of waging war with a kindly
demeanor
We are not interested in
generals who win victories without bloodshed.
The fact that
slaughter is a horrifying spectacle
must make
us take war more seriously,
but not provide
9 radu aHy blunting our swords in
Se
°J
humanity.
Sooner or later someone
i
will r£L°
come along with a sharp sword
and hack
off our arms.

At the point at which war commences
there exists
neither space nor opportunity for the
sort of political

vocabulary which decries the use of violence
or which
argues, along the lines of "jus in bello,"
for restraint
in warfare.

Like the constraints on state action imposed

by the law of nations, such concerns are not
appropri-

ate—indeed, they may actually be dangerous--if one
places much faith in them.

Attached to force are certain self-imposed
imperceptible limitations hardly worth mentioning, known as international law and
custom, but they scarcely weaken it. Force
that is, physical force, for moral force has
no existence save as expressed in the state
and the law is thus the means of war; to
impose our will on the enemy is its object.

—

This disregard of international law from warfare,
"jus in bello," establishes in the Clausewitzian framework

the primacy of what has come to be known as "Staatsrason ,"

reason of state.
state embodies it.

Moral force exists only insofar as the
The sole means for that morality to
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find expression is in the
actions of the state: act::ions
mediated by force. Morality
exists and sustains itself
not by argument but through
the institutions and decrees
of a central political authority.
Physical force, recourse to war, is the sole
legitimate arbiter of competing political moralities. But
we are really speaking
here not of morality but of the
power and institutional
interests of the state.
In this sense Clausewitz codifies
a feature of

balance-of-power politics that marked Europe
from the
Treaty of Westphalia to the Treaty of Vienna
of 1815.

The sole test of a state's power was the army
it sent in

battle.

The clash of warfare, a politics of physical

force, mediated state conflict.

War, the capacity and

willingness to wage warfare, embodied national power.
Yet Clausewitz does acknowledge that international

law retains a certain significance, though one "hardly

worth mentioning."

On no other page of On War does he

discuss international law.

This is a strange oversight,

for Clausewitz himself could hardly have been unaware of

the war conventions customarily upheld by belligerents
in his day.

War prisoners, for instance, were held in

camps and exchanged after

a

peace agreement, not arbi-

trarily slaughtered after battle.

Clausewitz, for in-

stance, spent several months
in 1806-07 as a war
prisoner in France and was
released only after the
Peace of
Tilsit.
Throughout the whole balance-of
-power era cease
fires-during which emissaries
enjoyed free transit
through enemy lines-were
mutually respected. Such
customary accessions to the law
of nations, even under
extremes of wartime, are summarily
dispatched by Clausewitz in the opening pages of his
work.
The logic of his
realism allows no serious consideration
of the manner
by which international laws of war
were upheld-even if

merely for reasons of self-interest.
a terribly bloody business.

ter must seem.

It would be

No, this is rather

Or so this "is how the mat-

futile— even wrong— to try

and shut one's eyes to what really is from
sheer dis-

tress at its brutality." 5

The temptations and dangers o

unilateral kindness, he reminds us, must be avoided in
war.

The intellect discerns this, and opts for full

force.

This is an act of intelligence.

Intelligence also teaches states to channel their

aggressive drives via effective means.

This distin-

guishes them from barbarian tribes or primitive people
with no political institutions and therefore, with no
real wars.

Clausewitz's example here is revealing.

the page immediately following his brief dismissal of

On

.

226

international war, Clausewitz
refers in passing to certain rules of warfare: rules,
"jus in bello," warrantin
g
the kinds of constraints
that contradict the nature
of
warfare. Man is capable, he
confesses, of agreeing
bilaterally to restraints on force.
Those societies, in
fact, capable of such agreements
are more advanced and
civilized
If, then, civilized nations do
not put
prisoners to death or devastate cities their
and
countries, it is because intelligence
plays
a larger part in their methods of
warfare and
has taught them more effective ways
of using
force than the crude expression of
instinct. 6

We come, then, upon a curious feature of
Clausewitz's

realism.

And it is a characteristic, too, of those

extreme versions of "Staatsrason" that posit an
immutable

realm of conflict among states in any balance-of-power
system.

Warfare demands extreme exertion, particularly

in an era of national mobilization.

International law

cannot suffice to console nations at war; their full
energies, transformed by armies into force, alone can
settle such conflicts.

Unilateral measures introduced by

citizens or parties within a warring state can only

weaken the state.

Countries at war, in fact, have to act

as one unified body.

The more advanced a political cul-

ture, the more able it is to organize its armies and

direct them for political purposes.

This ability to
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give political direction to
force characterizes civilized
societies, and distinguishes
them from political ones.
One way in which advanced
nations give political purpose to their armies is by
agreements or conventions of
an international character to
establish rules for the
conduct of warfare. The binding
force behind such rules
of war, the realist tells us, is
not their moral but their
mutual character.
It is simply in the interests of
each
belligerent to abide by these rule, not to
breach them in
search of some immediate gain lest the
entire system of
rules of engagement break down. But the
operative prin-

ciple here is not a moral claim, rather an
expedient one.
The political arbiter of such restraints, then,
is not

moral but reason of state.

Not citizens but statesmen

and commanders-in-chief have the right to decide poli-

tical questions.

The dictates of war place constraints

on the sphere of public action that may legitimately

intrude upon the state.

Absolute and Real War

Clausewitz

1

s

discussion of the difference between

absolute and real war, a discussion central to his opening chapter in On War, contains the key to his politics
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and to the politics of
statesmanship.
He relies heavily upon a
Kantian distinction between
the noumenon of absolute war
and the phenomenon of its
real, actual occurence.
Clausewitz likens the pure concept of absolute war to a duel
between two men: "an act
of force to compell an enemy to
do our will." 7 The

social relationship, the attribution
of intent, is crucial for war, even in its absolute
form.
For war is not
mere violence, not something disembodied.
it "is an act
of force, and there is no logical limit
to the application of that force." 8 The true path of
war is to seek

disarmament of the adversary, and such an intent
knows
no moderation.
But because war, like a duel, is a social act,

each party

seeks disarmament of the other, and an escalating spiral
of violence comes quickly to characterize the action.

An opening thrust is parried, then returned.

Each re-

sponse then carries the exchange beyond some mere stand-

off into escalation.

The hostile intent of the bellig-

erents prompts each to outdo the other.

The war that

unfolds then involves a numerical factor of available
forces and a qualitative factor of available forces and a

qualitative factor of strength of will.

To introduce

into this understanding of absolute warfare a moderating

:

principle would be literally
absurd, for war, as distinguished from all other
activities, means a mutual
struggle aimed at disarmament
of the foe by concentrating all violence against
him.
Is such a war,

in its absolute form,
possible in

practice?

Clausewitz does not pose this
question as if
he were some philosophical
naif.
He recognizes, if in
convoluted form, the philosophical
meaninglessness of
posing the question whether the pure
concept of absolute
war could be possible in practice.
Clausewitz s convoluted response denies, on practical
grounds, the possibility of absolute war ever realizing
itself
•

in human

action.

He does not recognize the category
mistake of

even posing the question, yet he comes around
to

a

similar position after reviewing the conditions
of any

possible war.

It turns out,

as we shall see, that one

could not embody in corporeal activity what Clausewitz
has termed absolute war.
The three conditions under which, according to

Clausewitz, absolute war would be possible in practice
are
a)

if war were a wholly isolated act, severed from

events in the political world;
b)

if war were a single decisive act, or a set of

decisive acts,

which transpired simultaneously;

.
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and

O

if the outcome achieved
were complete, perfect

unto itself, uninfluenced by
the political situation it would bring about, or
from which it

arose

9

To enumerate these conditions is,
as Clausewitz goes
on to show, to preclude absolute war
from ever being

realized.

To obtain each of these conditions
would re-

quire the abstraction of war from the
context out of
which, as an intelligent act between states,
it neces-

sarily unfolds.

Clausewitz articulates a set of prac-

tical responses to each of these postulated conditions
and he shows that whatever its conceptual purity as
an

absolute noumenon, war itself is something rooted in
social, political, and historical relationships which

indelibly stamp it as a human enterprise.
First,

"war is never an isolated act." 10

War,

rather, is rooted in relationships between two belligerents, each of whom possesses a will to action, each of

whom understands, if only partially,
in the war.

what is at stake

Clausewitz calls this set of contexts

"modifications in practice."

Through them, war becomes

something always short of perfect, never achieving the
absolute best.

The absolute form of war would consist
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as a pure duel removed from
the political or social

conflicts which led one party
to challenge the other.
But even were we to confront
two duellists completely
removed from the class attitudes
which spawned the:;ir
battle over honor, we would observe
in
the duellist!

themselves certain qualities of mind
and body inconsistent with the absolutist conception.
Duellists, too,
are embodied agents. And like the
very war whose distilled essence their actions comprise,
their actions are
delimited by natural features. War, in
other words, as
an activity embodied in two or more
forces always re-

mains constrained by the limits of human
organization.
These limits, however, are not merely physical.

Indeed,

their most characteristic limitation is psychological.

More troublesome in war than the limits of exertion
is
the fallibility of judgement.

Clausewitz has in mind the inability of human will
to comprehend a social relationship fully.

Not simply

because of a deficit of information, rather owing to the

nature of perception itself, knowledge in warfare is

terribly problematic.

Understanding and mutual compre-

hension are difficult enough in
between two people.

a

simple relationship

The complexities of warfare raise

to near incalculable levels the problems of knowledge and
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m

perception.

war,

intention plays a central role.

Each side's actions depend upon
both self-understanding
and an interpretation of the
adversary.
war, amidst
warfare, action is not something
objective; it does not
exist as mere physical behavior that
could be fully
apprehended
The action to be examined is always
in

m

.

the course of becoming something more
than it was.

The

action of war is not separable from the
perceptions and
analyses of what each side is doing.
This is no mere

restraint that in principle could be overcome; it
resides
in the very nature of warfare that it is an
activity

between human agents whose perceptions in part constitute, in part reshape, the events which they seek to

understand.
Second,

blow."

11

"war does not consist of a single short

A succession of acts follows upon one another.

Action in war distends over space and time.

Clausewitz

remarks parenthetically, that if war did not consist of
a single,

overwhelming blow, "preparation would tend

toward totality, for no omission could ever be rectified."

12

But even in the era of total national warfare,

in which combat achieved a level of scope and intensity

never before imaginable, the constraints posed by communications, terrain, and human exertion limited the extent

6
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of war.

The embodiment of the concept
in even the most
powerful national armies of
Clausewitz 's day still entailed something short of absolute
war.
The "abstract
world is ousted by the real one
and the trend to the

extreme is thereby moderated." 13

A who le range of re-

sources basic to warfare "cannot
all be depoloyed at the
14
same moment."
The "fighting forces proper, the
country with its physical features and
population, and its
5
allies"
all comprise relationships which bind
decisionmakers.
The frequency of periods in which no
direct

combat takes place—the suspension of action in

war-

means that violence in battle is not of one piece.

The

natural hesitancy resulting from faulty intelligence
further limits the war effort.

Moreover, the inherent

superiority of the defensive strategic position helps

undermine the offensive initiative, turning the search
for a decisive breakthrough into a war of attrition.

These constraints, argues Clausewitz, cannot be overcome

through better planning or more training.

Writing in

the first third of the nineteenth century, an era which

did not know of tanks, wireless communications, and
aircraft, much less of satellites and intercontinental
rocketry, Clausewitz notes that "the very nature of war

impedes the simultaneous concentration of all forces." 1
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Finally,

"in war, the result is never
final." 17

Unlike the site of a duel,
where the violent conflict i s
settled and both sides then retire,
the whole site of
warfare is not just the battlefield,
however removed from
cities it may be, but whole
countries.
indeed, in the

warfare of Clausewitz's day even
the battlefield was not
removed from the towns of warring
countries.

Troops

were billeted in the homes of civilians,
soldiers were
conscripted from among the populace, and
armies were fed
from the private stock of citizens. But
Clausewitz

accords a larger meaning to war than merely
provisioning
for and conducting it when he locates it
amidst ongoing

political and social relationships.
Even defeated armies are never totally obliterated,
and victorious nations must still face the postwar tasks
of resettlement, reconstruction, and establishing control

When nations are not totally defeated, when wars stop
short of completely annihilating the enemy

always the case, because there remains

a

— and

this is

civilian popu-

lation to be governed, land to be tended, and cities for

commerce

— negotiations

and peace settlements take over

the tasks once carried out by weapons.

War in its real

form, not in its absolute manifestation, entails a range

of responsibilities that neither victor nor the defeated

can overlook.

Rearmament and revenge may
soon threaten
a country which has
triumphed in battle, just as
the
tasks of postwar civilian
administration may pose overwhelming problems to an occupying
force.
Had Bonaparte
in 1812 defeated the Russian
Army he still would have
had to establish rule over the
populace-a task beyond
the capability of any army he
could have brought to
18
Moscow.
In these three conditions, each
of which imposes

restraints upon the embodiment of warfare
in its absolute form, warfare "eludes the strict
theoretical re-

quirement that extremes of force be applied." 19

m

ac-

tual political contexts, the restraints of
human obser-

vation and the calculation of probabilities in action
limit the ultimate exertion of violence.

Clausewitz develops this account of the factors

modifying the practice of absolute war in the first chapter of Book One in On War

.

This chapter, he notes, is

the only one in the whole work he considered finished, 20

and it has become one of the most widely read chapters
of all military theory.

Here Clausewitz establishes

two points, and the tension between them characterizes
all that he wrote on military strategy.

His concern,

first, is to establish what distinguishes warfare from
all other activities.

This he can discern only in
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examining the concept of
war in its most abstract
form.
The essence of war, he
concludes, that which constitut
es
its nature, is the striving
by violent means to dis
arm
the adversary.
stripped bare of all constraints,
this

moment stands revealed as the
activity unique to war.
in its embodied form,
however, as ah activity engaged
in
by two countries, two armies,
this moment

of war does
not disappear but rather becomes
subject to constraints:
of human will, of space and time,
of imperfections in the

mobilization, however total, of national
forces.

War-

fare, then, whatever its extent,
is burdened by this

ambiguity.

Limited war, defensive wars, both contain
a

moment of war's essence, but are not exhausted
by this
one dimension. Only by abstracting the concept
of war
from the form it commonly assumes in human action
can

Clausewitz explore that which defines it as different
from both the exchange of diplomatic demands or the

temporizing of armies unable to achieve
"All real wars," writes Clausewitz,

cations of the absolute concept."

a

breakthrough.
"are modifi-

"The theoretical

concept is not fulfilled in practice." 22

Real wars are

quite different from their absolute counterparts, for

here the suspensions of activity that characterize human

battle limit the ability of forces to exert themselves

ltanSOUSly

"aik;

" arfare

concept.

—
^™

-
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suspenses

0 f action

ac k no„ ledged by
the absolute

from

fche

standpQint Qf absQiute
what actual ly transpires
upon the battlefiel(J
seems
"incoherent ana inco mp
iete,
. chimera Qf true
But Mobility and
inactivity are the nor.ai
state
of armies at war;
action is reallv
really th=
the exception.
Fear
and indecision, native
to the human mind,
are reduced to
the rarest of moments
when an army does exert
,

'

itself-

when troops push on in
search of a decision, when
generals gather together their
reserves for deployment.
imperfect human perceptions,
the difficulty of making
judgements, and the virtual
lack of any reliable information all pose problems for
those who have managed the
appropriate will power to mount an
all-out
attack.

Finally, what Clausewitz explains
as the inherently
greater strength of the defensive
position reduces the
effectiveness of offensive assaults and
tends to prolong
wars.
Clausewitz repeatedly emphasized that
the defender
enjoys a familiarity with the terrain,
secure lines of
communication, established supply lines, a
clear line of
retreat, and--usually--support of the population. 24

Such strategic advantages are only overcome
with extra-

ordinary difficulty, and overwhelming numerical
superiority, on the part of attacking armies. 25

Battle drags
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on, it ceases at night
time, and it virtually
ceases in
winter. Much of an army's
time in war consists of

gathering supplies, securing
billets, waiting for word
from convoys, marching for
days, weeks, on end without
ever confronting the enemy.
War thus consists of a
whole series of separate
engagements, each one of which
involves violent battles but which
rarely call upon

whole armies.

in most wars,

the overwhelming majority

of them, neither side can summon
the strength to force a
clear decision. And even when in
those rare battles
whole armies of a quarter of a million
men each converge
upon a vast field for one great confrontation—
as at

Leipzig in 1813— the natural friction of the
military

machines will keep war short of its absolute form.
"The art of war deals with living and with moral

forces," wrote Clausewitz

.

"Consequently, it cannot

attain the absolute, or certainty." 26

This would seem

to follow from the terms of the Kantian distinction be-

tween absolute and real war with which Clausewits opens
On_War.

Yet in this text, and in his essays and studies

of Bonapartist generalship, 2 7 Clausewitz slides over to
the view that here, indeed, for the first time in mili-

tary history, we see war conducted in its absolute form.
The ambivalence is not merely a matter of curiosity,

.
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nor an example of
Clausewitz's phUosophical
clumsi,.ness
It goes to the heart
of the path of mo dern
warfarewhether through the advance
of technology and the
political mobilization of the
democratic state one could
actually conduct warfare at
the absolute extreme.
Clausewitz's condensed sociology
of military
history presents an entelechy
of war's development into
its fullest, total form. 28
what he repeatedly refers to
in On_War as "the natural
course" of battle achieved
apotheosis under Bonaparte. The
era of national warfare
ushered in after the French Revolution
brought the scope
and intensity of warfare to its
highest point since
Antiquity.
The "element of war itself, stirred
up by
great national interests, has become
dominant and is

pursuing its natural course." 29
The French campaigns of 1805-06 against
the Third

Coalition "are the ones that make it easier for us
to
grasp the concept of modern, absolute war in all its

devastating power." 30

At Ulm, Austerlitz, Jena, and

Auerstadt, in campaigns that devastated Austria and
Prussia, the French army brought to Europe a scale of

war that no contemporary cabinets were prepared for.
In 1816, Clausewitz observed that since the rise of
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Bonaparte, "the most daring
of gamblers ... all campaigns
have gained such a cometlike
swiftness that a higher
degree of military intensity
is scarcely imaginable." 31
in apparent contradiction
to his philosophical claim
for
the concept of absolute war,
Clausewitz observes that
"with our own eyes we have seen
warfare achieve this
state of absolute perfection.
.Bonaparte brought it
swiftly and ruthlessly to that
point." 32
.

Clausewitz, to be sure, equivocates
on this point.
Within Book Eight of On War he shifts
terms and qualifies his claim of modern French warfare's
absolute
,

character.

"since Bonaparte, then, war ... closely ap-

proached its true character, its absolute perfection." 33
His account of the Russian Campaign of 1812 also
equiv-

ocates.

"This was not," observes Clausewitz,

"the kind

of campaign that drags feebly on to its conclusion, but
the first plan ever made by an attacker bent on the

complete destruction of the Russian Army and the occupation of her country.

Despite Bonaparte's attempt at

such an absolute conquest, a strategy of annihiliation
(

"Niederwerfungsstrategie")

,

he failed for having under-

estimated the enormity of the undertaking.
Clausewitz, however, leaves open the question whe-

ther with more forces, Bonaparte could have succeeded.
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And this is part of Clausewitz

's

larger ambiguity, left

unresolved, whether in fact an
absolute war is really
possible.
Clausewitz at times defies the
logic of his
own philosophical distinction
between absolute and real
war.
As we shall see, this was
because Clausewitz at
times equates the philosophical
distinction between the
two concepts of war, absolute and
real, with the practical distinction between two kinds
of real war: total
36
and limited.
a subsequent section we shall
explore
in detail the difference between
total and limited war.

m

But first we need to clarify the reasons why
absolute

war in principle is impossible.

We need to explore why

Clausewitz really thought, as distinguished from what
he occasionally says in Book Eight of On War

,

that abso-

lute war, because of its logical consistency, was a

practical impossibility.
Clausewitz always understood that warfare entailed

obstacles to success in the field: that there existed

a

fundamental difference between the plan of war on paper
and battle as it actually unfolded.

He expressed this

difference through the concept of "friction,"

a

concept

which enables one to appreciate how plans and strategems
will often go awry because of accidents, misinformation,
the confusion of battle, sheer exhaustion, faulty equip-
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merit,

or untimely weather.

m

this military equivalent

of Murphy's Law in engineering, 37
Clausewitz makes the

reader aware that the enterprise
of war involves reducing this factor to a minimum-but
that unforeseen,
indeed, unforeseeable, difficulties
are bound to arise.
The concept of friction constitutes
one of Clause-

witz

's

genuine contributions to military theory.

military strategist before him had developed

a

No

system-

atic account of why things are bound to go
wrong.

A

general whose plans depend on the perfect coordination
and functioning of all his troops and equipment is

likely to face military disaster. 38

Through practice an

army learns, at best, to minimize friction and to accom-

modate itself to the vicissitudes of chance which are
inherent in warfare.
Clausewitz'

s

concept of friction is far narrower

than the flux of history which Machiavelli had accounted
for in terms of "fortuna."

The cyclical nature of suc-

cess and failure, the ephemeral nature of good fortune
and wealth: these Machiavelli had incorporated into a

concept of history that confronted the most virtuous of
princes.

But what three hundred years ago had codified

the destiny of whole polities is now, with Clausewitz,
in the era of standing national armies,

reduced to a
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range of technical
problems in managing total
warfare.
For friction » is the
only CQncept

^^^^^

responds to the factors
that distinguish real war
from
war on paper." 39 It retains
neither
destiny of "fortuna," but
friction does pose vexing
problems in the conduct of
warfare to the extreme.

^

^

Numerous minor incidents interfere,
of a type you
can never really anticipate.
Clausewitz considers the
case of a traveler who has
embarked on a ten mile trip.
The whole journey is but a half
day's
ride, and so he

does not depart until the afternoon.

His progress is

slowed, however, first by hilly terrain
and then by poor

visibility as dusk falls.

At the halfway point, where

he needs to change horses, the stableman
informs him that

his only remaining mare is unaccountably
not available.

The traveler thus faces yet further delay until
a re-

placement can be found.

Finally, hours behind schedule,

he arrives near midnight at his destination, and must

awaken the innkeeper to secure a bed.

Multiply these

everyday delays a thousand times, suggests Clausewitz,
and you get an idea of what can obstruct the most basic
of military maneuvers.
In war, events "combine to lower the general level

of performance, so that one always falls far short of
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the intended goal." 40
y

^

ph
vc a i impediments
Pnysical
pose the
first sort of obstacles.
A planned assault, calling
for
two corps fifteen miles
apart to assemble the night
before battle, suffers because
a swamp not designated
upon
the maps slows down the
horse-drawn artillery. A fog not
lifting until ten in the morning
delays the opening salvo.
The soldiers have had to camp
outdoors because no
tents could be carried by the
supply train; their clothing has thus had no chance to
dry during the night, and
their movements throughout the day
become impeded by
their soaked, insufferably hot uniforms.
Moreover they
have been marching for three weeks now,
and despite
•

having not yet engaged the enemy until today,

a

fourth

of them suffer from injuries or illness
acquired since

leaving home.

The gunpowder fired from their muskets

and cannon creates huge black clouds of smoke in the
air.
In the absence of a wind the soldiers' vision is im-

paired, and they can neither see the enemy nor bring

themselves to advance.

An experienced messenger of the

flank has fallen from gunshot wounds, and a battalion

commander on the covering side must now dispatch his
orders through a hastily recruited scout who can hear

nothing over the battlefield roar.

A cannon breech

blows up and kills the men and horses tending to an
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artillery battery.

The soldiers, who have been
fed for

weeks on rations of bread and
wine, begin to lose their
physical endurance.
The forces at the disposal of
the commanding officer
lose in a hundred little ways what,
on paper, appeared
as indefatigable strength.
Even in a well-oiled machine,

concludes Clausewitz, resistance inevitably
develops.
Armies can, however, reduce through rigorous
practice the
mechanical failure of their equipment and
accustom themselves to all manner of harsh weather.
Still, a surprising number of troops will suffer

casualties from their own or their colleagues' weapons.
And try as one might to adjust, the most rigorous training program will scarcely supplant real battlefield

conditions.

Only experienced armies, hardened by their

recurrently having to face obstacles, can learn not to
panic in the field.

"Peacetime maneuvers are a feeble

substitute for the real thing," writes Clausewitz, yet

they are far better than "routine, mechanical drill."

Reverting once again to the mechanistic simile that he
so frequently relies upon when discussing the nature of

modern armies, Clausewitz concludes that combat experience is the only "lubricant that will reduce this
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abrasion" of friction. 41

Mechanical and physical obstacles are
not, however,
the only sources of friction.
Problems of faulty intelligence confront the general staff with
a whole other
category of friction.
Reports in war, writes Clausewitz, are of
three
sorts: contradictory, false, or uncertain. 42

They pro-

vide a most unreliable basis for making judgements
in
the course of war, yet they remain the only way for
com-

manders to gain a picture of what is transpiring in the
field.

Information about the enemy and his country are

the basis of one's plans and operations.

Yet insuf-

ficient knowledge of the enemy will always create doubts
and anxieties.

In an era when neither observation bal-

loons nor telegraph stood at the disposal of the general
staff, the difficulties of gathering reliable informa-

tion about an enemy prior to engaging him were left to

convoys and sentries.

mounted messengers.

All information was carried by

What these messengers did not di-

rectly observe they gathered from reports by the local
populace or from travelers on the roads.

Rumors spread

by spies, however, or estimates based on partial access
to the truth, would often lead to faulty reports.

The

great time involved in conveying messages over ten or

.
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fifty miles might easily render the
news close to useless by the time it arrived, for the
situation would
change in proportion to the distance
traveled by the

messengers
Uncertainty about one's own strength and position
was another source of friction.

in an era when armies

were billeted over an area upwards of one hundred
square miles, 43 the mere logistics of assembling forces

would lead to numerous stragglers— and deserter s--scattered over many miles.

Within the area occupied by an

army, a panoply of unforeseen geographical obstacles

might obtrude upon the movements of men: lakes, hills,
swamps, rivers

— not

all of them marked out on the map.

And the problems of estimating one's own position and

strength escalated incredibly in battle.
Among one's own troops, uncertainty and exaggeration also served as

a

considerable source of friction.

Human emotions undergo the most extreme shifts in the

midst of battle: from the depressive contemplation of
one's impending death to the mania of supreme triumph.
This lability of emotions carries along with it the

powers of judgement.
Even amidst the fragile serenity of camp life,

suspiciouns and fear play a powerful role in the moods
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of soldiers.

Personal antagonisms among the
troops,

deeper antagonisms-inherent
in every army-between the
front-line soldiers and their
general staff: both of
these feed the kind of explosive
atmosphere that pervades an army during a campaign.
Men receive the
slightest news from home as if it were
a message borne by
the gods.
A letter from loved ones can becalm
the most
tortured soul. Likewise, the flimsiest
stories about
enemy forces rapidly become the basis of
firm conviction.
Rumors and legends quickly implant themselves
in the

minds of every soldier.

The generals and their aides

must battle against the spread of such stories, for in
little time they supplant a proper perspective, making

realistic assessments most difficult.
The very climate of war lends itself to faulty

judgement.

Extreme danger, utmost exertion, uncer-

tainty, and change: within this lethal vortex decisions

have to be made.
The rush of sensations threatens to overwhelm the

man who has not hardened himself in the face of battle.
Neither classroom study nor the demands of civilian life
will have prepared one to stand up with courage on the
battlefield.

Literary embellishments, like the civil-

ian's hankering for honor and glory, ill prepare you for
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what warfare really looks
like.
"Let us," suggests Clausewitz
in a preface to a
masterful piece of graphic writing,
"accompany the novice
to the battlefield."

As we approach the rumble
of guns grows
louder and alternates with the
whir of canbegin t0 attract his atten2!on
tion.
Shots begin to strike close around
us
We hurry up the slope where
the commanding
general is stationed with his large
staff.
Here cannonballs and bursting
shells are
frequent, and life begins to seem
more serious than the young man had imagined.
Suddenly someone you know is wounded;
then a
shell falls among the staff.
You notice
that some of the officers act a little
oddly;
you yourself are not as steady and collected
as you were: even the bravest can become
slightly distracted. Now we enter the battle
raging before us, still almost like a spectacle, and join the nearest divisional commander.
Shot is falling like hail, and the
thunder of our own guns add to the din.
Forward to the brigadier, a soldier of acknowledged bravery, but he is careful to take
cover behind a rise, a house or a clump of
trees.
A noise is heard that is a certain
indication of increasing danger the rattling
of grapeshot on roofs and on the ground.
Cannonballs tear past, whizzing in all directions, and musketballs begin to whistle
around us. A little further we reach the
firing line, where the infantry endures the
hammering for hours with incredible steadfastness.
The air is filled with hissing bullets that sound like a sharp crack if they
pass close to one's head.
For a final shock,
the sight of men being killed and mutilated
moves our pounding hearts to awe and pity. 44

k

*

—

The friction and

confusion that develops in such an

atmosphere pose the most basic challenges to the plans of
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war to which an army plans
to adhere.
But how, amidst
all this noise, chaos,
and fear, can an army
maintain
itself?
The answer, for Clausewitz,
revolves around leadership, particularly around
the commander-in-chief.

prevail in battle, to draw up

a

To

workable military stra-

tegy and to carry it out,
requires leadership of the
most far-seeing and courageous
kind.
it requires the
military genius.

Genius and Statesmanship
The German Enlightenment concept of
"genius," of

"aesthetic genius," pertained to sensitivity in
one's

ability to perceive, and elicit through the visual
arts,
a sense of

nature— of what constitutes the essential

and the enduring of the natural world.

Hans-Georg

Gadamer, in a concise account of the transformation of
"genius" in the late German Enlightenment philosophies
of Kant, Schiller,

Schelling, and Hegel, summarizes

Kant's views in the latter

's

Critique of Judgement

;

"what

the concept of genius achieved is only to place the pro-

ducts of the art aesthetically on the same level as

natural beauty." 4 5

in its restrictive sense of pertain-

ing to art and to aesthetic reaction, the concept "gen-
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ius" involved an innate ability
to master the rules of
a creative

discipline-without (necessarily) being
able

to articulate precisely what
those rules fully

are— and

in executing a work that extended
our appreciation of

what counted as "natural."

Throughout the early nine-

teenth century, in the hands of Fichte
and Schiller
during the growth of a more unified
Prussian state, the
philosophical strivings for unity and a
transcendental

nature that had so characterized the German
intellectual
landscape became subject to more practical concerns. 46
Clausewitz, who over-modestly confesses "no special

expertise in philosophy or grammar," 47 develops the
concept of genius with masterful psychological subtlety.

Clausewitz

's

concept of genius, and his ability to dis-

tinguish its nature from those forms of expertise
unique to other fields, serves as an unintended refutation of his own professed humility.

Indeed, the account

of genius in warfare reveals on Clausewitz

's

part an

underlying aesthetic sensibility that is scarcely to be
found in subsequent bearers of the Prussian militarist

tradition like Helmuth von Moltke, Graf von Schlieffen,
Otto Hintze, or Hans Delbriick.

Clausewitz summarily dismisses the bookish, the
formulaic scribblers, from his pantheon of military
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geniuses.

"Only the rankest pedant would
expect theoretical distinctions to show direct
results on the battle48
field."
Yet in a curious way, Clausewitz
himself

makes a whole series of theoretical
distinctions and requires that they show direct military
results in
terms

of the ideal leader taking them
seriously.

Byt Clause-

witz by no means requires the application
of formula in
the course of battle-mere rules for strategy
or tactical
engagement.

Rather, Clausewitz

's

concepts express them-

selves as ways of understanding war.

And he wants,

further, to examine philosophically the kind of mind best

suited for directing enormous armies.

A social, indeed a cultural-historical, character
infuses the concept of military genius.

Only advanced

societies, in which the military factor dominates, give

rise to such genius.

tantish fashion to

a

When

a

society attends in dille-

wide range of tasks, or narrowly

concentrates its energies on, say, farming or trade, the
proper intellectual and moral powers peculiar to military life languish undeveloped.

Nor in primitive, bar-

barian, or nomadic tribes, however warlike they may be,

does such genius take roots, for though here one may
find those skilled in the arts of war, one does not find
a

culture sufficiently developed and disciplined to
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cultivate

kind of mental
prowess and
characteristic of military
genius
_

on

^

rf war,
"the greatest names
do not appear before
a high Uvel
of civilization has
49
been reached."
ine small ,armies
The
°f an Alexander the
Great do not q ualif
y him in the test
of genius Clausewitz
has in mind.
Only in the modern
era of standing national
armies, with men such as
Gustavus Adolphus of
seventeenth century Sweden
and with
Frederick the Great and
Bonaparte do we recognize
men
who, in Clausewitz' s terms
u«xms, qualify
*Hf« as true geniuses.
.

m

4.

Clausewitz rejects the romanticist's
model of untutored genius, "though this
is closer to the truth
than
that of the scholarly pedant." 50
He is "talking about a
special kind of intelligence, not
about great powers of
51
meditation."
The intelligence demanded by
battle, he
explains, is that of one who has the
courage and coviction to discern from the turbulence
and uncertainty of
events the proper course of action and
who then has the

will to act upon his convictions.

These convictions are

in part the product of contemplation,
but they are not

formula etched into the brain.

Yet they do not succumb

to the overwhelming sensations and impressions
which

define all life on the battlefield.
A natural talent, not a trained and educated one,

.
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distinguishes the mil itary
genius

.

Ris knowledgS/ his

sensitivity for guides to action,
itself constitutes a
realm of fore-knowledge upon
which he can rely when
making decisions. This knowledge
"must be so absorbed
into the mind that it almost
ceases to exist
in a

separate, objective way."

52

The genius remains committed

to firmly implanted judgements
of which he has been long

convinced, rather than to the intensity
and vividness of
immediate impressions and inspiration.
He acts instinctively, and senses the deeper truth.
Only those able to
downplay the dazzling veneer of war's chaos,
only those
few whose thinking retains a kind of impassioned
insight,
can succeed in wartime leadership.
In military life one meets various character
types:

solid, phlegmatic men who, though lacking initiative,
are

seldom seriously wrong because of their great reserve;
those more sensitive in demeanor, who are easily moved
on less important issues but who lack the stolidness to

bear up under pressure when faced with the most significant tasks; the nervous, excitable ones who frantically

display a veritable flood of emotions and thoughts at
the merest occasion; finally, those moved only gradually,

not suddenly, and who conceal their strongest, deepest

passions
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Only in this last character
type do we begin to approach the military genius.
But the true genius, though
aroused only gradually,
sustains in intensity a level
of
courage and boldness that
transcends his own self and
that radiates out to inspire
the men around him.
This
ability to rouse whole armies
requires of the genius a
capacity for inspiration that
emerges not from personal
greed for honor but from a degree
of political enthusiasm that can mobilize the entire
army.

Clausewitz discusses these qualities under
the
rubric of courage. By this term he refers
both to the

character of strength in the face of personal
danger and
to accepting "responsibility, either before
the tribunal
of some outside power or before the court of
one's
own

conscience."

53

Yet Clausewitz discusses only the first

dimension of courage, not courage in its second, political manifestation.

For Clausewitz is concerned en-

tirely with the genius' ability to stand up to the rigors
of battle.

He thus analyses the genius in terms of

character traits and sets aside as inappropriate a study
of the genius' accountability.

Perhaps it was mistaken

for him even to have raised the possibility

— by

mention-

ing such a political dimension in conjunction with the

genius' courage.

But it is characteristic of Clause-
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withz's realism that he
does not study the
military
genius in terms of his
political responsibility.
We
shall see later that the
matter of political accountability is one discussed
in terms of civilian
advisors
exercising influence upon
the genius, not in terms
of
the military genius measuring
up to civilian standards;

military brilliance calls for
its own standards and
rules.
The character demanded by
the nature
of war

eludes civilian standards.
It is not enough, however,

to manifest courage.

The scale of the warfare which
Clausewitz analyzed required that the military genius retain
through the whole
course of battle a firm sense of place
of where he and
his army are.
Friction in warfare arises largely from
faulty intelligence, not the least of which
develops

simply from not knowing the positions of
your own men and
the lay of the land for which they battle.
"Ortsinn," a
sense of locality, is "the faculty of quickly
and accu-

rately grasping the topography of an area." 54

Remember

that Machiavelli suggests how princes on the march, or
even out for an afternoon's ride, should continually

study the land, should familiarize themselves with rivers
and hills and pose tactical problems of maneuvering among
them.

55

Clausewitz elevates this activity to a psycholog-
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ical concept indispensable
to the military ge
nius.
The
better knowledge of
terrain contributes
greatly to a
strategic principle of
central importance to

military theory: the inherent
superiority of defensive
warfare, a superiority
rooted in exploiting local
knowledge of terrain and
conditions.
Clausewitz's theory of war
revolves around the military genius. The great
general's personal courage and
political sympathies are fused
in an intellect of such
creativeness in battle that he is
able to lead and inspire whole armies.
In the cacophony of battle he
never
gets unruffled; indeed, it is here
alone that he becomes
gradually roused until he arrives at
a level of
impas-

sioned action in which his mind and his
commitments are
fully engaged.
Throughout the storm and terror of battle his "intellect retains an image of the
inner light"
that illuminates both the details of his war
plans and
the principles of sound warfare he must follow. 56

This

inner vision, this "coup d'oeil," guides the true mili-

tary genius in times when lesser characters would bow
before the enormous pressure of utmost exertion in warfare or panic for fear of their lives.
The military genius must master not only the arts of

war but moral forces as well.

The strength of an army
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depends not simply on its
numbers; it depends, too, on
the depth of motivation
infusing men in battle.
CI ausewtiz, as we have seen,
understands real warfare in terms
of a clash of wills, each
side intent upon disarming
the
other.
Clausewitz's world, psychological
concepts
Play a central role. The military
genius must embody
particular qualities if he is to
lead his armies in victory.
Leadership and courage under fire,
and the impassioned allegiance to his country:
without these no general
can sustain his battle plans. And
no army unreceptive to these psychological forces can
sustain

m

its stra-

tegy,

m

no other collective endeavor do the
emotions

and passions play so determinative a role.

it is Clause-

witz's sensitivity to these issues that further
distinguishes him from the chalkboard military theorists
of
his day.
Virtue, military inspiration, must infuse the troops
if armies are to succeed.

The demands of modern warfare,

the sustained marches—increasingly

too

— require

,

in winter months,

of conscripted men a kind of toughening and

discipline that only the army can instill.

Civilian

life, even in a country predominantly rural and agricul-

tural, ill-prepares men for the rigors and sustained

exertion required of armies on campaign.

They must un-
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dergo the most exhausting
training, aceustoming themselves to hardships and
extreme pain, and thereby
develop
an eagerness for the
singular glories gained in wartime.

57

Clausewitz wrote extensively
on the creation of a
Prussian "Landessturm" and
"Landeswehr « the new conscript army and its reserve
system.
But in On War he
turns from a discussion of training
an army to an account of the moral forces it must
both embody and confront.
He thought that even the severest
military
,

training would scantilly prepare men for
what battle
demanded of them. Despite his obligatory
concern for the
drawing up and training of soldiers, Clausewitz
really
thought, as he shows in On War

,

that on the battlefield

one confronts a world unique unto itself: a world
dis-

tended and at remove--but not severed--f rom the claims
of diplomatic life, a world with a grammar all its own. 58
The only training that could prepare men for war was that

provided by war itself.
A spirit of military virtue comes from

a

series of

victorious wars and from "frequent exertion of the army
to the utmost limits of its strength."

5Q

True military

spirit, physical power accustomed and steeled to privation, driven by love for the country that it defends,

finds expression in the single, powerful, overwhelming
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idea of the honor of
national armies. Modern
war provides occasion for the
people to emerge from their
petty
Private concerns and to
unite-as had the French against
the First Coalition
Armies-for one great cause.
No
means other than war will
shake the people from the
lassitude and pursiut of luxury
"which debase the people in
times of growing prosperity
and increasing trade." 60
Clausewitz's paean to the patriotic
spirit of nationalist warfare was a common
response among early

nineteenth century German/Prussian
intellectuals to the
threat posed by Bonaparte's forces
across the Rhineland.
The new revolutionary spirit of
the French peasantry fed
twenty years of warfare on the Continent.
A people suddenly let loose from rural serfdom
brought their revolution to all the monarchies and duchies
of Europe:

Spain, Italy, the Empire, even Russia.

The explosive

political force behind these armies threatened to
over-

whelm those countries which did not increase their
armies sufficiently to meet the French challenge. 61
Despite the inherent risks of arming newly freed serfs,
there was no other way to defend against the threat of
a

French imperium but to expand the Continental armies.

And only if charged with an intense nationalist commitment would these new troops prove loyal soldiers. 62

But

.
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Clausewitz

discussion of motivation does not
cease
with an account of this patriotism.
He understood that
in the course of battle a whole
range of emotions and
sentiments, which he called "moral
forces," affected
troops and could even determine the
outcome of engagements between the largest of armies.
's

Clausewitz's appreciation of psychological factors
in warfare embraces, as we have seen, the
military

genius, and it covers, too, the general patriotic
senti-

ments which all citizens of warring nations should embrace.

But Clausewitz also portrayed in a very sensitive

manner the sense of loss, the spread of moral decay, that
pervades an army defeated in

a

major battle.

He appre-

ciated, too, how the outcome of battle could turn the

state of mind of those caught up in it, particularly of
the front-line troops.

The psychology of soldiers

proved for Clausewitz as important as the personalities
of statesmen and generals and the quality of naitonal

will
In military engagements, a loss of morale can prove

to be a decisive turn of events.

The decline in the

sense of comradeship and confidence will quickly lead to
defeat, for the real destruction of the enemy's forces

results less frequently from overwhelming advantages of

troops and firepower than from the ability to exploit
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weakened resistance and
determination.
In war, perceptions are
everything.

"The actual
facts only emerge much
later-through histories." 64
the course of a battle, which
usually, in Clausewitz's
era, lasted only one day,
the moods of the participants
provied if not decisive surely
central to the outcome.
Their ability to exert themselves
and to sustain their
efforts over many hours would determine
the outcome of
battle.

m

Consider a pitched battle between armies
of similar
size.

The attacker, having seized the initiative,
will

have at first been courageous, even confident,
of his

opening moves: the defender, by contrast, prudential
in
demeanor, more prepared to fend off an advance than
to

conquer new lands.

Both sides, of course, have prepared

lines of retreat, just in case of trouble. 65

As the

battle develops, and if the defender proves resolute, the

attacking side will gradually become exhausted at the

realization that it can only maintain its position.

The

inherent strengths of the defensive will tend to erode
the positive will of the attacker; the surety of communi-

cations lines, the amassing of local supplies, and the
better knowledge of terrain all play into the defender's
hands here, and they gradually give way in importance to
the different psychologies of each side to the point
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where the defender's prudence
and commitment to resist
become the basis for a shift
in the moods

of the troops.66

in such a situation the
defense becomes confirmed in its

will while the attacker suffers:
not necessarily in terms
of casualties or guns lost, but
essentially in terms of
will power. The morale of the troops,
concludes Clausewitz, cannot replace good arms and
well-trained
troops.

When the battle reaches

a standoff,

or when the at-

tacker's initiative is blunted, the morale of
the troops
can make a crucial difference. Outcomes can
thus result

having little basis in mere differences of materiel
and
size of forces.
One of these outcomes, of course, is a rout: not an

orderly retreat of an army along pre-arranged lines, but
a panicky abandonment of entrenched positions or battle

lines.

These tactical positions break down completely.

In such a rout the defeated army has virtually ceased to

be an army at all.

As if the training and discipline

have been for nought, the lines of authority and the
soldiers' obedience give way to chaos.

In its most

extreme form the loss of morale in battle can lead to
the disintegration of the army: soldiers fleeing for

their lives, supply trains abandoned, weapons tossed
aside, the general staff unable to impose order, and the

.
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febrile emotions of patriotic
zeal suddenly transformed
into a frantic struggle for
simple survival.
The obverse side of such
disastrous defeats were the
victories so decisive and won
against such odds that they
transformed an army's spirits and
even entered the national consciousness. Occasionally,
victories on the
battlefield become enshrined as turning
points in the
hitherto bleak history of a state.
Frederick the Great's
victory at Leuthen in the winter of
1757 helped turn the
tide of the Seven Years War. when
its 36,000 man army
defeated the 70,000 man Austrian army,
Prussia not only

forestalled defeat but was able to take the
offense in
Silesia.
The victory quickly entered the pantheon
of

Prussian military history.

Such victories acquire a

political significance that long outlives their strategic
consequences
Nowhere than in this moral-political sphere is

Clausewitz's dictum better illustrated, that "in war the
result is never final." 6 7

One cannot exactly distinguish

the point at which conventional military outcomes become

watersheds of history.

"We don't have a concept suffi-

cient to distinguish such defeats and victories, but

nevertheless we have such outcomes."

6Q

s

s
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Clausewitz

'

Politi cs

in an era when newly
created national armies first

waged war across the
Continent, an era in which
military
geniuses led armies of half
a million into wars of u„imagined intensity, a military
theorist dared the apostasy of defending civilian
control of warfare's conduct.
Or so it seemed when Clausewitz,
in the first third of
the nineteenth century, wrote
that "war is only a branch
of political activity; that
it is in no sense autonomous 1,69
.

"In no sense autonomous."

War, rather, was an act

of human intelligence, an act of
human will and under-

standing: an act worthy of the highest
intellectual
inquiry.

On_War.

To this end he devoted his enormous study,

Here he elevates war to an activity deserving

of the most scrupulous respect.

Yet he reiterates at the

outset and conclusion of his theoretical work that above
all, war is something political.

Clausewitz argues,

particularly in Book Eight, that warfare does not exist
of its own; nor does it consist solely of military en-

gagements.

Even total war, he wrote, "the pure element

of enmity unleashed," is ineluctably political.

7n

It is time now, after these pages of Clausewitz'

thought, to ask and to analyze what precisely he meant by
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the politics, the
political nature
LUie

of „
ot
warfare.
<=

By the
end of onj^ar one has seen
so many times, and in so many
different ways, his claim of
a politics underlying or
guiding war. What does this
claim mean?

There are,

I

'

think, four levels at which one
must

confront Clausewitz's assertion
about
warfare.

And

I

a

politics of

propose here, in this concluding section,

to examine what he meant about
such a politics:

in terms,

first, of war as a human activity;
second, as action in

tension between the demands of its own
nature and those
of the state whose policy it serves; third,
as an act of

national mobilization subject to the guiding hand
of

statesmanship at whatever level of intensity; and fourth,
as a political activity with a vision of legitimate

public life.

1.

War as

a

Human Activity

That warfare is

a limited,

certain natural constraints was

human activity subject to
a

theme underlying

Clausewitz's distinction between absolute and real war.

With the concept of "friction" he introduced

a

factor

that delimits the achievement of war plans in practice
and that denotes the inherent, unavoidable problem of

faulty intelligence in wartime.

Friction, then, stands
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as a reminder, a fruqtraf^
,
rrustratmg reminder,
that warf;:are entails a whole range of
obstacles
acies of the most practical
sort many of which
wnich r-^n
can k«
be minimized, but not
all of
which can be overcome.
Friction Uke
principles Qf
suspension of action in
wartime and the inherent
superiority of the defensive,
enables Clausewitz to explain
•

r

—

•

•

•

,

^

how a pure concept of
warfare gives way to real war
as
something protracted, imperfect,
extended over space,
and subject to shortcomings
of human judgement.
The
noumenon of war gives way to
its phenomenal form.
Wars, then, whatever their
extent, take place within
a particular human context,
and this both delimits the

scope of war's action and locates
it within a larger
political context. As a human activity
war is neces-

sarily subject to the natural restraints
of human exertion and to the technological limits of
an epoch.
But in
a more significant sense, in terms of
conducting warfare,

Clausewitz is intent upon placing warfare within
the context of ongoing relations among states.
The three counterf actual conditions by which abso-

lute war might be possible thus retain for Clausewitz a

central importance.

The epigrammatic conciseness of

their refutations betrays

a

profound appreciation on

.
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Clausewitz's part that warfare
does not unfold in the
abstract, that international
violence, however destructive and persistent, is
continually mediated by human
agency.
Because "war is never an isolated
71
act,"
because "war does not consist of
72
a
single short blow,"

and because "in war the result
is never final," 73 the
conduct of warfare entails locating
public violence within
a whole range of human relationships.
The first dimension
of a politics of warfare, then, is
that by its nature as
an activity of organized human communities,
warfare is a

public matter for which political institutions
are responsible and by which, in turn, those institutions
are

transformed

Limited and Total Wa r

2.

At the second level, the politics of warfare may be

located at the point at which states call upon violence
against other states or against organized groups.

War is

a series of battlefield exertions that might achieve some

purpose or fulfill

a policy.

The means and ends of war-

fare, then, are central elements of its conduct.

starts a war
so

— without

— or

"No one

rather, no one in his senses ought to do

first being clear in his mind what he intends

to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct
it.

.74

Succinctly stated, the political value of

a

war's
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objectives determines the
expenditure in terms of men and
materiel and the magnitude
and duration of their expenditure.

But the apparently
utilitarian calculations necessary to make such ends-means
determinations is nowhere
more complicated than in warfare.

The conduct of war involves
three fields of endeavor
simultaneously. The armed forces of
the adversary must
be destroyed, the country
occupied, and the enemy's will
broken.
These are the basic elements of
total war: annihilating the enemy completely. These
would seem to be
the essential elements of warfare were
it to achieve its
absolute form. But the first lesson of a
politics of war
is that such a "Niederwerf ungsstrategie "
unfolds in a

whole complex of relationships that delimit
exertion.
Though the abstract element of war remains the same—
"all wars are things of the same nature" 75

wars take vary markedly.

— the

forms

They vary not only because of

inherent human and technological constraints; they vary,
are modified and confined, by the nature of any two

belligerents.

"The scale of force that may be used

against the enemy depends upon the scale of political de-

mands on either side." 7 6

So a politics emerges at the

level at which states must choose to wage war with one

another.

And this politics most clearly expresses itself

in the manner by which a war is worth the ends it seeks:

the rational calculation
within the midst of war
of how
Political objectives merit
a particular level
of exertion,
the course of war, too,
a politics emerges
here in terms of how to
keep the war within acceptable
confines without overcommitting
resources that risk more
than what politically is at
stake.
How in the face of
battle does one impose limits
on the scope of warfare?
Is there a tension between
the tendency of war itself to
full exertion and the political
claims of keeping it
within boundaries appropriate to
its object?

m

A substantial part of On War

,

most explicitly Book

One, deals with the tendency of
modern warfare to

achieve

a

level of utmost exertion.

The conceptual

category of absolute warfare, as we have seen,
has served
to codify in philosophical form the gradual
emergence
of

increasingly powerful and extensive armies.

The apo-

theosis of this development was, of course, Bonaparte's
Grande Armee.

The lessons of such national warfare could

not be ignored by any of the Continental powers.

The

formerly absolutist states had now to prepare themselves
for war on such a scale.

There was no reason to believe

that such total warfare, once introduced, would not reoccur in Europe.

The possibility thus existed, according

to Clausewitz, that warfare, once it broke out, could

always escalate to the extreme levels of mutual exertion

whose p Urest philosophical
expression was absolut.:e war.
But nations do not
wage absolute war; they
rage
war.

^

real

it is here, at the
level of deciding to wage
a

particular kind of real war,
that Clausewitz's politics
emerges to establish
criteria by which war may
be rationally conducted.
The rational relationship
in war between violent
means and political ends
forms the basis of Clausewitz's
entire political theory. He
is not the least concerned
in his study On War why
nations go to war, what the
causes of international conflict
are, or whether such
means are rational in the sense of
good or just.
That
wars have always occurred constitutes
reason enough to
take them at face value as undertakings
characteristic of

international relations.
The formulaic incantation, however, that
"war is

simply the continuation of political intercourse,
with
the addition of other means," 77 obscures in
the Clause-

witzian framework precisely how restricted--or "thin"—
is
his theory of politics.

Despite locating warfare on a

political continuum, Clausewitz confines his account of
a politics of warfare to instrumental conditions of
how

must effectively, most economically, to achieve whatever
war aims are set by the government.

So his theory is

not an account of what one may legitimately pursue by
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means of war, but rather
how to adapt
to achieve what the cabinet

a

level of warfare

sets for itself as an appro-

priate goal of state policy.
The restrictive concept
of politics around which

Clausewitz

whole theory revolves can be
seen in terms of
the distinction he elaborates
between two kinds of real
war: total and limited.
it is here that Clausewitz seeks
by means of an intelligent guiding
hand to fend off the
tendency of war itself to seek an
even more extreme
character.
Here he sets out to distinguish two
very different kinds of warfare and to suggest
how statesmen
's

might retain sight of the appropriate means
toward their
political ends.
Clausewitz distinguishes two kinds of war:

a

total

attack aimed at annihilation of the enemy's forces,
and a

limited campaign designed to secure occupied territory,

ward off advancing armies, or force through military
stalemate a diplomatically negotiated peace.
The complete military disarming of the enemy seeks

unconditional peace through sheer exhaustion and destruction of his forces.

Clausewitz sketches in the conclud-

ing chapter of On War an example of such a campaign.

He

outlines how only an allied attack launched upon France
could defeat her armies, suppress the temptation

which since 164 8 France had succumbed

— to

— to

prevail over
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European politics, and restore the
balance-of-power
The
combined armies of Great Britain,
the Netherlands, Prus.

sia,

the German states, and Austria
could launch two

separate assaults, one from the Lowlands,
the other from
the upper Rhine to the upper Seine.
Some 300,000 would
advance onto Paris from the northeast,
another 300,000
would march from the east. The object of
such coordinated attacks, supported by secondary operations
from

England along the Channel coast and by the Italian-based

Austrian Army in the sourth, would not be to besiege
towns, occupy garrisons, and invest positions, but rather
to converge upon Paris and occupy the capital.

Clause-

witz does not specify the terms of an ensuing peace, but
he makes clear that the punitive political character of

such an allied attack requires an unrelenting advance

aiming for the heart of France.
We are quite convinced that in this manner
France can be brought to her knees and taught
a lesson any time she chooses to resume that
insolent behavior with which she has burdened
Europe for a hundred and fifty years. Only
on the far side of Paris, only on the Loire,
can she be made to accept the conditions
which the peace of Europe calls for. Nothing
else will demonstration the natural relationship between thirty millions and seventy-five.
The extraordinary political aims of this allied at-

tempt to overrun France and to undermine its role in the

Rhineland and Lowlands dictate an unrelenting military
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strategy.

In a total war

^

entirely upon the battlefield.

^ ^ ^
But the scope of such a

campaign obliterates entirely
the absolutist era's distinction between native territory
and the field of bat-

tle.

The campaign reaches into
areas central to the
political and economic life of the
country.
Here, then,
the political aim-complete
annihilation, occupation of
the enmy's land-dictates the
extreme exertion. At this
point the guiding hand of politics
appears to give way

completely to the demands of military
necessity.
The more powerful and inspiring the
motives
for war, the more they affect the
belligerent
nations and the fiercer the tensions that
precede the outbreak, the closer will war approach its absolute concept, the more important will be the destruction of the enemy,
the more closely will the military aims and
the political objects of war coincide, and
the more military and the less political
will war appear to be. 79
The virtual eclipse of politics in the conduct of

total warfare emerges almost unintentionally in Clause-

witz's work in his discussion of Bonaparte's Russian
campaign of 1812, a discussion that concludes On War.
Unlike his historical study of the Russian campaign,

Clausewitz's analysis in Book Eight of On War reveals in
startlingly clear terms how the attempted policy of
forcing Czar Alexander to yield to the French simply

required a scale of unrelenting warfare of which Bona-
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Parte himself-or any
general-was simply incapable.
Clausewitz here does not
question the propriety of
such a
Policy; he rather explains
that Bonaparte was quite
right, having adopted
such a policy, to advance
beyond the
Niemen River. Apart from
relatively
criticismS/
that the campaign was
begun too late in the year,
that the
French neglected questions
of supply while advancing
on
the main road through Vitebsk
and Smolensk, and that the
Grande Armee stayed too long
in Moscow, 80 Clausewitz suggests that given the decision
to strike at the Russian
core, the French campaign was
an essentially sound assault and that those who criticize
Bonaparte for not

^

having first secured his position in
Lithuania misunderstood the boldness of his plans.
It may
well have been

an impossible task, but given the goals
of grinding down
the Russian Army and occupying Moscow, the
French cam-

paign, the very paradigm of a total assault,
was in truth

exceptionally well executed—even if bound to fail:
His campaign failed, not because he advanced
too quickly and too far as is usually believed,
but because the only way to achieve success
failed.
Russia is not a country that can be
formally conquered that is to say occupied
certainly not with the present strength of the
European States and even with the half-a-million men Bonaparte mobilized for the purpose.
Only internal weakness, only the workings of
disunity can bring a country of that kind to
ruin.
To strike at these weaknesses in its
political life it is necessary to thrust into

—
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shake th^
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no other way of gaining
it. 82
The Russian campaign of
1812 reveals for Clausewitz
the ultimate in wartime
exertion and the manner by which
total war calls for a politics
defined solely in terms of
military conquest. But if we find
here warfare at the
limits of its nature, we realize,
too, that in less extreme military operations political
concerns play a more
decisive guiding role.

L

'

'

A subject which we last considered.
.now forces itself on us again, namely the
political
object of war. Hitherto it had been
rather
overshadowed by the law of extremes, the
will
to overcome the enemy and make him
powerless.
But as this law begins to lose its force
and*
as this determination wanes, the
political aim
will reassert itself. 83
.

If total war entails maximal concentration
of forces

at the greatest possible speed, limited warfare
defines
a campaign whereby strategy aims not at defeat of
the

enemy's forces but at the political conditions of the
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adversaryy which
men pnAhiQ
enable -i-v,~
the war to persist.
The whole
basis of limited war is
to confront an adversary
with a
protracted defense or a very
cautiously advancing army.
The overriding strategic
aim of limited warfare is not
to
confront directly and disarm
the enemy's
forces but to

modify, indeed suspend, military
action so as to reduce
the likelihood of an adversary's
military success, to

require he commit too great an
expenditure of forces "in
proportion to his aims and situation:" 84
to hold or seize
small tracts of land, the occupation
of which would induce an adversary to negotiate, to wait
in position until
matters took a better turn— for instance, the
arrival
of

reserves.

The aims of such limited campaigns involve
af-

fecting the domestic politics of an adversary state,
its

public opinion, and the views of allies.

War itself be-

comes subject by political design to restraints, suspensions, and modifications of the extreme.
In limited war the emphasis shifts from decisive

engagements to peripheral harassment of supplies, convoys,
communications, and morale. 8 5

The principles of total

wa rfare, to act in as expeditious and concentrated a
ma nner as possible while securing positions already taken,

give way to

a

concept of deliberate military modification.

The front is slowed down, spread out, positions are care-

fully invested, supply lines and billets thoroughly pre-
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pared, and forces withheld
wxtnneia so
=o as
ae 4-^
to ensure their survival.
Clausewitz's chapter on "Maintenance
and Supply"
(Book five) provides a vivid
example of the theoretical
difference between real and total
war.
Regarding
"questions of supply. .as well as
the choice of a theater
of war and the lines of
communication " Clausewitz writes:
,

.

.

,

How far their influence will extend,
and how
much wieght should in the final
analysis be
attached to the ease or difficulty of
supply—
those are questions that will naturally
depend
on how the war is to be conducted.
if war is
to be waged in accordance with its
essential
spirit--with the unbridled violence that lies
at its core, the craving and need for
battle
and decision— then feeding the troops, though
important, is a secondary matter.
On the other
hand, where a state of equilibrium has set in,
in which troops move back and forth for
years
in the same province, subsistence is likely
to
become the principal concern.
In that case,
the quarter-master-general becomes the supreme
commander, and the conduct of war consists of
organizing wagon trains. 86
We could be no farther away from the concept of ab-

solute warfare than in this case of real, limited war.

Clausewitz admits, in fact, that such limited endeavors
reside so far away on the continuum of real war from
total warfare that the former is barely illumined by the

guiding light of the abstract concept.

"The more these

factors [of restraint, deliberation, and suspension of
action] turn war into something half-hearted, the less

solid are the bases that are available to theory: essentials become rarer and accidents multiply.

87
"

In con-
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trast to the concentrated
intensity of a campaign to annihilate the enemy, a limited war
seeks to grind down or
exhaust a belligerent's will to
fight-to make it clear
that a conventional military
victory would require an
expenditure of resources for which
the war cabinet is
not prepared.
Limited war, "lacking an overt
positive
element of attack," 88 seeks through
attrition to frustrate
the enemy and thereby to induce
him to negotiate a settlement rather than to seek conquest in
the
field.

A limited war, however, is not so
characterized by
moderation and deliberate suspensions of action
that it

loses entirely its nature as a war.

for all wars are of

the same essence, and no military activity
involving

violent confrontations of opposing armed forces can
be
said entirely to have departed from the continuum of
war.

Even the deliberate retreat of the Russian Army, its

organized march to the rear under Kutusov in 1812, was,

properly speaking, a war, although
strategy.

a

classic defensive

The strategy was precisely to yield ground, to

enable, if not to enduce, further French penetration, and
to force the Grande Armee beyond its culmination point.

At that point, as in any limited, defensive war, the

negative object of the strategic retreat transforms itself into a counter-offensive.

The extraordinary losses

.
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endured by the
ne French

^ ^
m
their
•

march on Moscow may
well
have been the Price
price to n«xr
pay *for apparent
territorial

achieve Bonaparte's aim
of defeating the army
and forci ng
Alexander to
o caDitniafo
T
capitulate.
Moscow the campaign reached
its culminating point.
Th e French forces, unable
to
achieve their real policy,
were now forced into a heading retrait with the Russian
Army at their heels. Thus
the limited, defensive
strategy of Russia went over
from
the negative goal of allowing
the French into a state

m

of

attrition to the positive goal
of pursuing them and destroying them on the road across
the Beresina River to
Kovno

A policy of limited war, then, as
distinguished from
a total campaign,

controls the level of violence and

seeks to wait until favorable circumstances
enable it to
take the offensive.
Policy guides and constrains military exertion, deploying forces only at a
level con-

sistent with the aims of the central government.

in

total war this political intelligence recedes
into the

background.

3.

In limited war it emerges to the fore.

The Politics of Mobilization

That specific political criteria guide the choice

between limited and total war aims is

a

central feature

"
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Of ClausewitZ

'
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But Clausewitz's intent
throughout his work to establish the primacy of politics in
warfare veils on his
part a deeper commitment to a
peculiar conception of
what that politics involves.
It turns out, as we shall

now see, that for Clausewitz a politics
or policy of
warfare revolves entirely around the actions
of a very
few statesmen, and that insofar as he considers
domestic

politics in civil society at all, he construes it
merely
in terms of its service to the political-military
ef-

fort.

Clausewitz's heralded politics, in other words,

is one confined to the primacy of foreign policy,
to

the dictates of "Staatsrason

.

As we have seen in the preceding chapters, the

realist statesman's concern for the conduct of diplomacy

overrides questions of domestic political legitimacy or
virtue.

The system-legitimacy of which Kissinger wrote

in terms of an ordered international system 9 0 reflects

in the parlance of modern democratic theory what are at

s

.
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root concepts embedded in
the diplomacy of absolutist
Europe
The first secular theorist
who sought a procedural
political response to the collapse
of the Christian

Commonwealth, as we have seen, was
Machiavelli. He
sought to balance concerns of
securing the polity with
the need to cultivate civic virtue.
The primacy of
foreign policy, however, abandons the
Stoic psychology of
the virtuous roman citizen that
underpinned Machiavelli
peculiar formulations. Moreover, it abandoned
the elements of Aristotelian political theory that
had so clearly
•

influenced Machiavelli

'

s

conception of the good citizen.

Where Machiavelli sought

a

tension between domestic

life and the demands of statesmanship, the emergence
of

coherent territorial states throughout the Continent
impressed upon absolutist rulers the need to suppress

competing claims for control of the polity so as to expedite their ability to wage and threaten warfare.

The

outcome was a system of mutually encircled, "eingekreist,
states, each of which, with the notable exception of

"

insular Britain, found itself virtually in

a

permanent

state of warfare and which therefore required the service
of a standing professional army.

The mercenary system

was reduced from its reliance on commercial contractors,

condottieri, to a secondary role of supplementing the
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already well-disciplined

^ ^^
Qf

Adolphys, France under
Louis XIV, and Prussia
under
Frederick William, The
Great Elector.
The primacy of foreign
policy that developed in
seventeenth century Europe
cannot be divorced from the
social structure of the
absolutist states, for these,
as
we have seen, were the
product of an alliance between
a
small bureaucratic royal
administration and the landed
estates.
This alliance, in cutting
out the towns and
fledgling merchant and middle-classes
from political
power, led to a narrow view of
public life, defining it
entirely in terms of securing the
state, whether through
mercantile activity or the professional
army.
France,
Prussia, Russia, and the Habsburg
states, the cornerstones of the European balance-of-power
system, were
each characterized by such a polity. 91

Clausewitz's politics reflects this absolutist tradition, and it reflects, too, an attempt in the wake
of

the French Revolution to accommodate national politics

within this traditional framework.

The political changes

during the Prussian Reform Era were

a

kind of revolution

from above designed to liberalize public life and to

allow for the degree of economic and military strength
that had expressed itself so successfully in France.
the Reform Era failed at precisely that point at which

But
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citizens, the towns, and
the liberal students
("Burschenschaften") after 1815
began demanding significant constitutional changes
that would go beyond merely
strengthening militarily the
various German states under
Prussian and Austrian rule:
that would enable them, so
to
speak, to seize public
power.
At this point, the reformers gave way to the
Metternichian reaction. The
Carlsbad Decrees of 1819 reversed
the limited public
sharing of power that had been
conceded by Frederick
William III-without, however, reversing
the means relied
upon by the Honenzollern Monarchy
to strengthen its economic and military powers.
In the wake of the Treaties of Paris,

1814-15, the

Prussian was now immeasurably enhanced by its
acquisition
of ore-laden Rhenish lands— the secession
of
these

Rhinelands being a Metternichian brainchild to punish

France and create

a

protective belt against renewed

Bourbon expansionism.

These lands provided a mineral base

for the subsequent flourishing of iron and coal indus-

tries.

A middle class of merchants and the educated be-

gan to form on a self-conscious basis as the Prussian

political economy moved from the last vestiges of feudalism to the first stages of capitalism and industrialization.

The Prussian King had legally abolished serfdom in
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1811, and the ensuing migration
of unskilled peasants
into the oities provided
nascent manufacturing with new,

relatively cheap sources of
labor,
with feudal ties to
the land now severed, mass
armies could be recruited from
people who otherwise would have
been beholden to their
Junker lords.
The Prussian Army was now expanded
to
embrace a considerable share of the
male population.
Contract law and legal codes began to
replace the patchwork of natural law traditions that
had marked the old
German states.
Standardized currency, stamps, and tolls
(through the "Zollverein") were introduced
to expedite
trade throughout the whole German Confederation.
By mid-century, the Prussian Army became the
back-

bone of the German Confederation.

Neither the Austrian

state nor its army could hold in check the centrifugal

political pressures of its polyglot empire.
sian Army suffered from no such pressures.

The PrusIt was an

army which claimed an extraordinary share of public

expenditures and that, combined with Germany's economic
and industrial boom, served exceptionally well in the

three wars of German unification of 1864-71 against
Denmark, Austria, and France.

The army in its abso-

lutist guise had enabled the Prussia of Frederick the
Great to seize Silesia, Pomerania, and Eastern Prussia.
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More than a century later,
that army, having again expanded to meet the Bonapartist
challenge, became the
means by which Germany achieved
unification in the fo:>rm
of the second Reich under
Bismarck and Kaiser Wilhelm I.
No European state better
exhibited the political uses of
warfare. And in no other continental
country was the
relationship between political reform
and military power
so clear.
Clausewitz, whose political activism confined
itself to military reform, expansion of the
Prussian Army,

and to arguing in 1812 against the alliance
with France,

was neither at the forefront of the Reform Era nor,
like

Hardenberg, Alexander von Humboldt, and Hermann von
Boyen, one of its victims after the Metternichian reaction.

But his military writings nonetheless contain a

significant political element rooted in the Prussia of
his time.

His theoretical studies on the policy nature

of war betray this contemporary dimension.

The politics

of which war was a continuation is defined by Clausewitz

entirely in terms articulated by
closest advisors.

a

statesman and his

Moreover, the statesman himself should

be both political leader and military genius.

When military strategy is decided in the capital,
far from the field, operations become

stultified and in-

287

flexible.

The overcoming of friction, the
securing of

reliable information, questions of when
to pass over
from a defensive to an offensive stance,
or confronting
the culminating point of battle all
require a close

working relationship between cabinet government
and the
army.

Indeed, the affinity should not merely be
poli-

tical.

It should be physical and territorial as
well.

It used to be the custom to settle strategy
in the capital, not in the field— a practice
that is acceptable only if the government
stays so close to the army as to function as

general headquarters. 92

But as Clausewitz's account of the military genius

makes clear, it is best for strategy if the roles of
general and statesman are fused in the hands of one man
We argue that a commander-in-chief must also
be a statesman, but he must not cease to be
a general.
On the one hand, he is aware of
the entire political situation; on the other,
he knows exactly how much he can achieve with
the means at his disposal. 9
-^

If war is to be fully consonat with political objectives, and policy suited to the
means available for war, then unless statesman and soldier are combined in one person,
the only sound expedient is to make the commander-in-chief a member of the cabinet, so
that the cabinet can share in the major asBut that, in turn,
pects of his activities.
is only feasible if the cabinet—that is,
the government is near the theater of operations, so that decisions can be taken without serious loss of time.94

—
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4.

A Vi sion of Political
Life

The imperative of fusing
political and military
leadership for the rational,
goal-oriented conduct of
warfare brings up the final
dimension of Clausewitz's
politics: its vision of
legitimate public life. Starting from the view that
warfare is a legitimate tool
of
state policy, Clausewitz's
realism elevates warfare into
the central activity of a
polity.
Hobbes and Rousseau,
by contrast, were two
political theorists who even while
viewing the international system
as a state or condition
of war did not locate the rational
conduct of warfare at
the center of public political life. 95

Perhaps it is unfair to hold Clausewitz
to the
standards and concerns of other, more
explicitly political theorists.

But the whole point of this work has
been

to explore the domestic side of realist
theories of in-

ternational relations, particularly in the early
modern
era of the European balance-of -power system.
The peculiarly authoritarian fate of such theories, especially
of the doctrine of total war first articulated by
Clause.

witz,
.

96

c ertain
s ion.

suggests as an appropriate concern a critique of

tendencies apparent in the theory's early verIt is not a question of somehow blaming Clause-

itz for either the Schlieffen Plan or the Second World

s
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War.

However, theories and
strategies, even in military matters acquire
significance insofar as they
establish a kind of intellectual
framework by which subsequent generations form
their views and develop policies,
the history of military
thought Clausewitz
work has been peculiarly
influential.

m

'

Clausewitz

's

work has so tightly circumscribed

politics as to render his vision
of rational policy a
matter delimited to a few statesmen
who do double service
as military leaders.
The theory he develops construes
politics in terms of the mission of the
army, but not in

terms of the relationships of men either
within the army
or within the state they serve. With
the theory of total
war we have reduced relationships among
citizens
to a

managerial problem for the general staff.

civic virtue

becomes entirely absorbed by the technocratic politics
of waging warfare.

Postscript: The Era of Total Warfare

Clausewitz had been greatly impressed by Bonaparte's

ability to mobilize and command an army, and he discerned in the French general's maneuvers the limits

achievable in real warfare.

In 1816 he observed that

since the rise of Bonaparte,

"the most daring of gam-

.
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biers... all campaigns have
gained such a cometlike swiftness that a higher degree
of military intensity is

scarecely imaginable." 98
These comments were written
before industrialization
began to take hold on the
Continent. Armies then consisted of mobile cavalry, infantry
with muskets, and
horse-drawn field cannon that could
shoot 100 pound balls
up to half a mile accurately.

Clausewitz's confessed inability to foresee
great
changes in the technology and scope of
battle may strike
us today as stunning naivete, the
more so because Clause-

witz was himself a skilled military historian.

But we

can now see that the armies of Napoleonic Europe
stood
far closer to those of the Renaissance some three
hundred

years earlier than to those that fought the First World

War a century after Clausewitz
In the era of mechanized warfare, an era ushered in

by the rapid advance of technology accompanying the indus-

trialization of Europe, the face of battle underwent a

revolutionary transformation."
clash of men in battle to

a

Warfare went from the

struggle between machines and

technologies of destruction. 100

Behind this new iron veil

of firepower stood nations not capable of a decisive

victory in the field but intent instead upon mere survival through attrition.
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When war broke out in early
August 1914, the young
men of Berlin and Paris
marched off eagerly to the railroad stations expecting to
return by Christmas. Visions
of yet another charge of the
Light Brigade, the cavalry
that had inspired Britain's
efforts in the Crimean War
of 1855-56, filled the air of
Europe.
Men and women
celebrated the outbreak of war that
August with an enthusiasm normally reserved for sports
rallies.
The decisive
breakthrough achieved so stunningly by
Germany in the

Franco-Prussian War: surely this could be managed
once
again.

The Schlieffen Plan, the bold German
strategy of

sweeping through Belgium in an enormous move
to encircle
Paris, was born out of this vision of another
Sedan.

If

the last man on the German right flank brushed his
sleeve

against the English Channel, victory would be Germany's
in a matter of weeks.

The last words uttered by

Schlieffen on his deathbed were reported to have been
"make the right wing strong." 101

Two years later the land of Verdun gave way to rot-

ting bodies.

In the forests and mud of a valley eight

miles long and half that distance across, 700,000 men of
France and Germany lost their limbs and lives.

Further

north, in Flanders Field, flamethrowers enfiladed rat-

infested trenches in which the men of three countries
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spent their short lives.

Phosgene gas fil led the air.

Land .nines laid waste the
once-arable soil, and flares
lit up the night time
sky.
Machine guns rendered cavalry
simply obsolete, and long-range
artillery heaved half -ton
chunks of metal across twenty
miles of no-man's land.

Front-line soldiers fought not
to win but merely to survive.
Home fronts, now fully mobilized,
worked overtime
as national economies were
transformed in a year's time

into full-scale economies of
death.

In mind-nineteenth

century the citizenry of Paris and
Vienna would occasionally venture out for a picnic
astride the battlefields.
Now they burned their furniture for
heat and spend winters eating turnips because their armies
had requisitioned all the potatoes.
The wars of annihilation brought by
Napoleon to

Europe had become wars of attrition.

The early phase of

Britain's Industrial Revolution that had brought
forth
looms,

"satanic mills," and railways was now surpassed

by the products of the second Industrial Revolution in

Germany in the last third of the nineteenth century.
Lightweight steel replaced iron.

Bursting cordite

shells replaced the solid iron balls of an earlier day.

Accurate rifles with spiral grooves in the bored-out
barrels rendered archaic the muskets of revolutionary
France.

Water-cooled machine guns enabled one man to

.

293

stand guard over acres of
bleak gray land.
Telegraph
lines were laid so that
generals could direct the course
of battle from reinforced
bunkers behind the fronts.
Railways delivered fresh recruits
with a speed unimaginable in Clausewitz's day.
And submarines were used to
blockade whole countries from
receiving shipments across
the North Atlantic and the North
Sea.
War, once conducted by military geniuses on a
battlefield of limited
scope, had come to embrace whole
continents and to involve citizens at the home-front in
the era of total
warfare
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CHAPTER

VI

CONCLUSION:
THE UNSTABLE BALANCE
OF TERROR

The relationships which
Machiavelli saw between
good laws and good armies,
between love of country and a
willingness to defend one's
liberties in battle, are recurring themes in the political
theory of realism.
In an

international system of numerous
sovereign states competing for wealth and land, no country
can be assured of
its security when its citizens
are unwilling to do battle
in ints name.
"Si vis pacem, para bellum:

pare for war.

If you want peace, pre-

Nations that voluntarily disarm, that do

not provide for well-trained armies and the
latest array
of military technology, only invite disaster
at the hands
of hostile foreign powers which will seize any
advantages

presented them.
The psychological bonds of patriotism, and the poli-

tical relationships of civic virtue, are repeatedly construed by Machiavelli in terms of a citizen-army.

The

willingness to fight for one's state, in fact, is construed in his account of statesmanship as an obligation

entailed by citizenship.
terizes

a

For Machiavelli this charac-

virtuous state: one not dependent upon mer-

s
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cenaries recruited by
condottieri but upon an infantry
force of local volunteers
and conscripts.
The symbol of
Machiavelli
^ respect for infantry was the disdain he
expressed for cannons.
Machiavelli s almost Luddite
stance regarding cannon, his
preference instead for
Roman column formations and
the tactics of Swiss pikemen,
embodies in stark terms his concern
for building
,

'

into
his military strategy a place
for the patriotism and

political zeal which he thought should
underpin the
virtuous polity.
In the three hundred years separating
Machiavelli

'

armed civic virtue from Clausewitz's
articulation of
total national warfare, the terrain of
political rela-

tionships expanded—and with it, the scope of
warfare.
The nascent urban republicanism of Renaissance
Italy

gave way to the obligatory military service of conscript

armies within a continent-wide balance-of -power political
system.

Within this new state system that characterized

Europe after the era of religious wars, from the Thirty
Years War to the French Revolution, citizenship and al-

legiance to the state differed dramatically from Machiavelli

's

understanding of them.

In this new state system a more ordered hierarchy of

public power developed.
factions gave way to

a

The dynamism of copeting urban

centralized mercantile economy and
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to the

..

statism „ of bureaucraticaUy
organizea< aristo _
cratically led standing
armies.
The „ animo „ an(J „ am _
oizione.. of private
citizens

^

^

trolled monopolies, the
primary concern Qf which
expansion of state fiscal
and military strength
The
balance-of-trade and the
balance-of-power occupied the
courts of Europe. The
glory of military leadgrship
the muster of feudal
chivalry increasingly became
the
domain of war cabinets and
professionally trained career
staff men.
The commercial mercenary
system of Italian
Renaissance warfare gave way to
standing armies with
their coterie of technologists,
metallurgists, and manufacturers entirely occupied in
the development of mass
firepower, military engineering,
artillery, and naval
science. These bureaucratic military
institutions only
drew upon mercenaries to supplement
the manpower requirements of warfare in the service of
the balance-ofpower

^

.

^

.

The economic constraints of mercantilism
expressed

themselves in elaborate battlefield tactics
designed to
avoid costly expenditures of men, provisions, and
armaments.

But eventually this, too, gave way to the inten-

sification of firepower afforded by technical improvements
and by the ability of some states, preeminently Prussia,
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^

to train and
discipline their
This gradual expansion
in the scope and
intensity of war
found its apotheosis
in the French
Revolutionary Army
The rules of absolutist
warfare, assiduously followed
by
the Continental powers
throughout the shift fro,
dynastic
to national politics,
demanded that citizenship be
construed in terms of supplying
the manpower necessary for
political competition. The
open public space of Machi-

^

avelli's city-state became
narrowed, structured, and
firmly institutionalized within
the stultifying ministries
and bureaucracies of the modern
nation-state.
The flux
and challenge of overcoming
"fortuna" became the mechanics of managing "friction."
After the Treaty of Westphalia had
consolidated the
modern state system, the great European
states all developed standing armies: armies that did
not disband in
peacetime; armies invariably led by
professionals from
the noble, land-owning families.
Those states unable to

raise such armies, Poland, for instance, or the
small

Rhenish principalities, literally disappeared from the
map, absorbed by neighboring land powers.

The sole ex-

ception to the forging of standing national armies was
the most geographically isolated and secure country:

England.

Yet even she replicated within her naval force
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the social structure
of European absolutist
militarism.
As we have seen in
the chapter on Frederick
the
Great, the political-geography
of Prussia dictated that
its army pl ay the
greatest fQrmative role n
Qf
internal state-building
and territorial consolidation,
indeed, the history of
the Prussian Army clearly
exemplifies the military dimension
of political reform.
.

Throughout the absolutist era
and the Reform Era, and the
later chancellorship of Bismarck,
political liberalization and the transformation
from feudalism to capitalism
were recurrently the product of
initiatives undertaken by
the state in the name of creating
an army more competitive
with those of Prussia's allies. The
result was a political revolution managed from above:
military liberalism.
Machiavelli's initiatives for political reform
had also
been guided by this concern: to create a more
effective
and larger, more broadly based army.

This later con-

stituted the underlying rationale of political reform in

Prussia and Germany.

The political character of poli-

tical-military strategy thus expressed itself in

a

liberal guise, but its deeper structure pertained to

consolidating national military strength.
Several themes have emerged in this dissertation.

My interest has been to show how the preparation for war
has been a central activity of the modern state.

The
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gathering together of human
and material resources for
the purpose of waging war
has played a decisive role
in
the political and economic
development of public life in
Western polities. Such activities
have found intellectual justification in terms
of a balance-of-power
in
terms of the need to preserve the
peace by preparing
:

for war.
"Si vis pacem, para bellum" has
provided a kind of

telegraphic summary of

a

whole range of efforts coordi-

nated by the state in the interest of
protecting public
life: of assuring national security, of
furthering na-

tional interests.

But as

I

hope to have shown here

in

the development of the state in early modern Europe,

the politics of warfare in the name of responsible
states-

manship has created an environment of armed civic virtue
on a national scale in which both citizenship and the

national economy are placed in

a

permanent state of

readiness to do battle.
Countries like Britain and the United States, coun-

tries without traditional militarism embodied in standing
land armies, had until the advent of nuclear weapons been

spared somewhat this classical realism.

Strategies of

deterrence, however, have changed this.
The organization of peacelessness that characterizes
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Public life in the nuclear
age has its origins in
the
reali sm of the early
modern state.
It is a peacelessness that renders unstable
the very same balance-ofpower in whose name deterrence
has been
invoked.

Every new weapon and every
new propellant in military history has been
heralded as the advent of a revolutionary era. Strategies
devised to integrate them
within armies, navies, and air
forces are looked upon as
ushering in a new age of warfare.
Yet in retrospect
we

see that each new level of
violence has only contributed

marginally to warfare.

The breakthroughs of today fade

in their significance.

What looks like

a

military revo-

lution becomes, upon consideration of the
changes that
followed, just another step in the escalation
of warfare.
In two respects, however, we can concede
that nuclear

weapons and intercontinental missiles really do
constitute
such a revolution.

For the first time in history we have

the capability to annihilate all life.

And if it turns

out that nuclear strategies of deterrence and the search
for a stable balance of terror become but means for war-

fighting, there may remain no one on earth to testify
that,

in retrospect, these weapons were deployed in a man-

ner not all that different from their predecessors.
That war would be something different.

The war that
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quite conceivably could rage with
these weapons would
approach if not embody that war in
its pure form which
Clausewitz rightly dismissed as meaningless:
as apolitical and outside the realm and
comprehension of human
life.

Despite the widespread claims, however, of

a

nuclear

revolution as embodied in pure mutual nuclear deterrence,
the statesmen and military geniuses of the
post-World War
Two era have assimilated their weaponry and targeting

doctrine in terms that very much recall conventional

military strategy.
witz'

s

Despire the obsolescence of Clause-

principle that defense is the stronger position in

warfare, arm-chair strategists in their video-arcade

scenarios now contemplate ballistic missile defenses

against incoming nuclear missiles.

Earlier restraints

upon "first use" of nuclear weaponry have given way in

terms of N.A.T.O. "first-use" strategies.

Arguments on

behalf of a purely retaliatory capability have fallen by
the wayside as the nuclear superpowers never really sub-

jected themselves to the political-military constraints

called for by a classic strategy of nuclear deterrence.
They have increasingly moved to

a

strategy of active war-

fighting and counterforce targeting; conventional military concerns for destroying enemy forces in the midst
of protracted warfare have been resurrected in the nuclear

.
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age
The nuclear revolution
is over.

The revolutionary

strategy of pure mutual
nuclear deterrence has given way
to the continuation of
realism, with the addition of
nuclear means. An inherently
unstable balance-of -power
has been transposed into
nuclear terms.
But a politicalmilitary strategy derived in an
era of limited and restrained warfare can scarcely serve
as the basis for
world politics in an era today of
absolute warfare.
The weaponry now available to statesmen
renders
archaic the tradtitional wartime distinction
between

warriors and civilian non-combatants.

And the classical

distinction between wartime and peacetime has
been made
obsolete in the era of nuclear deterrence. The
political
character of political-military strategy has now been
eviscerated: replaced by techno-warf are

unstable balance-of -power

,

.

An inherently

transposed into nuclear terms,

has converted the language of "virtu" into a language of

mere military capability.

The citizenship once ennobled

by the efforts of its state to preserve and defend its

institutions and customs has disappeared from the annals
of strategy.

The armed civic virtue of the Machiavellian

city-state has been depoliticized and confined to the
existential bunkers of

a

terrorized nuclear republic.
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See Allan Krass, "The
Death of Deterrence,"
paper, delivered at the
University
of Massachusetts at
Amherst, 30 October 1982.
Bernard
Br0diG
(Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1959),
pp. i 73 -222, was too much the
classical strategist to abandon
active and passive
defenses entirely; he argues for
defense of retaliatory
arsenals.
Colin S. Gray and Keith Payne,
"Victory is
POSsible '" Foreign Policy no. 39
'

^^^hlJ^lile_^

,

(Summer 1980): pp. 14-

argue for a nationwide system of
ballistic and civil
defenses.
The paradox of pursuing security by
remaining
vulnerable is part of what I call here the
nuclear revolution.
Gray and Payne disagree sharply with this
view,
27,

that vulnerability is the only way to ensure
nuclear

deterrence
17

The study of pre-Napoleonic warfare suffers from

an overemphasis upon technical deficiencies, economic

parsimony, and shortages of manpower and materiel in

explaining the limited extent of warfare.

For example,

see William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicaao:

University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 117-184.

A

study which corrects this imbalance, and which examines
the relationship between economic development and cul-

.

.
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^

ture in Furope during

centuries is John

U.

York: W.W. Norton
18

&

Nef,
Co.,

Bernard Brodie,

P ° liCY '" in

sixteenth

^nO_Uu^^

(New

1968).

"Implications for Military

^h£^sp1ute_We^

ed.

Brodie, p. 76.

19

The most comprehensive
review of deterrence and
nuclear policy can be found
in Lawrence Freedman, The

^^^^
p ress,

1981)

(New York:

.

Max Weber,

"Politik als Beruf," in Gesammelte

PQlitische Schriften, 4th ed
(Tubingen: J.C.B. Mohr

21,

St. Martin's

,

.

,

ed

.

Johannes Wincklemann

1980), p. 506.

.

This phenomenon was also evident during
the recent

West European debates about the N.A.T.O.
"double-decision."

The security community feared that protestors
in

Britain and West Germany would undercut the Atlantic

Alliance's bargaining position with regard to possible
removal of Soviet intermediate-range land-based missiles
(SS-20s)
22

Friedrich Meinecke, Die Idee der Staatsrason in

der neuren Geschichte
R.

,

3rd ed.

(Munich and Berlin:

Oldenbourg, 1929)
23

A lengthy encounter early in my graduate career

.
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with Freud and the
theory of P s ychoanalusis
impressed
upon me the nee d to
embody in visualise
terms what
might otherwise remain
an abstract ardent.
This understanding of "embodiment"
might help us account
for the
Popularity of illustrated
war books.
Onl y sports lends
^self as readily to pictorial
representation.
The most
successful military historian
in terms of embodying

political-military strategy has
been John Keegan.
his

Z2l^c^p^attle

(New York: Viking Press,

"The Human Face of Deterrence,"

(Summer 1981), pp. 136 _ 151

.

and

See

1976);

Int^rnatipna^^

^^^^^

6

on war art by John Keegan
and Joseph Darracott The
N ature of War (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston,
1981)
,

Morton A. Kaplan,

"Variants on Six Models of the

International System," in International
Politics and
Foreign Policy, ed Rosenau. With little
exception this
.

volume exemplifies the lifeless and unpolitical
nature
of behavioral approaches to world politics.
25

Henry Kissinger, "Domestic Structure and Foreign

Policy," in American Foreign Policy
W.W. Norton

&

Co.,

,

exp.

ed.

(New York:

1974), pp. 9-50; and A World Restored

(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, n.d.), pp. 1-6.
26

Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York:

t

.

.
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Columbia University Press,
1965). Waltz also examines
"first imaqe" accounts of
war rooted in human nature
and
aggression, ass wen
well as h-i-h-Iv-^
third image" accounts based
upon
the formal anarchy of
the international system.
Waltz
much prefers "third image"
explanations as the starting
point for explanations and
theories in world politics.
•

27
- Ur

Dieter Senghaas

,

Abschreckung und Frieden: Studien

Kriti k organisierter Friedlosiakei

(Frankfurt: Europaische Verlaasanstalt

new ed
1981).

,

CHAPTER II: ROMAN AND MEDIEVAL ORIGINS
OF STATESMANSHIP
J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment
(Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1975); and Sheldon

S.

Wolin,

Politics and Vision (Boston: Little, Brown,
1960), pp.
195-238
.

Clcero

De re publica, De legibus

'

,

trans. Clinton

Walker Keyes (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1928),
p.

173.
3

4

Ibid.

p.

174

St. Augustine,

Augustine
Regnery
5

,

&

,

ed

.

Co.,

The Political Writings of St.

and trans. Henry Paolucci

(Chicago: Henry

1962), pp. 42-43.

The most subtle account of how modern just-war

.
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theory emerged from
Augustinian thought and became
fused
with elements of the
chivalric code to ^orm both
holy-war
dootrine and the law of
restraint in warfare is to be
found in James Turner Johnson,
Ideolog

L_Reas^^

^iMMpn_^f_^

(Princeton: Princeton University
Press,

1975)
6

My account of the eclipse
of Roman law in the wake
of the Germanic feudal customs
brought in by the barbarian invasions is based upon
Percy Anderson, Passages from
Anti quity to Feudalism (London:
NLB 1974); Geoffrey
,

Barraclough, The Origins of Modern Germany
(New York:
Capricorn Books, 1963); Marc Bloch, Feudal
Society
,

2

vols., trans. L A
.

.

Manyon (Chicago: University of

Chicago Press, 1961); M.P. Charlesworth

,

The Roman

Em P ire (London: Oxford University Press,
1982); Heinrich

Fichtenau, The Carolingian Empire

,

trans. Peter Munz

(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957); F.L. Ganshof, Feudalism

3rd ed., trans. Philip Grierson (New York: Harper

&

Row,

1964); Fritz Kern, Ki ngship and Law in the Mid dle Ages,

trans. S.B. Chrimes (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1968); and

Ferdinand Lot, The End of the Ancient World and the
Beginnings of the Middle Ages

,

trans. Philip Leon and

Mariette Leon (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1961).
7

Kern, Kingship and Law in the Middle Ages

,

p.

10.

,

.
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8

The overview presented
here of the decline of
feudalism and the medieval
Church and the ensuing rise
of
international relations and
diplomacy is based upon Perry

AnderS ° n

'

^2e^^

(London: nlb

^

1974); F.L. Ganshof, The Middle
Ages: A Histpry_of

±I±SIIllti^
York: Harper

trans

&

Row,

.

Remy IngUs

(New

1970); Michael Howard, War in

European History (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1976);
J. Huizinga, The Waning
of the Middle Ages
trans.
F. Hopman (Garden City,
N.Y.: Doubleday Anchor, 1954);
Garrett Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy
,

(Boston: Houghton

Mifflin, 1971); r.w. Southern, The
Making of the Middle
Ages (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1953); and Max
Weber ^e protest antische Ethik I: Eine
Auf satzammlung
'

ed.

.

Johannes Wincklemann (Gutersloh: Gutersloher

Verlagshaus, 1979).
9

St.

Thomas Aquinas, The Political Ideas of St.

Thomas Aquinas

,

ed.

and trans. Dino Bigongiari

Hafner Press, 1953), p.
10

(New York:

9.

Pope Boniface VIII, "Unam Sactam,

"

in Brian

Tierney, The Crisis of Church and State, 1050-1300: With

Selected Documents (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall,
1964)

,

p.

189

:

,
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111

machia

™

and the rise of the insecure

My account of the transition
in Italy from th e
medieval to the early modern era
is based upon the following sources: Anderson,
Passages from Antiquity to Feudal ism; Anderson, Lineages of
the Absolutist State Rloch,
Feudal Society; Jacob Burckhardt,
The Civilization of the
;

Renaissance in Italy.
(New York: Harper

&

D awn of a New Fra,

2

Row,

vols., trans. S.G.C. Middlemore
1929); Edward p. Cheyney, The

1250-1453

1936); Ekkehart Krippendorf f

(New York: Haper
,

&

Row,

Internationales System als

Geschichte (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 1975),
pp. 25-56;
Niccolo Machiavelli, "The History of Florence," in
Machiavelli: The Chief Works and Others

3

,

vols., trans.

Allan Gilbert (Durham, N.C.: Duke Universtiy Press, 1965),
vol.

3,

pp.

1025-1435; Lauro Martines, Power and Imagina-

tion: City-States in Renaissance Italy (New York: Alfred
A.

Knopf, 1979); J.H. plumb, The Italian Renaissance

(New York: Harper

&

Row,

1965); C.W. Previte-Orton

The Shorter Cambridge Medieval History

,

Cambridge University Press, 1952), vol.

2

2,

vols.
pp.

(Cambridge:

763-1091;

and Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System (London:

Academic Press, 1974), pp. 3-129.
2

The relationship among commune governance, urban

,

:
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factionalism and the

ra

ilitar y towers of early
Renaissance

Florence is explored in
Martines,
PP.

Po^nd^a^ti™,

32-41.
3

Niccolo Machiavelli, "The
Life of Castruccio
Castracani of Lucca," in M
achiavelli: The Chief Wo rks
vol. 2, p.

538.

Machiavelli, "The History of Florence,"
bk
chap.

15,

p.

1097.

Also see in the same work bk

.

2

.

2,

chap. 41, pp. 1136-1138.
5

See Gene A. Rrucker,

Florentine Studies, ed

.

"The Ciompi Revolution," in

Nicolai Rubenstein (Evanston,

111.: Northwestern University Press, 1968),
pp. 314-356.

Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy
7

,

p.

69.

The following discussion of the Florentine Consti-

tution is based upon Felix Gilbert, "The Venetian Consti-

tution in Florentine Political Thought," in Florentine
Studies

,

ed.

Rubenstein, pp. 463-500; Felix Gilbert,

Machiavelli and Guicciardini (Princeton: Princeton

University Press, 1965), pp. 7-48; and J.R. Hale,
Machiavelli and Renaissance Italy (Harmondsworth

,

Eng.

Penguin, 1972), pp. 1-71.
°Felix Gilbert,

"Machiavelli: The Renaissance of

the Art of War," in Makers of Modern Strategy, ed. Edward

j
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Mead Earle (Princeton:
Princeton University Press,
1944),
PP. 3-25; and Mattingly, Rena^anc^
p.

1

Mattingly, Renaissance Diplomacy

,

p.

61

.

143.

12

Roberto Ridolfi, The Life of
Niccolo Machiavell
trans. Cecil Grayson (Chicago:
University of Chicago
Press, 1964)
pp. 98-108.

.

,

Niccolo Machiavelli, quoted in Hale,
Machiavelli
and Renaissance Italy

,

p.

52.

Niccolo Machiavelli, quoted in Ibid.,
p. 55.
15

Machiavelli speaks of "my understanding of great

men's actions

in"

the preface to "The Prince," in

Machiavell i: The Chief Works
set of "The Prince"

(chap.

,

2,

vol. 1, p.
pp.

11-12)

10.

At the out-

he establishes

his intentions;
I shall omit discussing republics because
elsewhere I have discussed them at length.
I shall concern myself with the princedom
only, shall proceed by weaving together
the threads mentioned above, and shall continue how these princedoms can be qoverned
and preserved.

By contrast, Machiavelli examines republics from a

variety of viewpoints in "Discourses on the First Decade
of Titus Livius," in Machiavelli: The Chief Works
pp.

175-529.

Book one (chap.

2,

p.

195)

,

vol.

eximines cities

that at their beginnings were far from all
external servitude, but at once governed

1,

8

.
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6

as

™?"

by th6ir Wn Judgement,
°
eithe r
a ' P rincedo -es.
Just as

they have £L°5-

Book two (preface,
p. 324) addresses "what the
Roman
people did pertaining to
the expansion of their
empire."
Book three (chap.
4 23)
1, p
sets out to "show how the
deeds of individuals increased
Roman greatness, and how
in that city they caused
many good effects."
.

16
17

l(ml_

"The Prince,

"p. H.

Cf. Machiavelli's criticism
of those who blunt

their political acumen in the
course of supplicating for
employment.
See the dedication to the "Discourses,"
pp.

188-189;
...I believe I have got away from the common custom of those who write, who always
address their works to some prince and,
blinded by ambition and avarice, praise him
for all the worthy traits, when they ought
to blame him for every quality that can "be
censured.
So in order not to run into error,
I have chosen not those who are princes, but
those who because of their countless good
qualities deserve to be; not those able to
load me with offices, honors, and riches,
but those who, though unable, would like to

do so
1

Herbert Butterfield, The Statecraft of Machiavelli

(New York: Collier Books, 1962), pp.
19
20

"The History of Florence," bk.

"The Prince," chap.

6,

p.

24.

23-66.
5,

chap.

1,

p.

1232.

.
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21,

Ibid.

22
23

,

chap.

3,

13.

p.

Ibid., chap. 20, p. 80.
Ibid., chap.

24 T

9,

41.

p.

,

Ibid., chap.

17,

""Discourses," bk

63.

p.

chap.

3,

.

explains at the chapter's outset

6,

p.

444.

why he writes

428)

(p.

Machiavelli

at such length on this subject,
making this chapter, at
20 pages,

by far the longest in the whole
work.

In order, then, that princes may
learn how
to guard themselves against these
dangers,
and that private armies may be more cau-

—

tious about entering them or rather that
they may learn to be content to live under
whatever rule chance provides--I shall deal
with conspiracies at length, not omitting
anything important for the instruction of
either sort of person.
26

27
28

29

30
31

pp.

"The Prince," chap. 18, p.
Ibid.

,

chap. 18

,

p.

Ibid., chap. 15, p.

"Discourses," bk.

2,

"The Prince," chap.

65.

66

58.

chap.
25,

p.

29,

p.

406.

3,

chap. 19,

90.

"The History of Florence," bk

.

1170-1171.
32

The image of Ixion's wheel as a simile of a

philosophy of history is explored by Frank

E.

Manuel,

317

^^-^^^

(Stanford: Stanford

University Press, 1965),
pp.
33

"Discourses,» bk.

2,

5 -69.

chap.

29, p.

408.

34 IIml_

The Prince," chap. 25,
pp. 89-90.

35

Pocock, The Machiavellian
Moment

,

92.

p.

36...,

Gllbert

37
38

39

'

Machiavelli and Guicciardini

"Discourses," bk.

1,

.

3,

.

1,

chap. 12, pp.

The History of Florence," bk
41

p.

40.

chap. 1, p. 193.

"The History of Florence," bk

"Discourses," bk

,

.

5,

chap.

2,

p.

1036.

p.

1242.

459-460.
chap.

8,

Machiavelli distinguishes, for instance, between

wars of imperial conquest and those undertaken out of
self-defense, of necessity.

Supporting a tax law that in

1427 would have forced the wealthiest to pay for the wars

whose cost the middle-class alone had been bearing,

Machiavelli notes in Ibid., bk.

4,

chap.

4,

p.

1202 that

if this method of taxation had been devised
before, there would never have been wars with
King Ladislas, nor would there now be war with
Duke Filippo, for these wars were undertaken
to enrich the citizens, not from necessity.
42

43

"The Prince," chap.

Neal Wood,

18,

"Machiavelli

p.

'

s

66.
\

Concept of 'Virtu'

Reconsidered," Political Studies 15 (June 1967): 159-172.

.
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44
45

"The Prince," chap.

"Discourses," bk

.

3

8,

,

36.

p.

chap.

1,

421.

p.

The Prince," chap. 12,
p. 47.

Pocock

The Machiavellian Moment

'

p.

,

4.

Martin Fleisher, "A Passion for
Politics: The
Vital Core of the World of
Machiavelli " in Machiavelli
and the Nature of Politi cal Thought
ed Martin Fleisher
,

,

(New York: Atheneum, 1972),
pp.
49
"

Ibid.

50 IlrN

,

p.

52
53
54

.

.

1,

chap.

Ibid., bk.

1,

chap. 17, pp.

Ibid., bk.

1,

chap. 18, p.

4,

202-203.

pp.

239-240.
242.

Ibid, bk. 1, chap. 18, p. 243.
.

Niccolo Machiavelli, "The Art of War," in

Machiavelli: The Chief Works
55

114-147.

125.

Discourses," bk

51

.

Ibid.

,

bk.

1,

p.

,

vol.

2,

bk

.

1,

pp.

573-574.

573.

"^Machiavelli writes that "our way of living today,
as a result of the Christian relicrion, does not impse the

same necessity for defending ourselves as anticuity did."
Ibid

.

,

57

bk

.

2

,

p

.

Ibid., bk.

623
7,

p.

720.
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Military histories usually
overlook the political
character of armies and focus
instead upon the evolution of tactics.
For welcome exceptions to
this rule
that examine in detail Swiss
infantry formations

and
their impact upon European
political-military strategy,
see Hans Delbruck, Ges chichte
der Krieqskunst im Rahmen
der p olitischen Geschtichte
7 vols., Vierter Teil:
,

Neuzeit (Berlin: Georg Stilke,
1920), pp. 60-65; and

CW.C. Oman, The Art

of War in the Middle Ages

B.H. Blackwell, 1885), pp.
59„ ml_
The Art of War," bk

.

(Oxford:

62-95.
pp.

3,

603-604.

The importance of cannons in the armies and
arma-

ments industries of Renaissance Italy is discussed
in
Carlo M. Cipolla, Guns, Sails, and Empires: Techno logical Innovation and the Early Phases of European

Expansion, 1400-1700 (New York: Minerva Press, 1965);
Delbruck, Geschichte der Kriegskunst, Vierter Te il:

Meuzeit

,

pp.

26-59: Gilbert,

"Machiavelli

:

The

Renaissance of the Art of War;" Howard, War in European
History

,

pp.

11-62: Michael Mallet, Mercenaries and

their Masters: Warfare in Renaissance Italy (Totowa,
N.J.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1974), pp. 146-180;

McNeill, The Pursuit of Power

,

pp.

63-116; Nef, War and

.
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^^Hl^Zloqress, p p

^i^l^es,

.

pp.

23 _ 112;

87-134; and

^i^£^^£ti]J^ry
1975)

,

61

pp.

The^r^war^
CcITTcTT^^,

(Secaucus, N.J.: Citadel Press,

19-38.

"The Art of War," bk
Ibid.

63„ m

Qman/

,

bk.

6,

.

3,

pp.

687.

p.

,

The History of Florence," bk

1267

.

5,

chap. 25, p.

.

64

Machiavelli enumerates these and other strateaems

in "The Art of War," bk
pp.

636-639.

6,

.

pp.

694-700; and bk

.

7,

712-714.

CHAPTER IV: FREDERICK THE GREAT AND THE POLITICS OF THE

BALANCE-OF -POWER
1

Letter of 14 December 1740, quoted in Nancy Mitford,

Frederick the Great (New York: Harper

&

Row,

,

trans. Giconda

1970), p. 94.

2^

Giuseppe Prezzolmi, Machiavelli

Savini

(New York: Noonday Press,

1967)

is an exhaustive

--and exhausting--cataloque of how Continental thinkers

interpreted Machiavelli

'

s

works locating Machiavelli

teachings.
'

tical traditions are Pocock

s

,

Two magisterial

work within specific poliThe Machiavellian Moment

regarding republicanism; and Meinecke, Die Idee der

,
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i^tsrason,
3

on classical "reason
of state."

A classic work on the
probity and

diplomacy is Francois de
Callieres,

»ic^ing_^^

f orthriohtness

of

On^h^anner^

trans. A.P. Whyte (South
Bend:

University of Notre Dame
Press, 1963).
De Callieres,
writing in 1714, never once
mentions ^achiavelli, but the
silence appears to have its
strategy; his depiction of
honesty and respect in foreain
service reads
like a

point by point repudiation of
Machaivelli
De Callieres,

'

s

"The Prince."

steeped in the culture of classical
diplo-

macy and courtly custom, is interested
in buildinq up
regular diplomatic bureaucracy to represent

a

the state

abroad.

Machiavelli

'

s

concern, by contrast, is with the

prince who conducts his own diplomacy.
the two views are not incompatible.

Perhaps, however,

As de Callieres

acknowledges, the legate who cannot carry out the
repug-

nant policies of his prince should resign if unable
to

affect policy.
4

Third Part of King Henry the Sixth

,

Act

sc.

3,

2,

lines 186-195.
5

Friedrich der Grosse, "Der Antimachiavell

,

"

in

Die Werke Friedrichs des Crossen in deutscher Ubersetzu ng,
10 vols.,

ed. Gustav Berthold Volz

(Berlin: Verlag

6
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von Reimar Hobbing,
1913-1914), vol.
6

Ibid.

,

p.

pp.

Ibid.

3rd ed

(Heidelberg: Quelle

.

,

pp.

1LFriedrich
.

74-91.

_

.

der Grosse,

von 1752," in Werke, vol
12

.

.

p.

373.

"Das politische Testament

7,

p.

154.

Friedrich der Grosse, "Geheime Instruktion

Kabinettsminister Graf Finckenstein
,

Meyer,

&

81-82.

Memecke, Die Idee der Staatsrason

Werke

lm

Gerhard Ritter, F^iedrj
£ h_der_^ro^

,

9

.

2

^prisches_Pro^
1954)

p

Ibid

7

8

7,

,

fiir

den

10 Januar 1757," in

vol. 7, pp. 281-282.

13„

Der Antimachiavell,

chap. 25, pp. 101-107.

"

For a concise summary of the Peace of Westphalia
and the importance of the Thirty Years

V?ar

for interna-

tional relations, see S.H. Steinberg, The Thirty Years'

War and the Conflict for European Hegemony, 1600-1660
(New York: W.W. Norton
15
1

&

Co.,

1966).

"Der Antimachiavell," chap.

Hans Speier,

14,

pp.

55-59.

"Militarism in the Eighteenth

Century," Social Research

3

(August 1936): 304-336.

8
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17

Carl von Clausewitz

,

On_War, ed. and trans.
Michael

Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton: Princeton University
^ess, 1976), bk 8 chap
3B§ pp> 585 _ 594
.

,

.

;

C° rViSer

^^

^i£s_J>nA

'

^

trans. Abigail T. Siddall
(Bloomington and London:
Indiana University »ress,
1979); Delbruck, Geschichte

^-^^S^^

Howard, War in

European Histo rv; McNeill,
I^l£_Pursii it^f^^pwer
222;

R.p. Palmerf

,

pp.

63-

"Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bulow:

From Dynastic to National War,"
in Makers of Modern
Strategy ed Earle, pp. 49-74; and
Hew Strachan,
,

.

European Armies and the Conduct of War
(London: George
Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 1-75.
1

Nef

19

.

War and Human Progress

/

,

.

Friedrich der Grosse,

p.

91.

,
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they are restricted, are
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Soviet SS-18 missiles.
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are political lines that continue throughout
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